An Roinn Gnóthaí Eachtracha
Department of Foreign Affairs

Formative Evaluation of the Programme Grant II (2017–2021) and Humanitarian Programme Plan (2019-2021)

FINAL REPORT

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABW	A Better World
CSDEU	DFAT Civil Society and Development Education Unit
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DCAD	Development Cooperation and Africa Division
DFA	Irish Aid Department of Foreign Affairs
DfID	UK Department for International Development
EAU	Evaluation and Audit Unit
EO	Executive Officer
ERFS	Emergency Response Funding Scheme
ET	Evaluation Team
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FINNIDA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland
GBV	Gender Based Violence
HEO	Higher Executive Officer
HPP	Humanitarian Programme Plan (2019-2021)
HU	DFAT Humanitarian Unit
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAPS	Multi-Annual Programme Scheme
MEAL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OWOF	One World, One Future
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PGI	Programme Grant I
PGII	Programme Grant II (2017–2021)
PU	DFAT Policy Unit
RAM	Resource Allocation Model
RBF	Results Based Framework
RBM	Results Based Management
RMNCH	Reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

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Executive Summary

Introduction

The Programme Grant II (PGII, 2017-2021) and Humanitarian Programme Plan (HPP, 2019-2021) are the Department for Foreign Affairs' (DFA) multi-annual funding mechanisms for civil society organisations (CSOs) working in development and humanitarian contexts.

This formative evaluation is an independent assessment of the PGII and HPP mechanisms and their ability to deliver on the policy commitments detailed in 'A Better World' (ABW, 2019) and 'One World, One Future' (OWOF, 2013). Out of the 14 CSO partners, seven receive PGII funding alone while six receive both PGII and HPP funding.

Since 2018, one CSO has received funding from a blended model that draws from a combination of the PGII and HPP. In total, an estimated €392 million will have been provided to CSOs over the 2017-2021 grant period, 70% of this funding was provided by the PGII, 20% the HPP, and 10% the 'blended' model (see table below).

PGII and HPP Total Programme Expenditure 2017-2021

	2017	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021***	**Expected 5-Yr Total**
PGII Total Programme Expenditure	€ 52,930,000	€ 52,930,000	€ 54,930,000	€ 54,930,000	€ 54,930,000	€ 270,650,000
HPP Total Programme Expenditure	€ 14,000,000	€ 14,000,000	€ 15,800,000	€ 15,800,000	€ 15,800,000	€ 75,400,000
Blended PGII/HPP Total Expenditure	€ 9,000,000	€ 9,278,000	€ 9,278,000	€ 9,278,000	€ 9,278,000	€ 46,112,000
Overall Programme Expenditure	€ 75,930,000	€ 76,208,000	€ 80,008,000	€ 80,008,000	€ 80,008,000	€ 392,162,000

*Proposed/expected subject to possible changes to annual budgets

Focus and Purpose of the Evaluation

As it is formative, the main focus of this particular evaluation is to inform lesson learning – in contrast, the overall results of the funding mechanisms will be the focus of a summative evaluation which will be commissioned at later date, drawing on programme evaluations at CSO level.

The evaluation was conducted to provide DFA stakeholders with findings, conclusions and recommendations that inform the design of Ireland's next CSO humanitarian-development funding mechanism(s). The Evaluation Team worked closely with the DFA Evaluation and Audit Unit (EAU) team throughout the evaluation process, including in the development of the evaluation methodology, data collection and the validation of findings.

Approach and Methods

The evaluation focused on five key evaluation questions:

- How effective is the programme grant model, as set out by PGII and HPP, as a means of achieving DFA's policy objectives in partnership with CSOs?
- How efficient and effective are the Department's processes for determining the eligibility of organisations up to and including approval of partners?
- To what extent are the Department's consequential management arrangements (PGII and HPP) appropriate for the range of organisations supported?
- Are the PGII and HPP Theories of Change relevant and coherent?
- What if any changes are needed in future programme design?

The evaluation team adopted an iterative mixed methods approach, employing a range of qualitative and quantitative methods across a sample of nine countries to enable ongoing analysis, triangulation and validation of findings. Over and above a target sample of five CSOs, the evaluation engaged stakeholders from all CSOs in receipt of PGII and HPP funding, as well as three CSOs receiving funds from other DFA grant mechanisms.

Due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the evaluation was conducted entirely on a remote basis. The evaluation team compensated for the lack of in-person data collection by expanding the sample of CSOs and countries originally envisioned in the Terms of Reference. In total, the evaluation team spoke with 183 stakeholders through interviews and workshops, including representatives from DFA, CSOs, bilateral donors and Dóchas members.

The rest of this executive summary sets out the conclusions and recommendations, which themselves draw on analysis and the more detailed findings set out in the main report.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion: Strategic Ambition

The evaluation found a key advantage of the programme partnership arrangement was the balance achieved between CSO autonomy and accountability. DFA has provided CSOs with the flexibility to prioritise the strategic areas they work on according to their own mandate and strategic focus. At the same time, CSOs were required to provide robust evidence that their programming is contributing to DFA's strategic ambitions. This allowed the CSOs to leverage their own experience and comparative advantages when designing and implementing their programming. It also reflected well against the Department's global policy ambition of providing predictable and flexible funding that holistically addresses humanitarian, development and where relevant, peacebuilding needs.

A drawback of DFA's relatively non-prescriptive approach to CSO policy alignment was the mixed levels of policy engagement across CSO partners. While examples of policy collaboration could be identified – including dialogues on Gender, Safeguarding and Protection supported by Dóchas, and collaboration with individual CSOs in areas such as scaling up nutrition – the evaluation found no systematic or structured process by which the Department set about clearly identifying, agreeing and engaging CSOs in areas of comment policy interest. An indirect result of this was that policy collaboration tended to be reactive rather than proactive, leading to CSOs with greater resources being better able to engage with the Department in policy discussions than some other CSOs.

The current approach of letting CSOs drive their own areas of policy, programming and geographical focus allows them to leverage their strategic capacities and comparative advantage, whilst also aligning with DFA's overarching policy goals and should be retained.

Recommendations: Strategic Ambition

Recommendation 1:

The Department should seek to more clearly expand upon the potential value added of the funding and its strategic policy intent.

This includes the areas where it will look for future CSO collaboration in support of 'A Better World', DFA's role in broadening the Irish civil society base for international development, and the ways in which it will systematically promote policy discussion and collaboration with CSOs.

Recommendation 2:

DFA should revisit its strategic framework and ambitions for future funding with respect to Global Island / Global Ireland / A Better World, as well as the Civil Society Policy to examine its potential role in supporting Irish civil society.

This should include a review of opportunities to:

- Develop a more systematic and structured approach to CSO policy discussions which are tailored to the potentially unique added value for each partnership;
- Support closer country level CSO-Mission relationships by improving internal communications of future PGII and HPP programmes to Missions to support their country level engagement of CSO partners on specific policy issues;
- Renew DFA's Civil Society Policy ambitions by establishing clearer bilateral expectations for CSOs with respect to their support for localisation.

Collectively, it will be important for the Department to communicate these high-level ambitions to its current and potential new partners in order to set the expectations of future applicants and partners, and to DFA itself.

Conclusion: DFA Partnership Approach

CSO Irish offices hold significant responsibility for the oversight of PGII and HPP grant management requirements. As a result of this along with the organisational oversight it has of the CSOs, DFA relies on the internal capacities and systems of its partners. There is strong evidence that this arrangement largely supports efficient and effective CSO grant management; builds strong internal coherence between CSO headquarters8, country and field offices; and supports high levels of trust with most CSOs.

The evaluation also found evidence that DFA provide increasing support to CSOs on governance, safeguarding, financial management, and risk management. This approach is appropriate to the way both DFA and its CSO partners aim to work and supports continuing CSO autonomy. However, DFA does not clearly differentiate between grant and partner management. This has at times led to an

over-emphasis on grant management processes such as contract compliance and fund disbursements at the cost of wider CSO engagement.

Recommendations: DFA Partnership Approach

When considering partner management, a more nuanced approach is needed, aimed at identifying the different strengths and weaknesses of each CSO and the subsequent focus of DFA oversight for each. DFA can look to build effective partnerships with the CSOs on the basis of the existing relationships and the current 'comply or explain' dynamic that contributes to, and may at times challenge, the extensive decision-making space given to CSOs. To improve the conditions for this relationship:

Recommendation 3:

DFA should consider unpacking its approach to CSO partnerships and the levels of trust and autonomy it is willing to provide to the partner and clearly delineate the expected contributions of both the Department and the CSO.

Recommendation 4:

DFA should also consider,

Breaking down each CSO's individual partnership to agree the core expectations of the DFA-CSO relationship at the grant agreement phase.

Working strategically with each CSO partner in relation to its individual strengths, weaknesses, comparative advantages and potential value-added contributions.

This should include agreement as to the key areas (including both programmatic and organisational areas) against which each CSO will be assessed; identification of the specific policy or other areas of value addition that DFA will seek to collaborate with each partner; and the formal and informal basis of the Department's annual review of its CSO partners.

Conclusion: Funding Model

The evaluation considers the three PGII, HPP and 'blended' funding models, as well as funding for development education and public engagement to be relevant to both the Department's and its CSO partners' strategic ambitions.

There is clear evidence of the continuing relevance of the PGII to a changing development landscape. Through it, DFA has shown support to donor commitments for a more coherent approach to programming, involving appropriate, flexible and predictable funding to CSOs. DFA's partners have designed programmes based on context analyses as well as their core strengths and have been allowed to adapt their programmes to changes in context. There is evidence of CSO engagement at micro, meso, macro and global levels and the strengthening of inter-linkages including through the capacity strengthening of civil society and government. Nevertheless, in areas

such as localisation,[1] where support to the civil society space in developing countries is a clear policy priority, there is a legitimate role for DFA to engage with its CSO partners in ways that encourage a more robust programming approach.

As a distinct funding model, the HPP ensures that CSOs maintain their humanitarian response capacities and ability to 'surge' (including with ERFS funding) whilst also targeting longer-term resilience building in protracted crises. This is a highly strategic approach to humanitarian partnerships that aligns with the ambitions of the HPP whilst allowing CSOs to work to their core strengths. In the provision of HPP funding, DFA has rightly avoided trying to define what a 'nexus' or other relevant programming approach might be, thereby allowing CSOs to design and implement programmes tailored appropriately to their specific contexts of intervention.

There is strong evidence the blended funding model has worked well for Goal, who applied it flexibly across the humanitarian-development nexus. DFA emphasis on partner management surrounding the pilot was appropriate and should be considered more broadly as a model of engaging all its CSO partners. While the evaluation team is supportive of the blended pilot for programmes in the nexus space, it may not be an appropriate mechanism for all CSOs such as those in the PGII who welcomed the current flexibility of the funding model.

A large majority of DFA and CSO stakeholders consider good practice to include efforts to enhance the capacities and engagement of local communities, civil society partners and government structures in delivering and sustaining programme outcomes. This ambition on localisation aligns with DFA policy priorities and can be applied to all but the most acute humanitarian emergencies. The Evaluation Team consider this strategic approach to partner engagement to warrant more focused support in future both with respect to individual CSOs and the expectations of the grant portfolio as a whole.

Recommendations: Funding Model

Recommendation 5:

a. **Given the distinct emergency response, resilience/nexus, development and public engagement contexts and CSO contributions in the portfolio, the combination of PGII – HPP – ERFS funding models should be retained.**
b. **Consideration should be given to delineating the funding mechanisms in four separate 'Lots,' that focus on funding DEVelopment (current PGII), CHRonic crises (current HPP), ACUte crises (current ERFS), and PUBlic support (including development education and public engagement).**

These four lots can be managed through a single call for applications with CSOs applying to each lot in accordance with their own strategic ambitions and capacities. To strengthen localisation, DFA should also consider reviewing the extent to which individual CSOs are looking to extend their work through local partners, community groups and government institutions as part of future funding agreements.

Given the potential shift of the blended model into this portfolio, consideration should be given to expanding the CHRonic crises (HPP) lot. Because of the specific requirements, context and need to

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[1] Localisation circumscribes a range of processes that collectively aim to ensure local actors (citizens, authorities, civil society, private sector) play a greater, more central role in determining, pursuing and reviewing humanitarian and development activities and outcomes.

understand the humanitarian capacities, linkages to the ACUte crises (Emergency Response Funding Scheme) fund should remain a sub-component of the CHRonic crises (HPP) portfolio, open only to CHRonic crisis grant recipients and management should remain in the Humanitarian Unit.

Recommendation 6:

The existing rules for CSO eligibility for the CHRonic crises (HPP) lot should be reviewed to allow more CSOs the option to apply by evidencing their humanitarian capacities and experience.

Assessment scores and fund allocations using the Resource Allocation Model for CSO applications to the PUB funding lot should be separated from other funding lots (DEV, CHR, ACU).

The two areas of formal and informal development education and public engagement are important for building global citizenship, participation and support for development in Ireland. Revisions to the funding approach have been captured in recent global citizenship discussions in the department that can be built on in 2021. This can be used to support future partnerships in this area that add significant value to DFA's programme funding.

Recommendation 7:

The Evaluation Team recommend that it is appropriate for development education and public engagement ('global citizenship') to remain integral components of DFA's programme funding portfolio.

Improving the focus on development education and public engagement to a consistent level with other policy areas is a key theme in this evaluation, which needs to be underpinned in the funding decision. To this end:

Recommendation 8:

a. **CSOs wishing to apply for PUB funding should demonstrate specific competencies, reach and experience in development education and public engagement as is required in the other areas.**
b. **Given the specific nature of development education and public engagement programming, and its Irish focus, a dedicated manager and team should continue to oversee the area with strong development education and communications focus.**
c. **DFA should look to visualise the activities that fall under public engagement and development education to provide CSOs with a clearer definition and guidance on the two work areas.**

Conclusion: Application Process

Eligibility, application, fund allocation, programme of work, MOU and contracting business processes allowed DFA to negotiate comprehensive partnership agreements with each CSO based on clear and transparent analysis of CSO strengths and weaknesses. The PGII and HPP grant structures and eligibility processes were appropriate and efficient and enabled DFA to identify and support effective partners with suitable levels of organisational capacity. The application process provided a platform for CSOs to present, and DFA to effectively assess, core expectations of PGII and HPP applications.

While the invitation to join the HPP did not explicitly require CSOs to meet the Core Humanitarian Standards, their past experience of working in the humanitarian sphere and ability to pass the PGII eligibility requirements were an efficient means of managing risks. However, consideration could have been given to opening up HPP applications to CSOs based on their demonstrable capacities, experience and ability to describe their approach to working across the humanitarian-development nexus. In addition, while the one-stage application process and Resource Allocation Model was efficient and provided a level playing field for applications, it was difficult for new CSO entrants and organisations with limited resources to apply.

Recommendations: Application Process

Recommendation 9:

CSOs should be able to apply for each of the four funding Lots in line with their context analysis, reach, capacity and experience. CSOs should also be invited (without obligations) to propose a shortlist of policy areas they will look to collaborate on with DFA during the funding cycle in line with their own strategic aspirations.

While the process will allow the Department to identify areas where policy collaboration is possible, care should be taken to ensure the continued independence of CSOs to set their own policy agendas. Consideration should also be given to requesting CSOs to identify potential areas of policy coherence with DFA's Mission strategies in target countries where operations overlap.

All CSOs should be able to describe how their strategic ambitions will be supported by their organisational plans for developing compliance and risk management systems and strengthening organisational capacities.

Recommendation 10:

a. **Any future application process should include the assessment of CSO organisational capacities as part of the indicative fund allocation.**
b. **DFA should consider factoring in wider knowledge of potential CSO partners in partner assessments and RAM calculations including organisational capacity elements and the results of CSO bilateral reviews, internal and independent evaluations.**

Recommendation 11:

DFA should explore a two-level approach to support smaller CSOs and new entrants:

a. **For CSOs that pass through the first application round, consider providing a tailored pathway in which DFA and the CSO undertake a technical review of capacities and identify required areas of organisational development before progressing to the next stage of the process.**
b. **In addition, consider a 5-year 'midway' or 'bridging' process that targets support to potential future Irish CSO 'pre-PG' grant applicants.**

The aim of the bridging grant would be to help potential applicants to review and build their compliance, programming and risk systems, capacities, policies and standards in order to build their ability to apply in a future funding round.

Conclusion: Grant Management Systems

The combination of results-based processes and PCM guidelines provided effective and efficient management support for the PGII and HPP grant programmes. Their interpretation and use by DFA partner managers and directors was sufficiently flexible to allow CSO partners to manage results frameworks in ways that supported innovation and the ability to adapt to contextual changes; including climate events, the COVID-19 pandemic, displacements and insecurity.

Introduction of the Strategic Approach to Grant Management (SAGM) was comparatively less efficient in supporting grant management, due to its overlay of existing CSDEU and HU grant management processes. For some CSOs delays in the annual disbursement of PGII funds led to the transfer of risk by DFA grant recipients to local partners and interruptions to field programmes. Given the department's annual budgetary cycle, it is important that DFA agree the mechanisms by which its CSO partners will avoid stop-start programme delivery in future.

