Thank you Chair and thanks to Ambassador de Klerk for his interesting and useful presentation.

Ireland welcomes all efforts aimed at providing greater security and transparency with regard to the risks relating to currently existing nuclear weapons arsenals, pending their prohibition and elimination.

Our discussions in February, which the Chair has reflected so well in his synthesis paper, stressed the importance and the need for greater transparency regarding nuclear arsenals and the need to safeguard them. Providing this information, as Ambassador de Klerk mentioned, would, in itself provide an important confidence building measure at a time when trust and confidence between the nuclear weapons possessor States is worryingly lacking.

While acknowledging that some nuclear weapon States are providing considerably more information and transparency than others, the levels of information provided remains insufficient and uneven. Adoption of the common reporting template already developed and proposed by the NPDI would encourage best practice and ensure that all Nuclear Weapon States provide the same and better levels of information. Ireland welcomes and supports the important and useful proposals made by Japan on this question.

While complying with, building on, and expanding on the reporting commitments already undertaken by the Nuclear Weapon States in the context of the NPT was one option shared by those who spoke on this theme in February, another useful recommendation made by many States related to the possibility of developing measures on transparency which could be adopted also by those Nuclear Armed States who are outside the NPT. Ireland supports such calls and looks forward to full engagement with the Nuclear Weapon Possessor States on this important issue. We believe this should be one of the key out-workings of this OEWG, leading to clear and concrete recommendations in the Final Report.

Ireland also welcomes the comments made by Sweden, and others, stressing the crucial role of the CTBT with regard to verification and implementation of the ban on nuclear testing. Ireland would like to mention in this regard our strong support for the CTBT and our hope that the discussions and the outcome of this OEWG will be a renewed impetus and provide a further incentive for its entry into force.

Next week in Dublin, the 2016 National Data Centre Workshop is being organised by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO, the Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies, and the Government of Ireland. The workshop will focus on the ability of national data centres to carry out their verification activities, including their ability to access IMS data and IDC products, as well as data sharing among the centres.
Finally, I would like to ask Ambassador de Klerk some questions regarding verification technologies, and in particular, whether these could be used to assure States that, if a nuclear weapon were to be detonated, would it be possible to ascertain who was the responsible party? In this regard Ireland wonders if verification technologies could play a role in insurance for third party liabilities with nuclear weapons, as with the requirements for nuclear safety in the civil sector.

Thank you Chairman.