Capacity limitations within the Department meant that there were cases in which feedback and other preparation for bilateral processes was late and where there tended to be too much focus on compliance and the release of funds, rather than partnership support for CSOs. For example, more could have been done to build on the policy and programme learning of CSOs and their potential strategic contributions to DFA's own policy objectives, and to adopt a more systematic approach to DFA-CSO policy collaboration.

Recommendations: Grant Management Systems

The extension to current PGII and HPP funding implemented due to COVID-19 provides an opportunity for DFA to update its grant management systems to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of future partner management arrangements. The following 3 recommendations make a number of specific suggestions to achieve this.

Recommendation 12:

Regarding internal use of its grant management systems, DFA should

a. **Consider bringing forward the release of funds, in line with the 5-year funding agreement allowing the 70% disbursement of funds in January with adjustments made in March.**
b. **Incorporate into the revised PCM guidelines the specific requirements and guidance for any future revised funding area or 'Lot'.**

Recommendation 13:

Regarding DFA-CSO bilateral grant management processes:

a. **An annual report page limit should be agreed commensurate with the scope of each CSO's grant arrangement.**
b. **A structured grant management timeline should be adopted that avoids delays preparing for, and providing feedback from, bilateral meetings with CSOs.**
c. **The focus of bilateral meetings should be reviewed to ensure policy, programming, compliance and risk, and capacity are covered. If necessary, programme, policy and public support discussions should be separated from organisational development and compliance engagements.**

Recommendation 14:

To support multilateral DFA-CSO and CSO-CSO collaboration, DFA should:

a. **Ensure that DFA's systematic communications provide DFA Missions and geographic desks with a breakdown of CSO budgets by country and by theme, and DFA policy users with a summary of CSO policy focus areas.**
b. **Clarify the purpose of monitoring visits on a case-by-case basis to either assess CSO performance and exercise oversight or help DFA strengthen its CSO relationships and support for future collaboration.**
c. **Consider adopting light-touch CSO visit models to supplement monitoring visits, such as country level, multi-partner visits and less formal visits accompanying CSO monitoring leads should also be considered.**

Conclusion: Capacities and Teaming

Although DFA is largely in a position to engage effectively with its different CSO partners, the management of staff rotation, demands on staff including high workloads have stretched the available capacity and led to inconsistency in approaches to partner management. Some recent improvements were noted in bilateral relationship management. CSO counterparts also appreciated the close engagement of DFA in agreeing common safeguarding standards through Dóchas and positive support for their COVID-19 response. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the frequency of rotation – inherent in a foreign ministry - and general civil service recruitment policies, some partner managers came into the unit with insufficient experience of international development or CSO governance and untrained in the use of results frameworks. New staff are expected to immediately step into the role of partner manager. This was exacerbated in the period 2008 to 2018 when Government spending cuts lead to staff shortages in DCAD, stretching partner managers further. This may leave DFA exposed to risk. The complexities of CSO partner management across governance, organisational, programmatic and policy dimensions need to be fully grasped, including at senior levels of the Department. Looking ahead the evaluation team considers it essential for DFA to ensure it has the entirety of partner management capacities in place for effective CSO oversight.

Recommendations: Capacities and Teaming

The Department requires a clearer articulation of the required competencies for partner and grant management. This should be clearly integrated in its workforce planning to ensure staff rotation does not lead to the recurrence of capacity gaps for partner oversight. To this end,

Recommendation 15:

DFA should consider an appraisal of its internal structures for partner management as part of the DCAD Management Review to ensure it has the appropriate capacities, skills and management arrangements in place to oversee all types of CSO.

Core competencies include areas such as financial controls, risk management and governance. The review should therefore seek to identify the required skillsets and resources needed for a more tailored approach to partner management. The Department could use this analysis to develop a training plan; better use the existing capacities in CSDEU and HU to cover its partner oversight

requirements; and continue to build its understanding of CSO systems and capacities through governance reviews.

Recommendation 16:

A 'Teaming' arrangement organised in a civil society 'sub-unit' should be explored, aimed at ensuring a range of organisational and programmatic skills is always available and some continuity is retained for CSO partners and the Department as staff members rotate.

The 'sub-unit' could integrate CSDEU and HU partner managers with each team managing clusters of similar CSO partners. Each team would contain a senior lead and administrator and would be able to call on both development and humanitarian expertise/knowledge as well as specialists from other units across the Department on a case-by-case basis. Dedicated humanitarian and development education, public engagement and communications capacity would be kept to ensure appropriate oversight in these areas. The competency requirements and role-specific responsibilities in the teams should be continually assessed according to the CSO portfolio and staff rotation. In support of this, consideration should also be given to engaging an external service provider to support workforce planning and/or capacity strengthening and ongoing support to partner managers.

Conclusion: Compliance, Efficiency and Risk Management

The introduction of CSO governance reviews and support to organisational development has led to signs of improvement in the compliance systems of some partners, and potentially, to their long-term programme and risk management performance. The convergence of management and administrative support between CSDEU and HU has also led to improvements in partner management and understanding of CSO work that should be further built on. However, inefficiencies remain in the duplication of PGII and HPP grant management processes that could be better integrated.

DFA's risk appetite recognises and supports the 'autonomous CSO' approach to its PGII and HPP partnerships. DFA compliance arrangements largely operate through CSOs' own systems and thereby dovetail, to some extent, to their accountabilities to Ireland's Charity Regulator as well as to DFA's control environment as overseen by the PCM guidelines and SAGM. The approach also appears to have led to high levels of CSO autonomy, trust and commitment to improving organisational and programme outcomes. The evaluation found that it is appropriate that DFA requires its humanitarian-nexus partners to have the capacities and knowledge to respond to emergencies and meet the Core Humanitarian Standards. By and large, most CSOs were highly tuned to DFA's appetite for risk.

However, while DFA has largely ensured the required systems are in place for CSO oversight, this has been held back by capacity limitations that have led to a primary focus on contract compliance. Given the reliance on internal CSO risk management systems it is essential for DFA to consistently track CSO governance arrangements and agree areas of weakness and capacity investment with its grant partners. To this end it is important for partner managers to understand how CSO governance works and to be able to commit to a range of financial and technical interaction.

Recommendation: Risk Management

Recommendation 17:

DFA's approach to CSO risk management should should continue to be mediated through its CSO partners' own organisational structures, processes and self-managed decentralised country teams.

In addition, and as part of maintaining the effectiveness of CSO risk oversight systems, the Department should,

a. Build its own internal understanding of how CSOs work and how they respond to the Irish regulatory environment in order to avoid duplicating processes covered by the Charity Regulator.
b. Expand use of governance reviews to assess CSOs internal compliance and risk systems and capacities.
c. Consider focusing investment support for CSOs with weaker compliance and risk standards into organisational capacity strengthening objectives.

Conclusion: Theory of Change

The current PGII theory of change provides an overview of DFA's strategic grant support to CSOs including DFA's grant management inputs, and the range and scope of CSO programme contributions. Stronger areas of performance identified by the evaluation included DFA's provision of funding for CSO humanitarian and development programmes, CSO targeting of vulnerable populations and use of context analyses, CSO micro to macro linkages, and the effectiveness of RBM systems supported by the PGII.

The evaluation considered to what extent the Theory of Change was able to circumscribe a coherent approach to partner management and was used as a framework to pool CSO strategic and policy contributions. Unfortunately, capacity limitations within the Department and the absence of a systematic process were found to have been a barrier to this.

Recommendations: Theory of Change

Building on this conclusion, there is an important opportunity to shift the Department's use of the Theory of Change to help better integrate the full range of individual and collective organisational, programmatic and policy outcomes that DFA funding supports.

Recommendation 18:

DFA should consider updating the Theory of Change to include an understanding of how CSOs set their expected policy and programme contributions to ABW, and how they seek to improve their effectiveness as organisations.

This needs to be done in a way which keeps roles clear and avoids any tendency toward 'capturing' the civil society sector or the strategic focus of CSOs, which is their responsibility. A revised Theory of Change would then be the basis of CSO consultation, applications, partnership and policy collaboration in the lead up to, and implementation of, a future grant cycle and provide the basis for future evaluations. This partnership-based Theory of Change would use an overarching structure to 'nest' CSO-led changes across the portfolio. This should consider combining 'A Better World' outcomes, CSO outputs, CSO inputs, DFA inputs and DFA grant purpose.

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Introduction

Evaluation purpose and scope

Following a request for Tender from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, IOD PARC was invited to undertake a formative evaluation of the Programme Grant II (PGII) and Humanitarian Programme Plan (HPP) of the Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFA or 'Department').

The purpose of this formative evaluation is to provide DFA with an independent, evidence-based assessment of the PGII and HPP funding mechanisms and assess whether the funding mechanisms are fit for purpose to deliver on the policy commitments as laid out in 'One World, One Future' (OWOF, 2013) and 'A Better World' (ABW, 2019). This will allow future humanitarian and development programme funding of civil society to build on learning of what has worked well, less well or could work better across the different elements of the PGII and HPP grant mechanisms.

This evaluation will feed into the design of a new funding round planned for 2023. It has examined whether the Programmes are being implemented as intended and if changes are needed in the design of future programmes. This included assessment of the challenges and opportunities for the possible integration of the PGII and HPP mechanisms. This evaluation also explores the management of the PGII and HPP grant programmes and their implementation by partners. It does not assess the effectiveness of CSO programmes. This will be the subject of individual evaluations to be commissioned by each CSO partner which will feed in turn into a summative evaluation assessing the overall effectiveness of the programmes to be contracted by DFA in 2021. Further learning will be supported by a concurrent audit of internal controls on Programme Grant and Civil Society Fund budget lines in the Development Cooperation and Africa Division (DCAD), and a review of development education and public engagement contributions to active citizenship that are ongoing.

Evaluation audience

The primary audiences for the evaluation include DFA senior management, and the directors and staff of the Humanitarian, Civil Society and Development Education and Policy Units (HU, CSDEU, and Policy Unit respectively) who will use the evaluation findings to inform the design of the next CSO humanitarian-development funding mechanism(s).

The secondary audience includes Irish based CSOs in receipt of PGII and HPP funds or interested in applying for future support who wish to build their understanding of what has worked well and less well in terms of the grant design, award, management and policy support processes.

Tertiary audiences include the Irish public and Government, interested in how well the grant mechanisms are working and the ways in which tax revenue is spent, as well as bilateral donors looking to learn from DFA's experiences managing both grant mechanisms.

Evaluation Context

The PGII was introduced by DFA in 2017 to provide long-term, predictable and strategic funding to civil society organisations (CSOs) over the period to 2017 to 2021. It replaced the earlier PGI grant mechanism that operated from 2013 to 2017. Both programme grants aimed to build on learning from the Multi-Annual Programme Schemes (MAPS I and II) that were overseen by the Department over the period 2003 to 2012.

The HPP was introduced in 2009. Originally running parallel to the MAPS and PG mechanisms, in 2017 the HPP shifted from an annual to a multi-annual funding cycle to bring it into line with the PGII timeline with both mechanisms due to end in 2022.[2]

PGII and HPP were designed, launched, and managed against a backdrop of important shifts in global policy, as well as policies specific to Ireland's Development Cooperation Programme. These shifts have had a bearing on DFA's approach to international development and humanitarian assistance, the grant management mechanisms, and on DFA relationships with its CSO partners. The COVID-19 pandemic that arrived in the latter stages of the grant cycle has also had an impact on grant management arrangements, as well as testing the flexibility and adaptiveness of the management mechanisms.

Global policy shifts

The general global trend in international development and humanitarian assistance is towards a more harmonised and coherent approach to strategy, programming, partnerships and funding models. Several recent policies and agreements highlight this trend, with Ireland often at the forefront of these discussions across diplomatic, donor and CSO spheres. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, or 'Agenda 2030,' was adopted in 2015 with the goal of ending poverty and hunger, reducing inequalities, and promoting human rights and gender equality.

As part of Agenda 2030, all 193 UN member states adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. Ireland co-chaired intergovernmental negotiations with Kenya to agree and finalise these Goals, bringing together UN member states, civil society and the private sector through both formal negotiating sessions and informal consultation discussions. The 17 SDGs were agreed, together with the 5 'Ps' of Agenda 2030 - People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership.

In 2016, the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) launched the 'Grand Bargain' which sought to find solutions to address the humanitarian financing gap and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian response by improving funding mechanisms, empowering local actors, and supporting the UN cluster approach. The work streams of the Grand Bargain set out to achieve this by increasing flexible multi-year planning and funding, reducing the earmarking of donor funding and strengthening engagement between humanitarian and development actors, as well as by including people receiving aid in decision-making processes.

The WHS placed increased focus on the localisation agenda that centres on strengthening the capacity of local and national actors by decentralising resources, decision-making and capacity strengthening to developing countries. The WHS also aims to achieve a "New Way of Working" among United Nation's (UN) agencies by which the agencies work together towards more integrated humanitarian

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[2] Originally the Grant period was due to end in 2021 but was extended by a year due to COVID-19.

and development outcomes. With climate change increasingly impacting on humanitarian and development contexts, a key part of the New Way of Working has been a focus on the "triple nexus" that seeks to build interlinkages between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding operations, and by which the international community seeks to align short-term humanitarian support with the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development.[3]

Ireland's policy shifts

Ireland's engagement with these global processes has informed the framing of its development policies and humanitarian and development programmes (Figure 1 overleaf) including the shift from the 2015 White Paper 'One World, One Future (2013) to 'A Better World' in (2019). The Framework for Action for OWOF set out three broad goals of reduced hunger, stronger resilience; sustainable development, inclusive economic growth; and better governance, human rights and accountability.[4] These themes continued into A Better World which seeks to operationalise the three corresponding Leadership Areas of People, Food and Protection through the strategies that address gender equality, reducing humanitarian need, climate action and strengthening governance.[5]

A Better World incorporates all three elements of the triple nexus, building on Ireland's commitment to peacebuilding and practical approach to development and humanitarian funding. It pledges support to collective responses to emerging and protracted crises and the provision of flexible and timely funding underpinned by humanitarian principles. Climate action is included as one of the key pillars, committing to 'future proof' development cooperation by integrating climate action in all of Ireland's work and scaling up allocations to climate action interventions.[6] Similarly, gender equality is both an "objective for and driver of sustainable development" for A Better World,[7] through which Ireland has committed to scaling up gender-mainstreaming through its foreign policy and programme interventions including committing to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Each of these priorities are underpinned by efforts to strengthen governance for the resolution of conflict, responding to shocks, enabling economic activity and allocating and targeting resources for social development.

As signatory to the WHS, there has also been a move towards aligning DFA policies and funding, including the PGII and HPP, to the objectives of the Grand Bargain including improving the quality of funding, increasing multi-annual funding to partners, and ensuring its predictable and timely fund disbursement.[8] Further examination of DFA policies is provided under Evaluation Question 1 (EQ1).

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[3] The triple nexus combines commitments to integrate peacebuilding, humanitarian and development support including in contexts facing protracted crises.

[4] Although DFA's Framework for Action (2014), provided a management instrument to guide policy and programming decisions it was valid to 2017 and was not updated as a means of assessing DFA funding during the evaluation period.

[5] Government of Ireland, 2019. A Better World: Ireland's Policy for International Development

[6] A Better World, p. 19

[7] A Better World, p. 15

[8] Grand Bargain in 2019: Ireland's Annual Self Report

Figure 1: PGII and HPP Policy and Programme Cycle Timeline 2005 – 2021

DFA Evaluation and Audit Unit, 2020

DFA development mechanisms

Since 2013, Ireland has consistently topped the Principled Aid Index of 29 OECD-DAC donors, which highlights the degree to which donors use official development assistance, 'addressing critical needs and vulnerabilities, investing in global institutions and challenges, and committing to public spirited behaviours that do not instrumentalise aid for narrow, short-term nationally-driven gain'.[9] The May 2020 OECD-DAC peer review of Ireland's development cooperation also provided a positive assessment of Ireland's performance,[10] having found Ireland's partnerships with civil society to be characterised by open dialogue and quality funding that was flexible, especially for humanitarian assistance, and that positive efforts had been made to address the triple nexus. This includes Mission level strategies that were found to increasingly support international and national CSOs toward common national goals. The Peer Review also found Ireland's commitment to strengthening multilateralism to span the triple nexus involving 'significant voluntary core funding and the use of multi-donor pooled funds'.[11] Collectively, these global development efforts were a crucial underpinning to Ireland's recent successful bid for a seat on the UN Security Council.

DFA grant management

Total overseas aid spending by the Irish government has increased over the evaluation period and is expected to continue to rise from €838 to €868 million between 2020 and 2021. While this will be the seventh year in a row that the allocation to overseas aid has increased, since 2015 Ireland's Overseas Development Assistance to Gross National Income (GNI) ratio has remained at around 0.31 percent in contrast to its commitment to meet the United Nations target of allocating 0.7 percent of GNI by 2030.[12]

Managed by the Civil Society and Development Education Unit (CSDEU) in the Development Cooperation and Africa Division (DCAD), the PGII is Ireland's largest civil society funding mechanism designed to support long-term development programmes implemented by mainly Irish-based CSOs. Fourteen CSOs received funding through PGII.[13] Of the 14 partners, seven receive PGII funding alone and six receive both PGII and HPP funding. Managed by the Humanitarian Unit in DCAD, the HPP is DFA's main humanitarian funding mechanism for CSO partners operating in situations of protracted, predictable and recurring crises. In addition, since 2019 one CSO, has received blended PGII and HPP funding support. The PGII, HPP and blended models allocated €80 million in combined annual grants in 2020. It is expected that over €392 million will have been provided to CSOs over the 2017-2021 grant period, 70 percent of this funding for the PGII, 20 percent the HPP, and 10 percent the Blended model. CSOs can decide which countries they will operate in under the PGII and HPP.

A summary of aggregate CSO funding across countries is provided in Figure 2. All agencies within the HPP and Blended models also received funding under the Emergency Response Funding Scheme (ERFS). The ERFS provides pre-positioned funding to CSOs in need of immediate funding to mitigate sudden-onset humanitarian crises.

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[9] ODI, 2020. Principled Aid Index 2020
[10] OECD, 2020. Development Cooperation Peer Reviews: Ireland
[11] Ibid
[12] Ibid
[13] These are: Trócaire, Concern, GOAL, Gorta-Self-Help Africa, Vita, Children in Crossfire, Frontline Defenders, World Vision Ireland, Action Aid, Christian Aid Ireland, Sightsavers Ireland, Oxfam Ireland, Plan Ireland and HelpAge

A number of oversight requirements have been put in place under the Programme Cycle Management (PCM) guidelines to support the PGII and HPP. Since 2018 these have been complemented by the Standard Approach to Grant Management (SAGM) which applies across the Department. Both systems are reviewed in the review of grant management findings under EQ3.

Figure 2: Total 2020 PGII/HPP Funding by Country across CSOs

*Please note that only HPP funding is allocated in Chad, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria

The evaluation took place in the context of a recognised need in DFA that to ensure delivery of the PGII and HPP funding models, it is essential that CSO governance and administrative arrangements, including for risk and compliance management, are adequate. This demand creates an overlap with Ireland's Charity Regulator standards. In 2020, all Irish CSOs had to adhere to the Charities Governance Code introduced in 2019.[14] The Code establishes six principles of CSO governance; core standards for putting the principles into action; and sets out best practice standards for charities with high income levels, complex structures, and significant employee numbers. The review of organisational capacity for grant management in CSOs as well as DFA has therefore been a feature of this evaluation.

COVID-19 has also featured as a backdrop to the evaluation with a number of CSO partners revising their results frameworks. Due to the pandemic, a one-year extension to the grant models was agreed in 2020, extending the grant period to 2022.

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[14] Charities regulator, 2019. Charities Governance Code.

Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation focused on the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability in relation to the Programme Grant II model and Humanitarian Programme Plan. The methodology outlined here is designed to address each stage of the evaluation's intervention logic (Annex 1) which is based on the PGII Theory of Change (Annex 2) and HPP strategic guidance to CSOs. It was shared in the Inception Report and summarises the Evaluation Team's understanding of the design, outputs, outcomes, and assumptions for each phase of the PGII and HPP grant cycles. This identified the expected inputs of DFA at key stages in the grant cycle and the corresponding inputs DFA expects to receive from its CSO Grant Partners, as well as the expected contributions of the Department and CSOs. Five overarching evaluation questions were explored, drawn from the Evaluation Terms of Reference (Table 1). The Evaluation Matrix (Annex 3) maps the specific tools used across to individual evaluation questions, evaluation criteria and indicators.

Table 1: Key Evaluation Questions

EQ1	How effective is the programme grant model as set out by PGII and HPP as a means of achieving DFA's policy objectives in partnership with CSOs?
EQ2	How efficient and effective are the Department's processes for determining the eligibility of organisations up to and including approval of partners?
EQ3	To what extent are the Department's consequential management arrangements (PGII and HPP) appropriate for the range of organisations supported?
EQ4	Are the PGII and HPP Theories of Change relevant and coherent?
EQ5	What if any changes are needed in future programme design?

The evaluation adopted a **mixed-methods approach** that was iterative and systematic to enable ongoing analysis, triangulation, and validation of findings.

The data collection tools included over 90 *Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)* conducted following a semi-structured interview protocol developed by the Evaluation Team. 8 *Focus Group Discussions* (FGDs) were facilitated with different groups and focused on the analysis of stakeholder groups' perspectives to inform decisions for the planning and design of the successor to PGII and HPP. Topics related to the design, management, implementation, and flexibility of the funding mechanisms, the value-added of CSO partner contributions to DFA policy, and the quality of DFA-CSO relationships over the grant cycle. Table 2 below provides a breakdown of the number and typology of stakeholders engaged through KIIs and FGDs. The full list of Stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation is provided in Annex 4

*The **document review** spanned a range of document groups which have been listed in Annex 5. These included DFA policies, PGII and HPP programme documents, DFA meta-data, reports, and reviews, CSO reporting for sample countries, CSO budgets and comparator agency reports.

The Evaluation Team held regular ***analysis reviews*** with the Evaluation and Audit Unit of DFA to identify preliminary and emergent findings and track these as they became more consolidated. It was also supported by meetings with an Evaluation Reference Group of stakeholders internal and external to DFA at the inception, preliminary findings and final report stages. Analysis of data from KIIs, FGDs and document reviews was organised against the evaluation matrix that was coded onto MAXQDA, a

software program designed for computer-assisted qualitative and mixed methods data, allowing the Evaluation Team to continuously triangulate findings and identify gaps to be covered in subsequent stages of the evaluation.

Table 2: KIIs, FGDs and Stakeholder Workshop

Stakeholders	Number	Stakeholders
KIIs Inception Phase	16	CSDU PGII CSO Managers; HPP CSO Managers; CSDEU, HU and Policy Directors; CSDEU Development Education and Public Engagement leads; Policy Unit technical leads; Internal Audit
KIIs Evaluation Phase	74	
CSOs (In-country)	30	CSO Country Representatives from 7 CSOs[15] across 9 countries[16]
CSOs (Ireland)	16	PGII / HPP Grant Managers from all 13 CSOs
CSO non- recipient	3	3 CSO representatives who did not receive PGII or HPP
DFA (in-country)	6	Embassy Development Managers and/or Heads of Missions in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Mozambique, Vietnam and Malawi
DFA (Ireland)	16	PGII/HPP Grant managers; CSDEU Director; Humanitarian Director; Internal Audit; Development Education and Public Engagement, Policy Unit, EAU Director General
Comparator organisations	2	Civil Society Unit in Finnida, Danida
FGD Evaluation Phase	8	
DFA	5	HU and CSDEU Administrative Team, Policy Unit, CSDEU Design Team, Development Education and Public Education Team
Dóchus members	3	Results, Policy and Humanitarian Working Groups
Stakeholder Workshops	3	Reference Group (2) and Stakeholder Group (1)

Across these methods, the report narrative presents assessments of the ***strength of evidence*** behind the findings in terms of 'strong evidence' (representing evidence triangulated across multiple sources and methods) and 'evidence' (representing evidence from at least two comparator sources).

Evaluation limitations were related primarily to COVID-19 restrictions. Due to the evaluation being conducted remotely it was impossible to visit projects or explore the functioning of CSO country offices in person. While this led to a consequential loss of formal and informal country level engagement with CSO and Mission representatives, as well as an inability to hold a findings workshop with DFA staff in Dublin or Limerick, the Evaluation Team does not consider this to have compromised the evaluation process or findings. To compensate, the Evaluation Team was able to undertake KIIs, FGDs and document reviews over a significantly larger number of CSOs and countries than was envisaged in the TORs. In addition, the Evaluation Team included members with significant CSO, humanitarian-development programming and country level experience.

> *Country and CSO sample*

In order to provide the evaluation team with an insight into how effective the grant mechanisms have been in supporting CSO programming, partner on-granting, organisational investments, and CSO-mission relationships, a sample of 7 countries were originally identified in the inception period. This

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[15] CAI, Concern WW, GOAL, Oxfam I, Sightsavers, Trócaire, World Vision
[16] Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, DRC, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Haiti, Rwanda, Malawi, Uganda, Somalia

was expanded in the evaluation phase to include a further 2 countries using a purposive sampling approach to ensure the following requirements were met (Annex 6):

- Countries with a context of operation that spans the double (in some case triple) nexus where CSOs operate with a combination of PGII and HPP grants.
- Countries both with and without an Irish Embassy or Development Mission.
- Countries that span regions across Africa and the rest of the world.
- Countries where 2 or more PGII and HPP-supported CSOs are present.
- Comparator where there is a low to high ratio of Ireland-based CSOs present.
- Countries allowing for an adequate representation of CSOs with Irish registered headquarters and family organisations with headquarters located outside of Ireland.
- Countries not suffering evaluation fatigue.

Attention was paid to covering all relevant head office staff in both DFA and its CSO partners. The Evaluation Team interviewed at least one representative from every CSO that had received PGII or PGII and HPP funding over the evaluation period. The Evaluation Team also interviewed three CSOs that were either unsuccessful applicants or ineligible for Grant approval in 2017.

The Evaluation Team also interviewed comparator donor agencies selected on the basis that they have adopted similar funding approaches to the PGII and HPP grant mechanisms to support CSOs. The comparator agencies were Danida (Denmark), and FINNIDA (Finland). The focus of these interviews was to explore areas that DFA could build on as they enter into the design phase for the next iteration of the strategic grant. A summary of data collection methods is provided overleaf.

Data Collection Overview

96 KIIs with **112** DFA & CSO stakeholders

8 FGDs with **40** DFA Staff and Dóchus Members

3 Key Stakeholder Workshops

517 Documents Reviewed

Social Network Survey – **27** Responses

IRELAND

32 KIIs with PGII / HPP Grant Managers; CSDEU, HU and Policy Directors; CSDEU Development Education and Public Engagement leads; Policy Unit technical leads; Internal Audit; and EAU Director General

16 KIIs with PGII / HPP Grant Managers from all 13 CSOs

3 KIIs with CSO representatives who did not receive PGII or HPP

5 FGDs with HU and CSDEU Administrative Team, Policy Unit, CSDEU Design Team, Development Education and Public Education Team

3 FGDs with Dochas Results, Policy and Humanitarian Working Groups

3 Stakeholder Workshops – Evaluation Reference and Stakeholder Group

DENMARK & FINLAND

Comparator Agency Analysis - KIIs with Danida and Finnida

ETHIOPIA, SIERRA LEONE, ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, DRC, SOUTH SUDAN, MALAWI, ZIMBABWE, RWANDA, SOMALIA, UGANDA, HAITI

30 KIIs with Country Representatives from GOAL, Trócaire, Concern, Oxfam, Christian Aid, HelpAge, Sightsavers and World Vision across 11 countries

ETHIOPIA, SIERRA LEONE, ZAMBIA, MOZAMBIQUE, VIETNAM & MALAWI

6 KIIS with Embassy Development Managers and/or Heads of Missions

Data Analysis

The Evaluation Team focused on a number of analytical entry points. These included:

1. A *Policy Relevance Review* of the strategic alignment of the grant models with DFA policies.
2. A *Programme Design Review* to draw out lessons learned from the design process and their relation to the recommendations of MAPSII and PGI evaluations.
3. An *Award Process Review* of the application of eligibility criteria, assessment formula and award communications from the perspectives of DFA and CSOs.
4. A *Development Education and Public engagement* review of how work streams sit within the Grant.
5. *CSO Typology Mapping* to interrogate the underlying factors affecting DFA experiences of the grant awards, flow of funds, grant management, and value-added contributions of CSOs.
6. A *Flow of Funds of CSO* spending including, but not limited to, comparative central-local, sector-led, development education, public engagement, organisational development, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E), country, and on-granting budgetary investments.
7. A *Partnership Management Review* of adaptive programming arrangements examining examples of changes to the planned use of funds by CSOs, and their justification, timeliness, and agreement with DFA in response to shifts in the CSO context of operation (e.g. nexus and COVID-19 response).
8. A *Partner Management Capacity Review* to examine the level of DFA capacities to engage in CSO partnerships and explore alternative structures and approaches.
9. A *PCM Guidelines Utility Review* to examine DFA's adoption of the Guidelines and both DFA and CSO perspectives of their influence over reporting, programme quality assessments, decision-making and feedback.
10. A *Risk Management Review* of the processes by which CSO risk analysis informs DFA decision making.
11. A *PGII Theory of Change Assessment* reviewing its alignment to DFA's policy objectives and use by DFA to shape CSO partnering arrangements and policy contributions; and
12. A *Comparator Agency Analysis* of DFA PGII and HPP grant arrangements in relation to those of Danida and FINNIDA.

Engagement

The Evaluation Team worked closely with the EAU team with one EAU team member accompanying the Evaluation Team in all interviews. The EAU team participated in workshops and provided feedback to the draft reports. The Evaluation Team presented the evaluation conclusions and recommendations to the Reference Group and facilitated a Stakeholder Workshop with DFA Stakeholders. The final evaluation report was shared at a final workshop in January.

EQ 1. How effective was the programme grant model as a means of achieving DFA's policy objectives?

In order to implement its policy objectives, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade engages in a variety of partnerships, including with Civil Society Organisations. As outlined in the Evaluation context above, over the Evaluation period, these policy objectives have been guided by a series of Policies including One World One Future (2013) and since 2019 by A Better World (2019). The purpose of this section of the Evaluation is to provide an analysis of the relevance and coherence of the PGII and HPP grant mechanisms in relation to their strategic alignment of the grant model to the Department's policy objectives. This is supported by a review of the extent to which learning from earlier funding rounds was incorporated in the design of both grants, an analysis of the strategic alignment of the CSO partners supported by the grants to the Department's policy ambitions, and a comparator assessment of the grant mechanisms to similar funding approaches of other donors.

Finding 1. Strategic alignment of grant model

There is strong evidence of continued strategic alignment between the design of the PGII and HPP grant mechanisms and the range of DFA's Policy objectives both at the time the grant models were introduced in 2017 and with the later roll-out of A Better World in 2019.

Both the PGII and HPP funding mechanisms were designed to support the achievement of the Department's humanitarian and development outcomes as set out in the Framework for Action for OWOF (2013), and there was clear alignment between the funding arrangements and the three broad OWOF goals.[17] This is evidenced by the PGII requirement that recipient CSOs show a track record in line with the PGII Strategic Framework in areas that: Support poor and marginalised groups and address inequality and marginalisation; Expand the enabling environment for good governance, human rights, and the civil society space; and Strengthen public engagement in Ireland with international development.

By recognising the value of a strong, independent, and inclusive civil society both the PGII and HPP reaffirmed Ireland's commitment to directly support CSOs as a reflection of Ireland's Foreign Policy, The Global Island (2015), Civil Society Policy (2008) and Gender Equality Policy (2004) alongside the OWOF objectives. The PGII was established as a funding mechanism to help CSOs strengthen linkages between Ireland's humanitarian and development support and facilitate public support for Ireland's development cooperation programme through the promotion of public engagement and development education both formally in schools as well as through informal approaches.[18]

In providing predictable and flexible financing, the HPP was designed to enable CSOs to build their humanitarian response capacities in line with Good Humanitarian Donorship in ways that supported humanitarian interventions in situations of protracted crisis, while also seeking to build resilience and the foundations of sustainable development. These HPP ambitions also aligned with the Humanitarian assistance policy (2015) and Rapid response strategy (2015) whose objectives

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[17] Although DFA's Framework for Action (2014), provided a management instrument to guide policy and programming decisions it was valid to 2017 and was not updated as a means of assessing DFA funding during the evaluation period.
[18] DFA (2008) Civil Society Policy; DFA (2013) Our World Our Future; DFA (2015) The Global Island; DFA (2019) Strategic Framework: Programme Grant II

targeted the building of partnerships for the provision of needs-based humanitarian assistance in sudden onset, protracted and forgotten humanitarian crises.

There is also strong evidence that the strategic alignment of the PGII and HPP to OWOF continued with the introduction of ABW in 2019. The strategic focus of OWOF, ABW and the PGII and HPP grant objectives is summarised in Annex 7. Both DFA and CSO stakeholders highlighted the way in which ABW was developed in close collaboration with CSOs. It was agreed by DFA that CSOs should continue to use the same results frameworks they developed at the start of the Evaluation period under OWOF. This appears to have supported most CSOs in their ability to understand and interpret Ireland's new international development policy. Nevertheless, the evaluation did find some limited evidence of CSO employees that remained unclear as to how they should articulate their support for A Better World, such as by demonstrating the ways in which they used some of the Key Strategies articulated by the policy to amplify their policy contributions (Finding 2).

Finding 2. Incorporation of earlier evaluation recommendations

While the PGII and HPP built on the programmatic recommendations of the PGI evaluation by providing flexible, multi-annual funding at scale, outcome level reporting and investments in organisational capacity development, they did not seek to clarify where and how CSOs results should contribute to DFA's priority policy areas.

Positive examples of alignment between the PGII and HPP and recommendations of the 2015 PGI evaluation included predictable and flexible multi-annual funding at scale, an emphasis on outcome reporting, and ongoing support to organisational development (Table).[19] Although CSOs were required to show broad policy alignment in their applications, to highlight policy activities and adopt OECD-DAC Gender and Climate change markers in their annual reports, both grants remained ambiguous about how DFA would build on these results or engage CSOs in policy discussion or collaboration. This is explored further in Finding 3.

Table 3: Summary of PGI evaluation findings and PGII revisions

Key lessons from the PGI evaluation	Changes introduced with the PGII
The PGI responded to Irish Aid's strategic and operational objectives by promoting Managing for development results, Delivery at scale, Strengthening the programmatic approach and Embedding greater accountability to funding allocations but links to Irish Aid policies were not clear.	The PGII maintained the strategic and operational objectives of the PGI. The PGII Theory of Change included grant partner contributions to OWOF Outcomes and Application Forms requested a description of CSO alignments to OWOF.
The PGI appraisal criteria were considered transparent and appropriate to the Grant's objectives but did not assess local partner capacity-building or government partnerships which required clearer articulation.	While the PGII appraisal criteria introduced weightings for performance and fund absorption capacities under the Resource Allocation Model (RAM), applications were not specifically reviewed for contributions to localisation.
The Programme Grant supported improvements in the quality of partner programmes, with the length, flexibility of design and scale of funding critical to professionalising programme delivery and achieving sustainable change.	These key funding attributes were maintained under the PGII
The use of funding was in line with CSO partners' self-identified areas of expertise and strategic priority supporting effective programmes that relied on CSO internal systems for risk management.	The PGII design emphasised the importance of initiatives to improve organisational capacities and performance including Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEAL) and compliance systems.

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[19] DFA, 2015. Review of the Irish Aid Programme Grant Mechanism. Coffey International Development Ltd. No equivalent evaluation of the HPP was undertaken, Ireland

DFA's emphasis on results-based management (RBM) led to a shift in CSO attitudes and performance that helped CSOs prioritise RBM, build their capacities in this area and introduce the capacity-building of local partners in RBM.	As above
While CSO use of Theories of Change improved as a result of the PGI's emphasis on context analysis, a lack of follow-up by DFA meant there were few examples where partners systematically tested or refined them.	Emphasis in the PGII's CSO application assessments was given to the quality of theories of change, results frameworks and past performance in relation to outcome monitoring and reporting.
The PGI provided opportunities for greater coherence between the Grant and other DFA funding mechanisms including for Development Education, Civil Society Fund (CSF), humanitarian and Embassy funding modalities.	Development education and Public engagement were included as PGII priority areas and there has been a push to improve partner management by the Department. PGII partners are excluded from Mission funding except for humanitarian purposes. The CSF and PGII remain separate funding models.

Finding 3. CSO contributions to DFA Policy objectives

Clear relationships can be drawn between CSO fund allocations to country programmes and DFA Policy objectives. There is also strong evidence of thematic learning and policy engagement by CSOs in areas that aligned with the OWOF and ABW. The absence of a systematic DFA approach to capitalise on CSO policy initiatives is holding back the potential for the PGII and HPP to contribute more to areas of common policy interest.

DFA key informants including CSDEU and HU partner managers, policy specialists, Directors and Mission Heads of Development consistently expressed a strong opinion that CSO independence is crucial, even where this may at times lead to policy differences between CSOs and the Department. This is supported by the Department's willingness to, "…allow partners to work to their strengths, [creating] more added value and expanded reach both thematically and geographically".[20]

This approach is supported by strong evidence that CSOs have used PGII and HPP funding to implement thematic programmes in areas that align with DFA's policy objectives (e.g. furthest to behind first), and to use the learning from these programmes to underpin their own strategic policy interests. For example, the Irish Offices of at least three family CSOs have been able to show added value to DFA at a policy and strategic level, the CSO as a wider institution, and the CSO's individual country programmes in areas including education, gender equality, and the prevention of malnutrition.[21] In each case these initiatives were driven by the CSOs themselves. Other CSO examples included policy engagements in areas of Localisation, Climate Change, Gender Protection, Human Rights, and Resilience Building.

While in each case, these CSO policy initiatives were recognised by at least one DFA key informant, both they and CSO stakeholders agreed that policy collaboration with the Department had not been systematic. The tendency instead was for case-led relationships to emerge between DFA and CSO thematic policy leads in areas of common interest. While this offered opportunities for collaboration, and good examples of co-working between CSOs and the Department emerged, some CSO stakeholders considered the semi-formal approach to have potentially benefited CSOs with larger

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[20] CSO key informant view: a sentiment shared across both DFA and CSO stakeholders

[21] For example, Plan Ireland's support to Education in Emergencies; WV-Ireland's focus on Health and Nutrition; and Action Aid Ireland's organisation-wide leadership in building understand around adaptive programme. See, Green, Duncan (2019). What is different about how INGOs do Adaptive Management?

resources or with strong existing relationships with DFA staff members. Because this may have led to potential CSO contributions being missed, a more pluralistic and systematic approach to partner engagement was called for to better promote collaboration in areas of common policy interest.

One of the factors that may have led to this 'policy distancing' by the Department was a desire, expressed by several DFA stakeholders, that DFA should avoid being directive in setting any expectations for the policy focus or positioning of CSOs. This should be the responsibility of CSOs themselves, based on their underlying culture, experience and strategic ambitions. The inherent flexibility of this approach was particularly relevant when areas of policy focus shifted, such as when the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic raised the profile of gender equality, gender-based violence (GBV), and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and rural versus urban needs.

In these instances, as with those above, the Evaluation Team consider it to have been reasonable for the Department to ask CSOs to illustrate how they interpreted DFA's Policy ambitions and standards and to respond according to their own capacities and interests. Nevertheless, it also found a clear appetite for a more systematic approach to policy relationships among many CSO and DFA stakeholders. While it was recognised the Department had limited available capacities to lead such an agenda across all areas CSO work, the absence of a structured approach to policy collaboration in areas of common priority was considered a missed opportunity for CSOs and the Department including, but not limited to, collaborative working through the Dóchas Policy Working Group (**Error! Reference source not found.**).

Box 1: Example of Collaborative Working Through the Dóchas Policy Working Group
A number of DFA and CSO HQ key informants identified the Dóchas Policy Working Group (WG) as an appropriate, existing space for joint policy engagement. The Policy WG's terms of reference focus on policy analysis; stakeholder engagement and advocacy; good practice and learning; and partnerships with other platforms. With 19 members, 12 of them PGII partners, the Policy WG priorities are set annually. In 2020 they covered financing for development; climate change; conflict, humanitarian action and principles; migration; and gender. Good examples of past multi-agency CSO-DFA policy collaboration include on Gender Based Violence, the Gender-related impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, developing a common understanding of Protection following the 2018 Haiti scandal, and Climate Change. All DFA's HPP partners also participate in the Humanitarian Assistance WG.
As the association of Irish CSOs, Dóchas benefits from modest annual funding from CSDEU. Its role is to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation between members and help them find a single voice on development issues. Because the WGs lie outside of any single organisation or CSO/DFA-led dialogue they are in the most part viewed positively by CSO and DFA key informants by being less susceptible to influence by any single organisation.
With 3 staff members, Dóchas' capacities to support intensive policy dialogue across multiple themes is limited and there has been a reluctance to explore opportunities to build on existing levels of collaboration through the association. Despite these concerns, examples of mature, expert dialogue facilitated by the WG emerged in areas such as Safeguarding, Gender and GBV and Climate Change that point to opportunities to extend the Policy WG as a platform for more routine and systematic, task-led policy engagement.

Finding 4. Alternative funding models

When compared to alternative models, the PGII and HPP grant models are viewed favourably by comparator donors and CSOs. Because their multi-annual, multi-country, flexibility, and organisational and programme quality aspects fit well within Ireland's policy and partnership ambitions, as well as those of CSOs, there is a strong desire for the models to continue.

The 2020 OECD DAC Development Co-operation Peer Review found Ireland's partnerships with CSOs through the PGII and HPP to be characterised by mutual trust and dialogue involving a combination of informal engagements including through Dóchas. The OECD DAC Peer Review found

Ireland's share of bilateral ODA allocated to and through CSOs to be one of the highest among DAC members, at 38 percent in 2018. This benefits mainly Irish CSO who received 64 percent of total CSO funding between 2015 and 2018. Among DAC members, Ireland is consistently providing the highest share of bilateral ODA allocated to CSOs (i.e. core contributions that are programmed by CSOs) at 23 percent in 2018 compared to a DAC average of 2 percent. The review also found Ireland to be an excellent humanitarian partner with a unique approach to fragility offered by the combination of flexible HPP and PGII funding models that "could provide useful inspiration for other DAC donors".

CSO country office stakeholders consistently reported on the importance of longer-term funding under the PGII and HPP. Less intensive reporting and flexibility in making programme adjustments were emphasised when CSOs compare the PGII and HPP to other in-country donors (EQ3.3). This is also a major focus for Danida and FINNIDA who provide greater flexibility to CSOs to report "in their own words" using a flexible structure. Not only has this led DFA's own funding mechanisms to support lower administrative costs, it has also had a major indirect leverage effect with DFA funds used to fund core programmes for which other, shorter-term donor income can be secured. This finding was triangulated across country CSO and Mission stakeholders with clear examples in at least 5 evaluation sample countries.

Comparator donors highlighted the importance of political expectations surrounding grant partnership agreements and of navigating the balance between core funding and accountability needs. An outline of the strategic and organisational demands of the Danish and Finnish equivalents of the Programme grant are provided in Annex 8 for comparative purposes indicating strong coherence with the PGII and HPP. As with Ireland, both Denmark and Finland reported a political context in which civil society is seen as a common good: a value that is accepted politically, by the public, and across the media and which translates into an ongoing expansion of their equivalent funding arrangements. As a result, few substantive differences were identified in comparison to PGII and HPP fund oversight. Where they did differ from Ireland was in their greater apparent risk appetite, evident through their 'tell us as you see it' reporting requirements and approach to partner management (see EQ 3).

EQ 2. How effective are the Department's processes for determining the eligibility and approval of partners?

Overview of the application process

In 2016 Irish Aid launched a Call for Applications for eligible partners. Core eligibility criteria included a requirement to be an Irish-based NGO involved in International Development, dependency ratio under 60 percent, average annual income in excess of €680,000 in the past three years and a past record of managing Irish Aid Grants (Box 2). A timeline for the application process is provided in Figure 3. Annex 9 shows a summary of the PGII eligibility criteria. CSOs who had passed them and could demonstrate proven experience in the area of humanitarian assistance were in most instances invited to apply for HPP.

> ### Box 2: Criteria for Appraisal
>
> - A sound strategic and policy basis consistent with the overall approach of OWOF underpins the partners' programme
> - Rigorous context analysis informs a strong theory of change and a clear targeting strategy
> - Partners engage robustly at micro, meso, macro level and global level where relevant
> - Strategic approach to partnership builds capacity and space for collective partnership in development processes
> - Partners have a strong focus on RBM systems that support effective PCM and encourage innovation
> - Partners apply the highest standards of accountability and financial oversight in managing programmes
> - Partners conduct engagement with the Irish public and development education (where relevant) in a strategic and quality-focused way.

A priority of the Programme Grant highlighted in both the PGII and HPP Strategic Frameworks was to allow CSOs to identify their own programme priorities and strategies in line with their own areas of expertise. Application Forms were appraised against criteria that aligned with the programme approach and PGII Theory of Change that had been developed following the PGI evaluation in 2015.[22]

Figure 3: Application and Appraisal Timeline

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
[22] For example, in PG1 links to Irish Aid's policies were not clear. In PGII application form, CSOs were asked to demonstrate policy coherence with OWOF; CSOs were asked to describe their approach to local CSO capacity building

Application forms were reviewed by teams from CSDEU, HU (for HPP) and the reviews quality assured by external consultants to ensure the partners were treated equally. Each application was scored against the eight criteria with both qualitative and quantitative feedback provided. A pass score of 50 percent was applied to all appraisal criteria except development education and public engagement where the pass score was set at 40 percent.

CSO funding allocations were defined by a RAM. The RAM fixed the proportion of the overall budget for each organisation during the grant lifetime beginning in 2017 (five years for PGII and 2 years for HPP). The RAM took into account previous organisational income levels and partner performance assessments alongside Application Appraisal scores.

Nineteen of 27 CSO applicants met the Programme Grant eligibility criteria and were requested to submit a full application. Thirteen applicants were successful. 6 of these CSOs were invited to apply for the HPP (Figure 4). All except one saw an increase in their funding allocation relative to PGI. For one of the 13 applicants that passed the appraisal process where the nature of their work was not comparable to the humanitarian-development work of other CSOs it was decided that they would receive a stand-alone five-year grant under similar management arrangements to the PGII.

Figure 4: PG and HPP Grant Eligibility and Application Success

At the point resource allocations were communicated, all CSOs were given feedback on the appraisal process and asked to submit detailed budgets and results frameworks for their proposed programme of work. The Evaluation Team consider it appropriate that full details of individual CSO RAM assessments were not communicated. MOUs were signed in May 2017 for the 5-year PGII and 2-year HPP.

In the case of one applicant, after falling into special measures due to a significant fraud event that entered the public domain and that later audits found not to be directly related to PGII/HPP funding), the CSO was requested to submit a proposal for a separate rolling one year grant that formally

combined what had previously been the PGII and HPP. This blended model followed the same application criteria and included an expanded organisational capacity element that the Evaluation Team consider appropriate to the CSO's needs.

Finding 5. Eligibility criteria

The PGII eligibility criteria were clear, transparent, and largely fit for purpose for a grant model designed to partner organisations with a base in Ireland and sufficient capacities to implement successful programmes in a range of contexts while minimizing dependency risks.

By linking the principles of a programmatic approach to the application appraisal criteria and providing a consistent structure for appraising applicants and synthesising data the eligibility and application processes responded to two of the three areas that were identified as weaknesses in the PGI Evaluation. A third area that was not addressed was the inclusion of public engagement and development education within the PGII. This is examined further under EQ3.3.

Successful CSO applicants considered the eligibility criteria to have been appropriate. They were designed to ensure funding went to medium and large sized Irish based organisations showing a minimum of €680,000 of gross annual income previously and receipt of Irish Aid funding averaging of a minimum €170,000 in the past three years. A dependency ceiling was set ensuring Irish Aid would fund no more than 60 percent of any CSO's annual income. CSOs were also required to show evidence of their organisational capacity and risk management capacity by summarising their audited accounts, records of compliance, child protection policies and decision-making structures. Overall, the Evaluation found these criteria to be coherent with the Civil Society Policy expectation that applicants have "developed standards of accountability [and] appropriate management systems".[23]

Once the PGII eligibility criteria had been passed, 6 CSOs with humanitarian experience were invited to submit proposals to the HPP based on the organisation's past record of working in the Humanitarian sphere or with the HPP. No further eligibility requirements were set such as the CSO's ability to leverage or adhere to the Core Humanitarian Standards. As a result, there was no change in DFA's list of HPP partners leaving the system open to criticism that it is a "closed shop". The requirement that PGII partners should have received an average grant of €170,000 from Irish Aid over the previous 3 years may have also lead to the system benefiting partners who were "already in".

While the Department's internal logic for this was clear, that to balance risks with limited internal resources and capacities it was important to target organisations with existing capacities (in terms of size, experience and systems), for some CSO applicants there was insufficient understanding of why eligibility criteria were set as they were, or of the heavy process demands of making an application.

Finding 6. Efficiency of the application process

Through the consistent application of eligibility criteria and adoption of standard templates for PGII and HPP applications and assessments, the application process proved a largely efficient model for the Department's management of CSO grant applications

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[23] Irish Aid, Civil Society Policy, 2008

DFA Evaluation and Audit Unit, 2020

While the PGII Strategic Framework guiding 2017 applications summarised the strategic intent of the PGII this was not prescriptive. CSOs were given room to apply based on their own strategic priorities, capacities, skills, experience and reach. Inclusion of the HPP in the Framework was evident though to a limited level. No theory of change was provided to guide HPP applicants and associated guidance was minimal. While joint PGII and HPP applications were accepted, no explicit expectations on how CSOs should inter-connect their PGII and HPP funding were made. Again, it was left to CSOs to show how they would link the funding models.[24] Although more comprehensive HPP guidance was included in the 2019 Application round, the lack of clarity provided to CSOs resulted in some HPP applicants placing more consideration to ensure coherence with the PGII than others.

At an organisational level, the application form was designed to "test partners' systems and ability to operate at the level required to manage programmes programmatically."[25] CSO information covering governance, income and expenditure, staffing, reserves, financial policies, and the use of risk registers was required.[26] This provided a level of assurance to DFA that grant recipients had the capacity to manage risk and manage the grant. Where elements were identified as weak or missing in the appraisal of successful applicants they were converted into "Benchmarks" for each CSO's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) appropriate to the size of the grant to be provided. Application forms did not specifically request details about whether CSOs had already identified governance and capacity gaps themselves or the content of their organisational development plans.

Application reviews were efficiently managed by CSDEU staff with the collaboration of HU counterparts in the case of HPP applicants. After the internal review, CSO application assessments were quality assured internally and externally by an independent consultant, to ensure the consistent scoring of appraisal criteria across CSOs. Each CSO was pre-informed of the criteria and provided a rating and accompanying narrative as part of their feedback.

While there is evidence the Policy Unit was asked to comment on applications, Ireland's Missions were not requested to provide any input. DFA Missions and DCAD geographic desk officers were not called on to comment on the aapplication process or planned CSO programmes of work in their countries of operation. Although the Evaluation Team accept this may have been an appropriate reflection of recognised capacity limitations of Missions, the absence of this oversight, or of resource allocations being systematically communicated to the Missions by country, CSO or theme, provided a limited barrier to in-country CSO engagement and dialogue that could have been easily addressed.

Finding 7. Effectiveness of the application process

The use of a single step application process proved difficult for some CSOs to navigate. With no opportunity for a second stage adjustment to the application, six CSO applications were rejected. As a result, the process largely supported medium to large organisations with previous experience of the PGII grant mechanism while new entrants, including CSOs receiving Civil Society Funds, were largely unable to access programmatic funding.

While CSOs note that the scoring was clear and transparent, and feedback was provided including to unsuccessful applicants, some CSOs reported application guidelines were distributed late and with

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[24] The main expectation in the application form was for CSOs to describe their "Approach to resilience," how they'd "Link Humanitarian and Development in Fragile Settings," and to provide examples of "Addressing Acute Needs While Contributing to Building Resilience".
[25] PGII Strategic Framework
[26] Reserves Policy, Fraud Policy, Procurement Policy, Financial Procedures Manual

further additions such as a flow of funds expenditure sheet. Smaller CSOs and new entrants, including those within the Civil Society Fund (CSF), considered the process time consuming and difficult due to resource limitations. This was particularly felt by unsuccessful applicants who would have preferred a stronger set of eligibility demands prior to investing significant resources in the application. The PGII saw six partners leave the scheme because they did not meet the required pass score in the appraisal process compared to one successful new entrant (Figure 4). Although workshops were held to help CSOs understand requirements such as for their Theory of Change, for some organisations interpreting what the application actually required was a challenge. For these reasons, the recent Dóchas OECD DAC Shadow report suggested streamlining the administrative requirements of the proposal process well in advance of the funding window.[27]

The Evaluation Team accept that it is inevitable that the eligibility criteria and appraisal processes will have benefited CSOs previously in receipt of PGI funds as well as organisations with greater resource mobilisation capacities. Similarly, the PGI evaluation did not review whether a graduation model might be adopted to support future CSO entrants and instead concluded that some CSOs may have been better off in the CSF. Nevertheless, given the scope of ABW and the Civil Society Policy, the Evaluation Team considers this to be a legitimate future consideration. Grant partnerships need to be managed by DFA whether the CSO is part of the PGII or CSF. In the case of FINNIDA, a priority of the 2020 call for programme grant applications has been to graduate grant partners from their 'project support' funding model (equivalent to the CSF) to their 'programme support' model (equivalent to the PGII). As part of this process, Finland's Civil Society Unit are increasingly looking to support CSO investments in organisational capacity strengthening and promote political and strategic relationships across the Department and internationally.[28]

Finding 8. Resource Allocation Model

The Resource Allocation Model provided a pragmatic, transparent and appropriate model for finalizing resource allocations based on CSO application scores (performance) and previous funds received (absorption capacity). This process ensured a high level of continuity in the portfolio of successful CSO applicants. However, the model was not shared with CSOs, and the RAM process did not include an analysis of CSO planned programmes of work.

The RAM was a pragmatic approach with the intention to maintain transparency and minimise disputes over funding decisions. Although DFA-CSO discussions continued after fund allocations had been decided, the approach left no room to influence these decisions. Where DFA stakeholders did express a concern was that in order to provide a level playing field to all applicants, the RAM did not take into account past performance and the knowledge of each CSO built up through annual reports, bilateral meetings and monitoring visits, including under the CSF for new entrants. While the RAM did take into account the amounts requested by applicants to fund actual programmes of work it focused appropriately on incentivising strong submissions that outlined a clear programmatic approach.

Comparatively limited attention was paid to the CSO programmes of work that were submitted to DFA after the RAM was agreed and before the partner MOU was signed. While this was in the spirit of the grant mechanisms DFA missed opportunities to discuss areas where the operational, geographic or cross-cutting contributions of CSO programmes could be developed. Although the

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[27] Dóchas, 2019. OECD DAC Peer Review: Ireland. Shadow Review
[28] FINNIDA key informant interview

application process enabled the assessment of CSO coherence and their overall programmatic approach, the Department did not require CSOs to articulate how they might contribute to (or challenge) DFA policy initiatives as part of the agreed Programme of Work, or the capacity areas they would look to address as organisational development Benchmarks.

Finding 9. Application for Development Education and Public Engagement

The evaluation found that there was a lack of clarity as to DFA's expectations for CSO contributions to public engagement that led to inconsistencies in CSO applications and resource allocation assessments. CSOs were required to include a Public Engagement programme in their application, while a Development Education component was optional. While application guidance was given on the distinction between these components, there was in practice a lack of clarity on the distinction between the two, and what was required by DFA.

Although the PGII application guidelines outlined objectives and parameters for the programme, both CSO and DFA stakeholders noted a lack of clarity as to the differentiation and definition of expected development education and public engagement contributions. CSOs could only later refer to the Irish Aid Development Education Strategy 2017-2023 that came too late for CSO applications. For PGII, the public engagement and development education works streams were separated with public engagement becoming an obligatory programme component while development education remained optional.

The appraisal of applications for public engagement contributed to the overall CSO application score whilst development education was scored separately. Consequent scores were generally lower for public engagement (average of 51 percent) and development education (56 percent) than other elements in the appraisal matrix. The combined funding allocations for public engagement and development education were an output of the RAM, calculated as a proportion of the overall PGII grant (averaging at just under 5 percent) rather than in relation to an analysis of the CSO's capacities in these areas. Examination of CSO budgeted data for 2020 show fund allocations to vary between 1 to 18 percent (Figure 5), suggesting actual expenditures bear little relation to the original appraisal.

Figure 5: CSO Development Education (DE) and Public Engagement (PE) budgets 2020

Among some CSOs, the expansion of funding to development education and public engagement outcomes reflects an area of organisational strategic focus and capacity that can be built on in future funding rounds. In several instances DFA and CSO stakeholders argued that future applications for, and assessment of, applications for development education and public engagement funding should be on the basis of what each CSO proposes for these specific areas and in line with their demonstrable capacities and experience. Resource allocations would then better reflect the quality of CSO applications and be decoupled from wider PGII and HPP funding allocations.

EQ3. How appropriate are the PGII and HPP management arrangements for the range of organisations supported by DFA?

EQ 3.1 How efficient and effective were the Department's processes for, and approach to, managing CSO partnerships?

DFA's approach to partnership and oversight is mediated by the systems, processes and relationships that operate between the Department and its CSO partners at headquarter and Mission levels. This section explores the efficiency and effectiveness of these systems leading to a preliminary analysis of the drivers of the Department's CSO partner relationships and leads into the analysis of DFA's partner management capacities in the section following. Analysis of programme related and CSO managed Results Based Frameworks for Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning is covered under Evaluation Question 3.4.

Finding 10. Grant management systems

DFA has adopted a range of systems and processes for CSO partner management including the Programme Cycle Management guidelines and Standard Approach to Grant Management (SAGM). While these systems provided an effective basis for CSO oversight, there were consistent reports from CSOs of delays in associated fund disbursements that affected programming that relate back to limitations in utility of the SAGM for PGII oversight.

Programme cycle management guidelines

There is strong evidence of CSO use of the PCM guidelines in relation to programme management and reporting, as well as their support to CSO adjustments to programme fund allocations resulting from context shifts including natural hazard events, COVID-19 and displacements. Introduced in 2014 to support the PGI, the guidelines reflected requirements under the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) Grants Circular (13/2014) and Public Spending Code. The guidelines were updated in 2019 to clarify differences in interpretation and cover both PGII and HPP programming aspects. They provide a comprehensive framework covering planning for results and results frameworks, budgeting, annual reporting to DFA, programme monitoring, risk, evaluation and audit, public engagement, development education and use of theories of change.[29]

The Evaluation Team review of the 2019 guidelines considers them to support a "comply or explain" dynamic that supports DFA-led efforts to help move away from a compliance focus prone to micro-management, toward more effective partner management. CSO Irish Office stakeholders consistently report broad compliance to the guidelines, due to their reinterpretation and incorporation within CSO internal management and reporting frameworks. This process has been led by CSO Irish Offices who have developed internal manuals for data collection and reporting that align internal systems to the PCM guidelines. While this approach has supported internal coherence and efficiency by freeing up CSO country offices to focus on programme implementation, the burden of responsibility has relied on the capacities of each CSO's Irish Office (including for 'family' CSOs with Head Offices outside Ireland) to influence the wider organisation to uphold PCM standards.

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[29] DFA, 2014. Irish Aid Programme Grant 2012–2016, Programme Cycle Management Guidelines; DFA, 2019. Irish Aid Programme Grant II (2017 – 2021) and HPP (2019-2021) Programme Cycle Management Guidelines.

While DFA and CSO stakeholders report the guidelines have largely supported CSOs, there were examples where the PCM guidelines were interpreted differently by DFA staff and CSOs. Examples included one CSO that used almost all the 6 percent programme quality investment to cover internal CSO staff costs,[30] and gaps in risk reporting where its country offices failed to relate their internal risk registers to DFA funds. CSOs also reported concerns with late changes to the PCM guidelines, such as additional requirements for reporting on expenditures, that have been difficult to accommodate within a short timeframe across multiple countries. They argue this has been exacerbated by the lack of a standard interpretation of the guidelines by all partner manager within DFA.

Standard Approach to Grant Management (SAGM)

Introduction of the SAGM in 2018 was championed by a number of senior DFA stakeholders, who wanted the tool to ensure greater consistency and rigour to grant management across the full range of Departmental funding arrangements. The grant management process described by the SAGM guidelines, follows the grant cycle and is "fundamentally about managing decision making, information, and risk. This is done to increase the certainty that the combination of money and technical and policy-based support provided will achieve the desired outcomes".[31]

CSDEU and HU stakeholders consider a key improvement introduced by the SAGM was that it helped partner managers navigate the grant approval process for releasing payments. The 2020 OECD Peer Review also found the SAGM to have improved the documentation of grant-level performance, allowing formalised and evidence-based decisions. Nevertheless, while both CSDEU and HU partner managers considered the SAGM to have been an effective means of streamlining accountabilities and upward reporting, they also argued that because the CSDEU and HU had grant management systems in place in 2018 under the PCM guidelines, its rapid introduction also created overlaps and inefficiencies in CSO oversight. All managers did not receive full SAGM training. The Evaluation Team also found concerns that to function effectively as a *grant* management tool, the SAGM needed to better reflect the step-by-step business processes across the grant cycle and to be accessible across electronic rather than current paper-based systems.

Fund disbursements

There is also a concern that whereas the PGII and HPP are multi-year funding agreements with Results Based Frameworks (RBFs) agreed at the fund application stage, under the SAGM and associated business processes in the Department, annual funds are not released until the annual contract is agreed in line with the. RBFs must be updated annually with the submission of budget adjustments at the end of January (HPP) or in March (PGII). These are then reviewed against the approved IDC (indirect costs) budget and approval sought from within the Department, including at the Ministerial level, before funds are released.

In effect, these arrangements have reduced multi-year PGII and HPP funded programmes into a series of annual budget rounds. The subsequent uncertainty over year-on-year funding levels is viewed as a constraint by CSOs. Each year, they are required to either pre-finance their programmes

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[30] The PCM guidelines stipulate that "programme quality investment needs to be clearly linked to achieving development results to avoid the risk of it being delinked from the delivery of development outcomes."
[31] Senior DFA Key informant

or wait until funds have been received to continue or to start work. This can negatively impact programme activities: delays have led to cases where farmers did not receive funds in time for the planting season, income-generation activities were paused, and risks have been transferred on to local partners where some CSO internal rules disallow on-granting until the annual contract is signed. A recent improvement for the PGII involved requesting CSOs to submit indicative budgets and results frameworks in late 2019 to advance fund disbursements at the beginning of 2020. This is considered an appropriate way to accelerate future funding flows to CSOs and local partners. Consideration should also be given to eligibility criteria that ensure CSOs can guarantee annual financial and programmatic continuity on the basis of their funding agreement with the Department.

Finding 11. Grant management oversight

Stronger relationships, co-working and communications between HU and CSDEU have supported a more cohesive approach to partner management that point to opportunities to address DFA staff turnover and a past focus on contracts over other areas of CSO partner management.

While the Evaluation Team found most CSOs consider their relationships with the Department to have been positive over the evaluation period, when discussing the "spirit of the partnership" CSOs expressed concern that a primary focus has too often been on contractual aspects. For some CSOs this has led the relationship to become one sided and focused on compliance rather than part of a strategic, technical or programming partner arrangement.[32] Most CSOs also expressed concerns over delays in annual report feedback, the forwarding of annual meeting agendas and summaries, and sharing monitoring visit reports, especially during the first two years of the PGII grant.

CSOs consider this to be indicative of weaknesses in DFA partner management capacities that relate primarily to staff turnover in the Department; a factor clearly recognised by Department stakeholders. The Evaluation also found evidence that this constraint was exacerbated by the inclusion of the Election Observation Roster under CSDEU leading to the Unit becoming over-stretched. This finding is mirrored in the 2018 Review of Staff Resourcing for Partner Management.[33]

On a more positive note, there is evidence from CSDEU and CSOs that backlogs in feedback have largely been addressed. Some limited additional partner management capacity has been added by CSDEU, and a closer management relationship has been established between CSDEU and HPP that should be built on in future. There is also an apparent desire among CSO stakeholders and partner managers that their role might include a facilitation function that seeks to link CSO partners, where appropriate, to DFA Policy leads and Missions.

Finding 12. CSO relationships with Ireland's Missions Overseas

Although there are good examples of Mission level interactions with CSOs, in some countries these were ad hoc, and the absence of routine documentation and communication of CSO partner programmes may have led to missed opportunities to support Mission strategies.

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[32] CSO Focus Group Discussion
[33] DFA, 2018. Assessment of Staff Resourcing for Partner Management in the Development Cooperation Division. Evaluation and Audit Unit

The strategic importance of PGII support to CSOs operating in countries where Ireland has no Mission is recognised and supported by both DFA and CSO stakeholders at both the country and global levels. Across the six countries of the Evaluation sample where Ireland does have a Mission, there was a near unanimous view among Mission and CSO stakeholders that the programme grant should be viewed strategically. However, despite this shared position, the Evaluation found the focus and quality of relationships to vary significantly across Mission countries.

Examples of good practice were driven by officers in Embassies who proactively brought together PGII recipients one to three times a year (COVID-depending) to share intelligence and present on how they had used PGII and HPP funds. Examples of close collaboration cited by Mission and CSO stakeholders included: planning support to the Mission strategy; Mission participation in CSO monitoring visits; the sharing of context assessments while humanitarian emergencies were unfolding; lesson learning on the prevention of GBV during the COVID-19 pandemic; the development of a national social protection strategy; and high-level political support for the return of an expelled CSO office.

These examples were highly appreciated by both Mission and CSO stakeholders. However, because the driving force behind them relied on individual Mission representatives having good relations with their CSO counterparts, they tended to build on informal relationships that favoured Irish CSO country office directors who felt they could "always pick up the phone". While the Evaluation Team accepts informal country level relationships are both useful and inevitable, almost all CSOs expressed a desire to have a strategic or programmatic relationship with Missions. However, the evaluation found no systematic approach to facilitating cooperation. Most Mission representatives were unaware of the level of PGII and HPP funding to individual CSOs in their countries of operation or their sectors of work. In the face of capacity limitations among Ireland's Missions, gaps in the communication of this information were thought to have exacerbated their ability to engage. This problem is not unique to DFA. For example, both comparator agencies were looking to involve Embassies more closely in their future Award decision-making processes.

Finding 13. Monitoring visits

Most monitoring visits have helped strengthen DFA-CSO relationships, joint learning and the widening of strategic horizons when led by an experienced DFA staff member. While there have been cases where CSOs were disappointed that visits were poorly prepared, involved inexperienced DFA staff, and visit reports were delayed, the model was nevertheless supported by CSO country offices and many would welcome more monitoring engagement.

Monitoring visits are held at least once for each CSO over the grant period. They are seen by both DFA and partners as an opportunity for DFA to gain in-depth understanding of how the partner is using PGII and/or HPP funds on the ground. Most visits were found to have been well organised and planned to ensure different levels of the CSO partnership – programmatic, compliance, risk and organisational capacity – were reviewed. Each visit included field and site visits; interviews with partner CSO and local partner staff, beneficiaries, and comparator organisations where possible. Feedback was provided informally to DFA partners at the end of the visit allowing them to adapt their programming focus or reporting.

DFA have been looking to strike an appropriate balance between using the visits as an accountability exercise whilst maintaining trust and partnership with honest feedback and support. While stakeholder feedback was largely positive, some challenges were noted. In at least two cases, the

CSO experienced a monitoring team arriving in country with little preparation, requiring them to bring the team up to speed; time that would otherwise have been spent on field visits and interviews. It has also been widely noted that formal monitoring reports have often been late: in some cases, it took up to a year for the CSO to receive their report. Although informal feedback had been provided immediately after the visit, late monitoring reports led to unnecessary and outdated demands being placed on CSOs. There is also now a backlog of monitoring visits resulting from COVID-19 restrictions (Table 4 – in red).

Table 4: Completion of monitoring visits 2019-2020[34]

Partner	Country	Year	PGII-HPP
GOAL	Sierra Leone	2017	PGII+HPP
Concern	South Sudan	2017	HPP
Trócaire	Lebanon	2017	HPP
Oxfam	Tanzania	2018	HPP
Plan	Cameroon	2018	HPP
Christian Aid	Burundi	2018	HPP
World Vision	Somalia	2018	HPP
Help Age	Ethiopia	2019	PGII
Children in Crossfire	Tanzania	2019	PGII
Self Help Africa	Zambia	2019	PGII
Concern	Central African Republic	2019	PGII
Trócaire	Honduras	2019	PGII
Christian Aid	Zimbabwe	2019	PGII
Frontline Defenders	Kenya	2019	PGII
Vita	Eritrea	2019	PGII
Planned visits that could not be undertaken: Action Aid, Nepal; GOAL, South Sudan; Oxfam, Tanzania; Plan, Guinea; World Vision, Sierra Leone/Tanzania; Sightsavers, Sierra Leone.		2020	PGII

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[34] Source, CSDEU & HU. Visits highlighted in red were postponed due the COVID-19 pandemic

EQ 3.2: To what extent have the internal capacities of the Department and CSOs allowed them to manage the partnership?

Finding 14. DFA partner management capacities

Capacity issues have created significant challenges to PGII and HPP partner and grant management that have impacted on the Department's ability to move beyond compliance to more strategic relationships with CSOs.

The PGII and HPP Strategic Grants are managed at Irish Aid Headquarters by the CSDEU and HU. In the CSDEU each CSO is managed by a Partner Lead (DS, SDS, AP, FS) most have a Higher Executive Officer (HEO) or equivalent and some have Executive Officer support.[35] Where the partner receives both HPP and PGII this is mirrored in HU. Partner Leads and HEOs typically manage up to 4 CSO partners (6 in HU) alongside other responsibilities, and they work within teams to manage their allocated CSOs.

Across the two Units, and in line with Government policy that supports the recruitment of general staff,[36] partner managers may or may not have a background in International Development, Humanitarian Aid, finance, RBM or understanding of CSO governance and Charity Regulations. In 2020, two out of the five Partner Leads in CSDEU were Senior/Development Specialists compared to 3.5 under the PGI. While a Junior Professional Intern also had a background in development, this was not the case for the HEOs.[37] In HU the Partner Lead has a background in International Development but none of the HEOs or EOs do. As a comparison, half of the Finnish Civil Society Unit partner management team of 12 have a development background (managing 16 partners).[38]

Partner managers work with CSOs that differ in size, sector focus, organisational capacities and geographic reach. The combination of the grant management requirements under SAGM and the PCM guidelines and the unique nature of each CSO, require a spread of partner manager skills including development expertise, knowledge of national contexts, financial analysis, programme design and management, safeguarding, and monitoring. When exploring how DFA had managed these areas, the Evaluation Team found several inter-related capacity issues:

Limited professional experience and skills is compounded by an absence of defined workforce plans with associated competencies and skills for grant and partner management. CSO and DFA stakeholders both consider gaps in professional experience and skills to have created challenges for partner managers to understand and engage with the substantive detail of CSO programmes and work as a "critical friend". At least five DFA key informants voiced concerns over the Department's credibility when using non-specialists to work with large multi-country CSOs. This view was shared by CSO stakeholders and the Dóchas OECD DAC Shadow Review asked for "…higher staff capacity with particular expertise in policy, development, humanitarian and peacebuilding programming".

High levels of staff turnover due to rotation was identified as an issue that impaired effective grant partnership management by DFA and CSO partners alike. One CSO noted they had had 4 CSDEU counterparts and 3 from HU over the past 5 years. At one point the entire partner management group in HU were replaced. For CSOs, DFA staff turnover has required time and resources to bring partner managers up to speed and impacted on their ability to engage in substantive technical conversations.

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[35] Plan, Action Aid, GOAL, Frontline, Trocaire and WorldVision do not have EO support; Christian Aid has a portion of an EO

[36] DFA, 2018. Assessment of Staff Resourcing for Partner Management in the Development Cooperation Division.

[37] Review of Development Cooperation Division organograms

[38] KII with Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Civil Society Unit

All stakeholders accepted that staff rotation is part of Government policy but stressed the need for it to be managed such that DFA staff could get to know their CSO partners and build a critical understanding of their work. While an induction booklet was recently produced in CSDEU,[39] challenges in managing the gap between posting cycles remain with annual leave, training and time to replace people at times creating delays of three to four months before a new position is filled.

Limited training for partner management has meant that apart from SAGM training there has been no specific training on partner management.[40] Where it exists, training can be hard to access, a factor that has been exacerbated by the move of training oversight away from the Development Co-Operation and Africa Division (DCAD) and into the wider Department. Comparatively, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have invested significantly into partner management capacity including by outsourcing training to an external service provider that also provides support to ongoing grant management.

Problems with bandwidth and workload led the 2018 Assessment of Staff Resourcing Report to conclude that CSDEU staff were the most stretched among DCAD units. DFA stakeholders expressed concerns over a lack of time to manage partner caseloads and competing demands such as election observation that left little time for substantive engagement. This carries risks. In one example, scrutiny of a CSO's financial and audit data led to the identification of financial problems that both the CSO that DFA accept could have been achieved earlier. The limited engagement with the development education and public engagement in the early part of the evaluation period was also reported by DFA and CSO stakeholders as an example of limited CSDEU capacities. Comparatively, the Finnish Civil Society Unit report a higher partner manager to partner ratio and a deliberately lighter touch approach to management in order to focus more on strategic and policy relationships.[41]

Most of these findings reflect problems identified in the 2018 Assessment of Staff Resourcing.[42] One impact of capacity weaknesses reported by CSOs was a tendency for some partner managers to focus on compliance. While this may have been appropriate for some CSOs, other CSOs considered the focus on detail to be inadequate and that a more strategic approach, in evidence elsewhere, would be better. One cause of this variance was differences in staff experience and skills that both CSO and DFA stakeholders considered to have led to an over-reliance on a shortlist of experienced individuals to whom less experienced staff would look for support. It was also notable that differences were evident between CSO partners with some uncomfortable with DFA's focus on compliance. Nevertheless both CSOs and the ET recognise this should be understood within the context of increasing scrutiny of the sector in recent years in order to manage risks.

It was therefore encouraging that efforts have been made to improve capacity in CSDEU as indicated in its Business Plan where the risk assessment has moved from red to amber.[43, 44] This shift reflects improved partner management capacities during the latter part of the evaluation period due to staff becoming accustomed to the SAGM, the return of experienced staff members, on-the-job learning, and closer relationships between CSDEU and HU that led to a more structured approach to co-managing CSO partners.

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[39] CSDEU Welcome Pack Index, August 2020, although to note this does not include CSO specific information.

[40] It is noted that there had in the past been a comprehensive tailored introductory programme of development training given by Kimmage and designed specifically for DFA but that Kimmage has

[41] The Finnish Civil Society Unit have 11 Desk Officers who manage 16 partners.

[42] The need for adequate levels, skills and better knowledge management was a recommendation of the 2014 OECD DAC peer review and the 2019 OECD DAC peer review, the 2019 Dochas OECD DAC Shadow Memo as well.

[43] Risk descriptor: High staff turnover and vacancies, and lack of relevant development/grant management experience and skill within the team leads to delays in strategic planning and implementation and/or reduces ability of staff to adequately monitor partner programmes/projects and anticipate difficulties (risk rating: 12)

[44] Examples of positive efforts have been the moving the management of Palestine and Vietnam programmes to a new unit.

Finding 15. CSO grant management capacities

There is strong evidence of DFA directly strengthening the capacities of CSO partners by providing intensive bilateral capacity support for CSOs in difficulty and by introducing governance reviews. While CSOs have also used PGII and HPP funding to invest in organisational development, DFA has not used CSO Memorandum of Understanding "benchmarks" to track progress in organisational development.

Mechanisms for strengthening the capacities of CSO partners include the allocation of a percentage of the overall grant allocation to programme quality costs, monitoring visits, and the use of benchmarks in CSO memoranda of understanding. Partners can allocate 6 percent of their PGII and HPP grant for programme quality costs for monitoring and evaluation, organisational development and research and learning.[45] All CSO country directors and headquarter stakeholders interviewed by the Evaluation could identify specific areas of PGII-supported capacity investment. In cases where bilateral reviews identified CSO compliance and risk or capacity weaknesses, the Evaluation also found strong evidence that DFA worked hard to strengthen CSO capacities and held them accountable to making demonstrable improvements.

While all partner Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) contain Benchmarks that include organisational development, these were mostly broad statements of intent, generic to all CSOs (Box 3). Annual Reports showed at least four of the 7 sample CSOs to have clearly reported against the five broad benchmark areas.[46]

These Benchmarks appear to have been developed by CSOs based on areas of weakness they highlighted in the grant Application Appraisal process. They therefore represent a clear articulation by CSOs of their own organizational development needs. However, while the Annual Report is structured around some of the benchmark titles and they are included as an agenda item in bilateral meetings, only occasionally are the Benchmarks referenced within the report.[47] Similarly, although the review of Annual Reports, monitoring visits and bilateral meetings for the 7 sample agencies found reference to some of the areas outlined as Benchmarks in the MOU, reporting was limited and the agenda item appears to have been squeezed-out by other areas in time-limited bilateral meetings.

> **Box 3: Examples of Partner Specific Benchmarks**
>
> For HPP partners, to further embed a RBM approach in humanitarian programming with a focus on clarity of anticipated change at different levels.
>
> Under Governance and accountability, examples include ensuring a reserve allocation policy is in place and strengthening risk management by using a more detailed scoring approach to risk reporting.
>
> Under partnerships one CSO is asked to finalise a board approved partnership policy whilst another two CSOs are asked to strengthen their approach to partnerships.

There were nevertheless good examples of organisational development that sit alongside the benchmarks. These included Governance Reviews introduced in 2019 that have been a way for DFA to provide targeted organisational development support. In one example, a family CSO Irish Office considered these Board level engagements to have helped it clarify its relationship with their parent organisation, suggesting potential linkages to the Benchmarks might also be explored.

The Programme Quality overhead has been used by a number of CSO country offices to invest in their capacity. A shortlist of CSO country and head offices described investing in MEAL packages and systems such as digital tools, indicators and baselines. As examples, CSOs noted the PGII grant

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[45] This is raised to 8% for the final year of the grant to cover costs of the final evaluation of the programme

[46] These include Demonstration of results; Governance and accountability; Partnership; Public engagement; and Policy and strategy.

[47] It is noted that the 2015 PGI Evaluation report also noted that in-depth baseline research into Partners' capacity and systems would be required in order to validate claims of improved programme quality and systems. Benchmark areas included in Annual reports include: Progress towards results/Results Based Management (RBM); governance and financial management; Partnership; and Strategic and Policy Framework.

had enabled them to undertake gender assessments, formulate gender action plans and appoint gender focal points; introduce Theories of Change; and expand operations with local partners. However, it was also notable that funding for these efforts was calculated as a percentage of each CSO's total fund allocation, rather than in relation to the organisational capacity development needs of CSOs. While this allowed larger CSOs to invest in robust systems, research and knowledge, the funding arrangement was not able to support smaller CSOs that might have looked to address significant organisational development needs (Figure 6).

Figure 6: CSO PGII Spend on Organisational Development, Research and Learning 2019

Source: CSO Budgets 2020

EQ 3.3. How effectively did the PGII and HPP enable CSOs to capitalize on opportunities and respond to challenges?

The 2015 PGI evaluation concluded that the Programme Grant had matured to a results-focused management and reporting model, allowing grant partners and DFA to increasingly focus on the strategic delivery of outcomes. The Programme Grant's long-term funding, its flexibility in allowing for partner-led programme design and the scale of funding were seen to have contributed to better quality programming and strengthened CSO management and oversight systems. To develop a stronger understanding of what this high-level finding has meant in practice, the evaluation examined four key programming areas:

- How CSOs used DFA funds to structure their programmes to support innovation and leverage and create linkages across the humanitarian development nexus.
- Comparisons between a Blended funding pilot introduced in 2018 and the joint use of PGII and HPP models.
- The 2020 COVID-19 response.
- CSO support to Localisation.

The section finishes with a review of DFA support to complementary development education and public engagement efforts.

Finding 16. CSO use of PGII and HPP funds

There is strong evidence that the PGII, HPP and ERFS grant mechanisms have been effectively used by CSOs to identify and respond to complex humanitarian and development challenges and opportunities across a range of contexts and themes. The focus on long-term, flexible and context-specific programme funding and its management through CSO systems consistently underpins core programmes that support good practice, innovation, evidence building and an ability to leverage wider donor funding and influence.

CSO annual reports and budgets provide detail of PGII and HPP outcomes and challenges. While the page count requirement restricted the scope of larger CSOs to report on the breadth of their work, reports could be consistently triangulated with country and Irish office CSO stakeholder interviews. Broadly, the differentiation in CSO use of funds can be clustered around two areas: PGII and HPP funding used by larger CSOs for country-led programme strategies that respond to specific national contexts; and funding used by smaller and family CSOs for multi-country programmes that focus on a specific area of technical (e.g. health, nutrition, education, climate) or human focused change (e.g. gender, disability and social protection) according to the CSOs' areas of expertise.

Figure 7 compares the sector focus of CSO funding from all donors (left) relative to the PGII (right).[48] One result of the space given to CSOs to use DFA funds in self-defined specialist areas is that it has enabled a number of CSOs to fund work supporting gender equality and women's empowerment. With the PGII comprising 61 percent of all funding in this area in 2020, this represents a hugely significant contribution and highlights its crucial role in supporting strategically important areas that are difficult to secure funding for otherwise. Conversely, the lower relative allocation of PGII funding

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[48] This analysis is confined to the PGII due to the lack of CSO HPP data by sector or theme.

for livelihoods, food security and resilience is a reflection of stronger funding in this sector. Both cases show flexible funding enabling CSOs to balance income across areas of strategic focus.

Other areas of learning are revealed by comparing individual CSO data, showing how flexibility has allowed organisations to develop areas of comparative advantage. The higher rate of PGII funding for services is driven by one large CSO that has used the PGII to fund 45 percent of its graduation programme across countries. In education, although PGII funding is lower than for overall income, this is because one large CSO has chosen not to use PGII funds in this area, receiving education income from other sources. For other CSOs the PGII has been a key donor in this area. In one example, the combination of PGII and HPP funding has enabled the Irish office of a large family CSO to position itself as a corporate lead on education (including in emergencies) and to use this as the basis for strategic contributions through Dóchas and the Irish forum on global education.

Figure 7: Comparative funding of Gender

Source: aggregate data by sector reported in individual CSO 2020 budgets

Innovation and leverage

This example of CSO specialisation using DFA funds, and the wider triangulation of CSO budget analysis and stakeholder interviews, support the 2020 OECD DAC peer review finding that DFA funds promote CSO innovation. Multiple examples of programme innovation were identified including examples (Box 4) that have been supported by both the PGII and HPP. Both DFA and CSO stakeholders also pointed to the importance of PGII and HPP funding in opening up opportunities for non-traditional areas of programming that many donors do not fund including localisation; gender focused action research; and private sector engagement.

Box 4: PGII and HPP supported Innovation examples
Adaptive programming multi-country action research supported by an academic that has introduced community-led outcome harvesting to supplement CSO monitoring and build ownership of the programme
Behaviour change action research in partnership with the University of London including social norms approaches to tackle structural causes of GBV
Blended model funding action research supported by Trinity College Dublin including analysis of its potential for wider application in the sector
Education in Emergencies with one CSO exploring opportunities to establish the Irish Office as a global hub for the wider organisation
Graduation model introduction and adaptation across different contexts in Africa bringing learning from South Asia into the CSO's programming with action learning support from University College Dublin
Localisation action research and exploration of opportunities to introduce a localisation hub with support from the DFA Policy Unit. Includes support for localisation and capacity strengthening in complex emergencies
Women's empowerment and access to markets including cash transfer pilot studies
Gender digital divide action research exploring, as an example, utility of a mobile App to help women monitor business and household income in urban and rural areas
Social protection multi-country programme for older persons linked to national social protection policy and programme support to Governments

By allowing CSOs to use predictable funds to develop core, long-term programmes, the PGII and HPP also enabled CSOs to leverage funding and influence with other donors. CSO country office stakeholders identified at least two examples of DFA partners that had collaborated to identify opportunities to work together across the triple nexus. Although some DFA Mission and head office stakeholders remain concerned that CSOs are too often behaving as competitors, in two further examples, the evaluation found evidence of the Mission successfully encouraging CSOs to develop a consortium to access other donor funding in areas that complement CSO and Mission strategies.

While these examples of innovation, collaboration and lesson sharing are positive, most CSO and DFA stakeholders consider levels of collaboration, and the use of multi-lateral spaces for joint learning over the evaluation period to have been insufficient. The OECD DAC Peer Review also concluded that more systematic efforts are required by DFA to promote and coordinate lesson sharing and collaborative efforts among CSO partners in areas of commonly agreed importance, including through Dóchas and more regular Mission level interactions.

The degree of and potential for joint working between the PGII and HPP programmes

To explore "The degree of, and potential for joint working between the two [PGII and HPP] programmes",[49] CSO stakeholders were asked to explain how the different funds were used, to provide examples where a resilience approach had been introduced to complement longer term development activities, and to identify linkages between the funding models.

Across the 28 PGII and 11 HPP funded programmes in the Evaluation country sample, only one CSO described their ambition to shift funding between PGII and HPP in a target context. One other example outside of the sample was identified by a CSO Head Office. Instead, CSO and DFA stakeholders at all levels argued that it was predictable, long-term and flexible funding, whether PGII

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[49] This responds to the Humanitarian Assistance Policy priority for "the provision of predictable HPP funding to CSO partners with demonstrable capacities for humanitarian response as a means of supporting an overall commitment to the -before, during and after- of humanitarian crisis situations".

or HPP, that allowed them to deliver effective and efficient programmes and build resilience. The funding model itself was not what mattered to stakeholders. Rather it was where and how each fund had been applied and supported by a clear process for making adjustments due to changing needs.[50]

Both funding models allowed CSOs to flexibly address the longer-term drivers of fragility and develop their work with local partners. In a typical example under the HPP, the midterm review of a CSO's gender and empowerment programme highlighted a gap in youth engagement that had caused a high-level outcome to have been missed. With DFA agreement, a local partner was recruited and the results framework modified in the following year to address the issue.

There was also strong evidence of a clear and consistent differentiation in the CSOs' adoption of the funding models according to the context of operation. Both stakeholder interviews and CSO annual reports show the PGII supporting long-term development outcomes in stable contexts while the HPP is used to fund double and triple nexus programmes in areas of protracted crisis. While the evaluation did identify three countries where a CSO was applying the PGII and HPP in the same location, in each case there was a clear differentiation between the scope and focus of the funding that was coherent to the ambitions of both the HPP and PGII. Capturing possible inter-relationships between the two models were therefore not considered a priority and would have been tenuous.

For CSOs that were part of the HPP, flexibility was enhanced by supplementary ERFS funding that could be quickly accessed in rapid onset crises. HPP stakeholders provided multiple examples where the ERFS had been used as a crisis modifier including one-off emergencies and more cyclical events (Box 5). In each ERFS example between €50,000 and €150,000 was released through the CSO headquarters, often within 24 to 48 hours, allowing CSO country offices to use the ERFS to scale-up their response to an initial crisis in contexts where the HPP provided a platform for a more protracted level of engagement.

A small number of CSO humanitarian stakeholders argued that with the shift of HPP funding to a multi-annual cycle, their ability to respond to unpredictable humanitarian needs was increasingly restricted by comparatively low levels of ERFS funding. This perspective was not widely shared. The large majority of CSO and DFA stakeholders considered DFA's positioning of the HPP and use of ERFS to support an early onset, lifesaving emergency response, within a short (typically 3-month) window to have been an appropriate use of DFA funds. Supporting this argument, the evaluation identified examples where the ERFS had enabled CSOs to influence donors and leverage wider funding. In two

> **Box 5: ERFS Crisis Modifier Examples**
>
> - Southern Africa cyclone Idai response
> - Flood response in contexts including Myanmar, Sierra Leone and the Horn of Africa
> - Health responses including cholera, Ebola and COVID-19
> - Emergency nutrition in Zimbabwe
> - Conflict related displacements in South Sudan, DRC, CAR
> - Refugee returns in Myanmar and Lebanon
> - Repatriation of US migrants to central American countries

cases, CSOs used ERFS funds to develop their COVID-19 response in urban contexts where they had not previously been operating, again allowing them to leverage wider funding.

This integration of HPP and ERFS funding has clearly moved ahead relative to the PGI evaluation. The Evaluation Team also heard suggestions that access to the ERFS should be opened up to PGII

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[50] CSO stakeholders consistently reported the PGII and HPP to be more flexible than other comparative funding sources where the donor requirement for agreeing changes to results frameworks and budgets are more limited and bureaucratic.

recipients. This was rejected by a significant majority of stakeholders at all levels who strongly argued that risks should be managed appropriately: it was essential that CSOs accessing the ERFS should be able to show appropriate capacities and experience that can uphold the Humanitarian Principles and Core Humanitarian Standards. In this regard, it was unclear to the Evaluation team why a family CSO with humanitarian experience, an international humanitarian platform and a member of the UK Disaster and Emergencies Committee had been excluded from the HPP.

Finding 17. Blended funding model

The blended funding arrangement has been successfully applied by GOAL, a large, dual mandated CSO, and could also be applied by similar organisations. However, the current, differentiated use of the PGII and HPP models is also considered appropriate to the different mandates, capacities, programming and risk management demands of DFA's CSO partners and has allowed them to design an appropriate and largely effective body of programmes.

In 2018 DFA invited GOAL to pilot a new funding modality that would combine the HPP and PGII grant mechanisms. This followed a period where the organisation was subject to special measures and was considered an opportunity for both sides to re-establish their partnership. Although no theory of change was developed, the rationale was to make grant management more efficient while also generating flexibility to enhance resilience building in fragile communities and contexts.

GOAL respondents consistently reported the blended approach created flexibility and enabled their country offices to respond to context driven needs. They noted the grant model allowed them to develop concept notes, innovate and introduce new programmes that could be used to leverage funds from other donors. GOAL stakeholders at all levels, supported by annual reports and research led by Trinity College Dublin consistently show the blended model worked well for resilience building, especially in complex emergencies and transitional contexts. Particular emphasis was given to the agile and highly adaptable nature of the funding model and supportive relationship with DFA.

Both GOAL and DFA stakeholders reported blended grant management processes were efficient due to the adoption of a single results framework, budget, risk register, MoU and annual report. However, when exploring this with PGII and HPP CSO stakeholders the majority argued a merger of the funding models would make little difference at the country level where there is a tendency for CSO offices to manage one or other of the grants rather than both and are required to plan and report against programme-specific results frameworks and budgets, regardless of the programme.

The majority of PGII and HPP CSOs were concerned about the risks of merging the two grants. Where is the value added, they argue, of adjusting strategies and management arrangements when you are already able to flexibly apply the PGII and HPP according to your analysis of target contexts, and access the ERFS as a crisis modifier? Some questioned whether the blended pilot was not in reality an expanded version of the HPP and ERFS rather than a real integration of the PGII and HPP.

There were also arguments that if CSOs are to effectively manage risks in contexts of protracted humanitarian crisis, they should be able to demonstrate a level of capacity and experience in managing 'surge'. Oversight of development and humanitarian work requires distinct management approaches, mandates, principles, protection strategies, skills and operational timeframes. For most CSO stakeholders, the challenge was not the funding model, but in ensuring a suitable balance of development, nexus and humanitarian funding was maintained according to their countries of operation.

Where the evaluation did find agreement among CSO and DFA stakeholders was in their support for improved partner management efficiency gains from bringing HPP and PGII oversight closer together. The 'teaming' approach that brought together CSDEU and HU partner managers to review budgets and reports and manage bilateral meetings for oversight of the blended model provides a good example of how this can work. Improvements in collaboration, such as those highlighted in the COVID-19 response analysis below, have helped create a more efficient oversight of PGII and HPP funding and CSO partnerships. This provides a stronger argument for the basis of future improvements rather than the model itself.

Finding 18. COVID-19 response

The Department is to be applauded for its rapid, agile and adaptive COVID-19 response, which illustrates how the ability to trust its CSO partners has allowed the Department to provide an adaptive and responsive approach to ongoing programming demands appropriate to each CSO's capacities and contexts of operation.

Without exception, CSO country and head office stakeholders consider the disruption to their programming from the COVID-19 outbreak to have been minimised by the effective, proactive and flexible DFA support they received. This pointed in turn to how they hope the partnership will operate in future. Agility was supported by clear and consistent communications to CSO Irish Offices by partner managers, group webinars and opportunities to exchange information over the re-purposing of up to 20 percent of both PGII and HPP funds. CSOs could adjust risk registers and results frameworks as long as changes remained within the framing of their theory of change.[51] For some CSOs, DFA's focus on communications was an example of good partner management that helped them better understand the institutional dimensions of their DFA partnership.

Both CSO and DFA stakeholders emphasised how these changes were appropriately supported by close collaboration between CSDEU and HU partner managers. This allowed DFA to have effective oversight of PGII and HPP funding. It also supported effective use of ERFS funds for the COVID-19 response including support to health centres, provision of protective equipment, opening of WASH facilities, public sanitation messaging, and support to women affected by GBV. While this response points to the importance of incorporating emergency preparedness and response plans across all contexts of operation, including under the PGII, the Evaluation Team consider it essential for DFA to ensure CSOs operating in areas of protracted crisis have clear and proven operational experience.

Finding 19. On-granting and localisation

Although capacity strengthening for local CSO partners and support for localisation are recognised policy and programme priorities for DFA, CSOs whose programmes operated in line with this ambition in 2020 were largely the same as in 2017. Despite no obvious barriers to change, the evaluation found little evidence that DFA sought to incentivise any strategic push towards more widespread localisation among CSO partners.

Localisation covers a range of processes that seek to move funding, programming and leadership to the local level where development happens. It is linked to a range of OWOF and ABW objectives

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[51] Each of these requirements is covered in DFA's 2019 Programme Cycle Management Guidelines

such as strengthening governance, Human Rights and accountability; strengthening the capacities of essential institutions; protecting the civil society space; and helping the furthest behind first. The PGII strategic framework identifies the strengthening of the social fabric and building capacities for collective participation in development as priority areas for grant support. This aligns closely with the concept of localisation of aid that has been present in the humanitarian and development sectors for decades, in the form of 'building local capacities' and which became a priority of the 2016 WHS.[52]

For DFA, planned expansion of a localisation approach under the PGII was a response to the PGI evaluation that found little evidence that grant recipients had changed the way they worked with local partners. Where the 2015 evaluation considered this to have been due in part to localisation not being made a stated intent of the PGI or its reporting requirements, the current evaluation found a desire to expand the localisation agenda under PGII among DFA stakeholders and to build on good practice identified by the PGI evaluation, including the capacity building of local partner RBM skills.

Supporting this agenda, a flow of funds analysis was introduced alongside annual PGII reporting requirements. While the primary aim of the tool was to track CSO financial expenditures, on the face of it, it also provided a means by which the Department could explore the extent to which DFA's CSO partners were passing on benefits to local organisations (Figure

Figure 8: Summary of PGII partner on-granting partners and expenditures as a percent of PGII

8). [53]

Figure 8: Summary of PGII partner on-granting partners and expenditures as a percent of PGII

Legend: No. of on-granting partners receiving PGII funding — On-granting (as % of PGII funding)

Source: 2020 CSO Flow of Funds Reports

Unfortunately this opportunity wasn't built upon, and as with the PGI, localisation was not made an explicit objective of the programme grant or of CSO RBFs. The causes for this relate to a number of

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[52] See for example, Barbelet, V. 2018. As local as possible, as international as necessary: understanding capacity and complementarity in humanitarian action. ODI: London.

[53] Similar concerns were cited by the 2018 NORAD civil society evaluation that found a continuing need to empower and create ownership among Southern partners through more innovative partnerships that go beyond funding of specific programmes and projects, and ensuring Norwegian organisations provide more long-term core-funding and capacity development support to local partners, based their own strategic plans rather than those of the Norwegian grant recipient.

factors. While at face value, CSO flow of funds summaries provide a snapshot of partner modalities and on-granting spends, both CSO and DFA stakeholders recognise the importance of context. Considerable variation exists in partner CSO approaches to localisation and capacity strengthening. One CSO has a country office led by a national partner. Other CSO sub-national operations are led by national NGOs to whom 70 to 80 percent of PGII funds are on-granted. Some partners focus their support on grassroots organisations that are too small to manage funds. In one example, a single CSO country programme on-granted to a women's rights NGO, a registered community organisation and Christian Association, and built the capacity of local women's associations to partner a micro-finance institution. All with the strategic support of a Ministry partner. There were also cases where on-granting was prevented by national policies, and where CSOs that build the capacities of government institutions, or the private sector are prevented from on-granting by charity regulations.

While on-granting alone is clearly an insufficient measure of localisation, and a better measure is needed, the Evaluation Team do not consider these complexities to have been a barrier to DFA engaging in an honest conversation on localisation with some CSO stakeholders. The evaluation found no evidence of any defined DFA risk and compliance thresholds that inhibited a diversity of localisation approaches or use of on-granting to local CSOs. Indeed, almost all CSOs whose strategies targeted local partners considered DFA on-granting and capacity building support to be a core PGII and HPP strength. They pointed instead to the importance of a broad definition of localisation with DFA, in line with ABW and the Civil Society Policy, to which each CSO can relate its own programme approach.[54] This expectation could have been more broadly applied.

Finding 20. Public Engagement and Development Education

Despite a positive OECD review of development education and public engagement in 2020, there has been little shift in DFA's approach since the PGI evaluation. CSO Stakeholders considered the guidelines for public engagement to have remained unclear and at the start of the PGII period they reported a lack of capacity in the Department to manage the work streams. Although there have been improvements, CSO performance has depended primarily on pre-existing capacities including in the monitoring and attribution of results.

Ireland aims to build support for global citizenship by implementing public engagement and development education activities that integrate development concepts in formal education for children and students and non-formal education targeting youth, adult and community sectors, as well as the public at large. The primary focus of the evaluation analysis of these areas explored the extent to which the PGII provided an appropriate framework for the articulation and delivery of a coherent strategy, that builds public understanding of the "rapidly changing, independent and unequal world we live in",[55] as well as Ireland's contribution to international development and humanitarian action and support for its development cooperation programme.[56]

The 2020 OECD DAC peer review emphasised development education as a strong area of DFA's work that pays dividends in an area most other donors give limited attention. The review highlighted

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[54] Although some DFA and CSO stakeholders suggested COVID-19 may have prevented some CSO head office and country office from travelling to directly support field operations, and that greater subsidiarity between both PGII and HPP CSOs and local partners may have supported the continued effectiveness of COVID-19 affected programmes, the evaluation was unable to determine the extent to which this was the case. Inclusion of a review of COVID-19 impacts on DFA partners should be considered for planned CSO evaluations in 2021.

[55] Irish Aid, 2016. Development Education Strategy 2017 – 2023

[56] There is no HPP funding for development education or public engagement

contributions to both formal and non-formal education through strong partnerships and outreach to schools, third level institutions and adult, community and youth groups This viewpoint was coherent with a focus on global citizenship and public engagement in A Better World. In a global and national political climate that many consider to have become increasingly inward-looking, the sense of relevance and responsibility for improving public understanding and building support for development is clearly shared by DFA and CSO stakeholders.

Although untested, both parties agreed that public awareness of, and support for, CSOs was higher than for Irish Aid, and that their greater capacities for public outreach could enhance the shared strategic ambition. The Evaluation Team concur and consider it to have been appropriate to have these work streams associated with the PGII. This was reinforced by CSOs who consistently pointed towards the funding as an essential mechanism that would otherwise be difficult to fund.

Since 2017, CSOs have reallocated funds either into, out of, or between public engagement and development education activities according to their own strategic capacities and interests (Figure 9) suggesting DFA needs to reconsider its approach to future funding to these areas.

Figure 9: CSO % Spend of PGII on Public Engagement and Development Education

This analysis is supported by the review of CSO approaches. Although DFA stakeholders identified examples of CSOs building capacity and exhibiting creative and innovative activities in development education and public engagement (**Error! Reference source not found.**), they argued that the quality of CSO contributions was variable, with stronger performers those that had existing organisational capacities to carry out public engagement and/or development education activities at the start of the PGII funding round. Stakeholders from CSOs without dedicated public engagement capacity in 2017 also remarked that they had struggled with implementation.

> **Box 6: Best Practice - Public Engagement and Development Education**
>
> **Volunteer Youth Advisor (VoYA) programme**
>
> The Volunteer Youth Advisor programme linked young people from Ireland and the Global South by selecting 14 young people to help build a needs-driven youth-program for 2020. The Youth Advisors were trained on global development issues, communication, facilitation and critical thinking skills; facilitated outreach events in Irish universities; participated in an online seminar with youth activists on environmental, health, and education advocacy in Malawi; had dialogue on climate change with the President of the UN General Assembly; and participated in the National Youth Council of Ireland's 'YOUth Climate Summit'. This worked to establish links between youth groups and bring focus to a number of key Irish policy issues.
>
> **Young Scientist and Technology Prize Collaboration**.
>
> One CSO collaborated with Irish Aid to present a Science for Development Award and Exhibition Showcase at the BT Young Scientist & Technology Exhibition. The event served as an opportunity to raise awareness of development, nurture corporate partnerships and to collaborate with Irish Aid.
>
> **World Café Events**
>
> Two CSOs collaborated to run an 'intergenerational café' as part of the activities for Positive Ageing Week 2019. This included running workshops to build awareness of inequalities and the SDGs. This collaborative approach should be encouraged to leverage CSO's wider networks and build space for partnerships and learning.

DFA stakeholders consider CSO weaknesses in public engagement to have been compounded by limited a capacity to engage with CSOs at the application stage in setting the agenda. In addition, a lack of capacity in DFA to manage the two workstreams prevented it from responding to CSO queries and overseeing a coherent strategy during the early evaluation period. Both CSO and DFA stakeholders agreed a better balance is needed in future to prevent the work stream from being side-lined by areas where the budget allocation is higher. While this was also the case for development education at the start of the PGII grant period, separate, dedicated capacity and bilateral meetings were later introduced into DFA. Time for both areas also needs to be ring-fenced in bilateral meetings to get a more complete bilateral analysis of results alongside multilateral arrangements such as Dóchas where learning can be shared.

This finding repeats the analysis of the 2015 PGI evaluation, that found some CSOs had applied for PGI funding to secure funds rather than build on relevant expertise. There was also limited DFA capacity to oversee these activities, and a lack of clarity as to whether development education and public engagement contributions were compulsory for PGI CSO partners. It is compounded by DFA guidelines that still lack clarity, leaving CSOs unclear about the separation of the Development Education and Public Engagement work streams.

Recent efforts by DFA to address these problems include a Performance Measurement Framework for Development Education that is now used to track results and provide feedback. By clarifying its measures of success CSOs are better able to align their contributions and the Department's ambitions, and for DFA to pool its PGII and wider partner contributions across the entire €5m DFA Development Education budget. There is also evidence of ongoing efforts to improve CSO guidance to support their engagement with the Department in these areas.

EQ 3.4. How effective was DFA and CSO monitoring, evaluation and learning in supporting the grant mechanisms?

Finding 21. CSO monitoring and reporting frameworks

CSOs were able to successfully apply results-based monitoring across different operational contexts in ways that were relevant to the organisation's programme ambitions. However, the adoption by DFA of a one-size-fits-all approach to partner reporting and limits to the annual report page count failed to capture the full range of CSO contributions.

The 2015 PGI evaluation considered the shift from output-focused RBM and reporting (under MAPS2) to a focus on outcomes (under PGI) as "*one of the Programme Grant's most commendable accomplishments*".[57] Although the process had been resource intensive for both DFA and CSOs, the improved quality of reporting by the grant partners raised the DFA-CSO dialogue to a more strategic level. For example, managing for results, improving MEAL systems, and using context analysis and theories of change. The PGI evaluation nevertheless found the quality of evidence supporting the reporting of results and organisational development investments to have been relatively weak.

This focus on the use of RBM has continued into the PGII. CSO partner monitoring and reporting covers field monitoring and aggregation in annual reports, monitoring visits and bi-annual bilateral discussions with DFA. To ensure a balanced review, CSO reports are reviewed by officers from CSDEU and HU. The OECD Peer Review (2020) concluded DFA was giving appropriate weight to encouraging CSOs to develop their own results monitoring and learning systems, a perspective shared by both CSO and DFA stakeholders.

DFA's CSO partners have largely reached a good level of understanding of RBM processes and report having developed MEAL systems that respond to RBF requirements. This was confirmed by independent research that found CSO adoption of RBFs may have facilitated greater understanding of complexity, an increase focus on outcomes through the systematic use of baselines and theories of change, and when applied well, the facilitation of greater accountability to beneficiaries through deliberative engagement in development programming and performance management.[58]

Nevertheless, for some CSOs the learning process has been hard, requiring significant investments in human resources and skills to reach the expected quality standards; an area that could be made more explicit in the funding for potential new CSO entrants in future. A small number of CSOs also expressed concerns with a lack of clarity on how they should report on results to DFA in cases when they pooled the funding with other donors. It is important to note that the majority of CSOs have navigated this by ensuring DFA funding is tied to a stand-alone single or multi-country programme or to have negotiated a combined report with DFA and its donor 'partners'.

In reviewing annual report appraisal scores, the Evaluation found a weak evidence base to have led CSO RBM assessments to score lower than other areas. In response, some CSOs have used PGII and HPP funds to introduce innovative monitoring approaches designed to better understand changes in social norms surrounding nutrition, GBV and sanitation behaviours. The challenges of

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[57] DFA, 2015. Review of the Irish Aid Programme Grant Mechanism. Coffey: London.
[58] Susan P. Murphy et al., 2019. Do results-based management frameworks frustrate or facilitate effective development practice? Irish international development sector experiences. Development in Practice (online)

monitoring such 'transformative' agendas affects the entire development sector so it is encouraging to see CSOs engaging with DFA in bilateral and multilateral discussions across forums like the Dóchas Results Working Group to improve the evidence base.

Although the shift to RBM has been largely successful, in the current monitoring and reporting system, the one-size-fits-all approach to partner reporting does not accommodate or reflect the size of grant, strategic and geographical scope, or innovation and policy contributions of CSOs. The annual reporting structure is the same for a CSO with programmes spanning seventeen countries to a CSO operating across two, thereby limiting the space for some CSOs to highlight learning, such as the challenges and responses it addressed in different contexts. This points to the need for a nuanced approach to reporting that is tailored to each CSO's partner agreement, and covers its programme and policy focus, compliance and risk management, and organisational development efforts.

Finding 22. Monitoring support to flexible programme management

DFA's openness to CSOs changing their results-based frameworks or shifting funds within the existing agreement has allowed them to flexibly adjust their programming to ongoing changes in context such as COVID-19. DFA has also supported CSOs to build local partner MEAL capacities and trial innovative approaches such as community-led outcome harvesting.

CSOs reported their RBFs and Theories of Change are developed collaboratively at the field, national and multi-country levels with the participation of stakeholders. CSOs consistently noted their ability to adjust frameworks and indicators according to contextual shifts, so long as the process and systems that justified the changes were transparent, including the presentation of context analyses. This process was overseen by each CSO Irish Office in liaison with their DFA partner manager. Through it, CSO stakeholders highlighted how DFA's monitoring requirements had pushed them to use their monitoring data and analysis to more effectively inform programme decision-making and to adjust indicators that weren't proving useful.

In some examples, CSOs reported retrospective adjustments were finalised in the annual report and bilateral feedback meeting, further emphasising the flexibility of the RBM arrangement. This comes in addition to the ability, under the PCM guidelines, for CSOs to move up to 20 percent of funds across activities within results areas on the basis of a simple request to DFA. Flexibility was particularly visible for COVID-19 related adjustments where most CSOs reported their ability to make adjustments within the existing RBF and 20 percent rule. The adjustment process was not seen as onerous by the CSO partners, who compared it extremely favourably to all other donors.

DFA support for CSO initiatives has also led to innovative mixed methods approaches to data collection. For example, there is strong evidence that CSOs with mandates that promote a localisation agenda have continued to use PGII and HPP funds to invest in strengthening the programme design, MEAL and risk management capacities of local partners.[59] In areas facing protracted crises and where COVID-19 has limited the CSO partner's access to the field, this has proved a highly strategic investment that has supported local level continuity. The Evaluation Team also found strong evidence of CSOs investing in developing innovative approaches to RBM including

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[59] A finding also reflected in the DFA, 2015. *Review of the Irish Aid Programme Grant Mechanism*. Coffey: London.

the introduction of community-led outcome harvesting by one CSO to complement the formal use of RBF indicators, supporting a more comprehensive joint learning process with local stakeholders.

Finding 23. Monitoring CSO policy contributions

High level alignment of CSO MEAL systems and the annual report is focused on each organisation's global or programmatic strategic ambitions rather than DFA Policy outcomes and there have been no efforts to adopt common, high-level indicators for CSO reporting.

Despite successes in RBM and reporting, both DFA internal stakeholders and 5 CSOs argued that there is comparatively limited attention given to areas of potential added value to DFA such as policy-related learning and advocacy. As with the 2015 PGI Evaluation, policy alignment to OWOF and ABW has not been a priority. Although DFA does now require CSOs to score their programmes against markers for Gender; Climate Change; reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health (RMNCH); and participatory democracy.

For DFA, this information is increasingly useful in its efforts to strengthen linkages between its global funding across sectors (using DAC sector codes) and its support for the SDGs and Harmonised Learning Outcomes (World Bank) and in line with its overall Policy targets. The data is analysed by partner managers, shared with DFA statisticians and Policy Unit, and is used to inform OECD DAC reporting, the Department's annual report and its high-level decision making. For the majority of CSOs however, it is unclear who is using this data and how, and the markers are not used as part of their strategic analysis of sector expenditures.

The focus of CSO results frameworks is first and foremost in relation to each CSO's global strategic frameworks, or its single, or multi-country programme strategy. The advantage of this approach is that it allows CSO partners to work in areas of comparative advantage. The disadvantage is that the results frameworks do not become part of strategic discussion or potential collaboration between DFA and its grant partners in strategic areas like policy, localisation and the civil society space.

One area being explored by the Department is the potential role of a set of high-level common indicators that would sit within a new Framework for Action for 'A Better World'.[60] Each CSO would be required to show their programme contributions to a selection of indicators in line with their strategic focus. FINNIDA and its CSO partners developed a set of indicators over 18 months that should be considered by CSOs for inclusion in their reports. Some large DFA grant partners have already developed internal high-level indicators within the CSO and the Department has introduced a set of development education indicators that have been used with some success.

However, no DFA or CSO stakeholders volunteered this as a suitable approach for the aggregation of results across more complex areas of context specific humanitarian and development programming. The risk expressed by many stakeholders is a simplified approach may lose sight of the differences between CSOs even in related thematic areas and fail to capture the subtle interactions outlined in A Better World between, as examples, People, Food and Security and cross-cutting gender, localisation and technical approaches. There is also evidence from UN agency evaluations that the processes of designing and building shared understanding of common indicators

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[60] The aim of the Framework for Action (2013-2017) was to provide the basis for measuring performance and demonstrating accountability of the Ireland's Development Cooperation programme

requires significant investment.[61] The Evaluation Team questions whether this approach would offer the Department a return on investment when compared to exploratory processes of joint learning.

EQ3.5: How effective was DFA's management of risk?

CSO risks have been a focus since the 2008 Civil Society Policy identified a number of risk areas including the clarity of CSO funding contributions to DFA policy outcomes, CSO dependencies, DFA funding and capacities to manage rapid funding growth, and the Department's ability to ensure public funds are made accountable to development outcomes. With managing risk a core requirement for the donor community, clarification of the expected control environment for DFA funding of its PGI and PGII partners was made with the 2014 introduction of the PCM guidelines (EQ 3.1 partner management) that require CSO partners to have established extensive policies and systems for the monitoring of risks and risk mitigation strategies at the field and headquarter levels in line with the Irish regulatory environment.[62] While not explicitly referenced in the guidelines, this approach aligned closely to international donor trends to managing risks that promote shared ownership,[63] including "getting CSOs to give critical assessments on risks to achieving objectives and short-term difficulties without losing sight of effectiveness and long-term impact."[64]

Finding 24. Risk management through CSOs

PGII and HPP risk management is mediated through the individual structures, processes, and self-managed decentralised country teams of CSOs. While this approach has for the most part been successful it relies on the Department's ability to have an eye on CSO risk oversight, identify instances where agreed standards aren't met, and help CSOs address associated governance failures.

DFA stakeholders report CSO risk compliance is generally well understood and adhered to, and there is strong evidence from CSOs that DFA PGII and HPP investments have provided a driver for, and contributed directly to, their investments in improving risk management systems and capacities. CSO and DFA stakeholder interviews and documentation clearly show the use of CSO internal risk management systems at field and HQ levels, including the adoption of codes of conduct and risk policies. CSO risk registers are reported to DFA alongside the annual report for areas such as safeguarding, fraud and staff wellbeing. Independent audit reports are shared with the Department.

Most higher-level CSO interviewees reported receiving risk induction training and refresher courses. There is also evidence of a sophisticated approach to managing local partner risk among most grant recipients. For example, CSOs that support a localisation and on-granting approach described address risk management that included strengthening partner risk management systems, requiring regular risk reports, undertaking monthly partner visits, and overseeing local partner procurement.

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[61] See for example, MOPAN, 2019. Organisational performance brief, FAO 2017-18. In particular the assessment of FAO's Programme Planning, Implementation Reporting and Evaluation Support System; and the MOPAN (2019) review of WFP (2017-18).

[62] The 2014 and 2019 PCM guidelines cover risk under sections on governance and financial oversight, audit and fraud. Appendices require the annual reporting of CSO risk registers. See, DFA, 2019. Programme Cycle Management Guidelines

[63] The principles of shared ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results and accountability, agreed in the 2005 Paris Declaration and reaffirmed in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action formed the core of the 2011 Busan Partnership and are promoted by the OECD Development Assistance Committee and Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

[64] OECD, 2012. Partnering with Civil Society: 12 Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews

Good practice in reporting risk registers that differentiate PGII and HPP programme risks from wider operational risks was also apparent among the majority of CSOs. However, the organisation of each CSO's country office risk register to capture risks associated with DFA funding was not apparent across all family CSO systems. There were also examples of CSOs that pooled DFA funds within multi-donor programmes without clearly tagging inter-related budgets, expenditures and RBFs. As a result, a number of DFA stakeholders requested there should be "…a much clearer mapping [by CSO partners] of how each organisation's guiding policies, technical support, authority and lines of accountability work in relation to Irish and other funding, and across its programme, country and global structures."

A further set of challenges emerged with governance failures of one CSO that required special measures including the suspension of funding and introduction of audit controls. The Evaluation Team acknowledges the Department's subsequent support to the CSO as a reflection of good practice in its duty of care for grant holders. However, in the absence of DFA contingency plans to ensure the extra demands on partner managers were supported in such instances, this positive response also placed significant demands on already stretched staff at the cost of their engagement with other CSO partners.

Finding 25. DFA oversight of risk management

DFA's risk management approach has relied on a constructive relationship with CSOs built around transparent and effective CSO risk oversight and reporting. There is evidence that DFA and CSOs have collaborated in agreeing Safeguarding standards and ensuring alignment between DFA requirements and those of the Charity Regulator. To build on these positive steps, it will be important for DFA to maintain its oversight of CSO risk efforts by expanding governance reviews that ensure effective Board and executive oversight is in place.

There is agreement among most stakeholders that the Department's willingness to build its risk oversight model around high levels of CSO autonomy strikes an appropriate balance between risk management standard setting and recognising that CSOs operating in high-risk contexts may at times find it challenging to meet them. The evaluation also found no evidence of a reluctance on the part of DFA to support CSOs that work through local partners including in protracted crises. Although some CSOs argued that the oversight demands of anti-terrorism legislation had led to a reluctance to work with local partners, this was not considered a barrier to CSOs whose strategic approach strongly involved local partners in programme implementation including in high-risk areas.[65]

With the emergence of the COVID-19 epidemic in 2020, DFA allowed CSOs considerable freedom to make adjustments to RBFs and programme strategies. Although this led to only limited changes in CSO programming during 2020, it has focused attention on the importance for DFA in having confidence in how CSOs factor-in risk strategies to ensure programmes can be sustained in shifting contexts, including development contexts, where access may become restricted.

The primary mechanisms for DFA oversight of this approach include measures outlined in earlier sections such as CSO accountability to the PCM guidelines, reporting against RBFs and risk

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[65] Reporting on anti-terrorism efforts is not a requirement under Irish legislation but is demanded by some other donors.

registers, and the Department's standardisation of grant management (Box 7). The Evaluation Team agree with the positive assessment of these measures, and overall approach to CSO risk management in the 2020 OECD-DAC peer review.[66]

DFA and CSO stakeholders also agree this approach, when resourced properly, can help focus the DFA-CSO risk relationship on ensuring adequate analysis, early recognition and transparency based on a "tell us before we hear" dynamic that can be managed on a 1-1 DFA-CSO basis. This arrangement relies on a clear understanding of each CSO's control environment and an ongoing dialogue in order to understand and identify areas where risk management may not meet expected standards and agree mitigating actions.

DFA partner managers argue the two-way process has led to more proactive

Box 7: DFA approach to partner risk management
Driven at headquarters level including,
- Standardisation of SAGM and PCM partner appraisal and monitoring mechanisms
- Risk reporting through the annual report in line with PCM guidelines – hence a reliance on the quality of CSO risk scrutiny and transparency in reporting
- CSO risk levels are scored and pulled into the MoU
- Strong focus on anti-corruption following the CSO fraud case example
- Development of a policy on preventing sexual exploitation, harassment and abuse in line with the 2020 OECD DAC peer review recommendation
- Open frank dialogue with partner organisations led by DFA partner manager
- Bilateral meetings and monitoring visits
- Introduction of CSO governance reviews from 2018

examples of CSO feedback on risk 'events' allowing them to build confidence in CSOs engaged in adaptive programming in complex contexts. There is also agreement that the building of common understanding to Safeguarding by DFA and CSOs, with the support of the Dóchas Results Working Group, has provided a positive example for ensuring risk management standards are mainstreamed and that future high level CSO collaboration of this kind may help CSOs and DFA address future potential risks.

In some respects, comparator agencies such as FINNIDA go further than DFA in this approach by viewing the primary oversight responsibility for CSO risk management systems to reside with the Charity Regulator. The role of their strategic (programme) partner managers is to engage in an ongoing risk dialogue with the CSOs to ensure the "tell us before we hear" dynamic allows them to focus on a facilitation role that looks to maximise areas of complementarity to the government's policy objectives.

Although the evaluation found some partner managers argue for a strong risk oversight function to remain in DFA, most consider recent engagement by the Department and Irish Charity Regulator to be a positive step. Given the Regulator provides a first line of risk assurance that ensures CSO systems for preventing risks such as sexual exploitation, harassment and abuse or fraud are in place, the Evaluation Team considers it appropriate for DFA to align its own approach to risk oversight. This can then be complimented by the independent review of CSO audit reports and DFA-led CSO risk oversight.

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[66] The evaluation found examples where intelligence over context shifts was shared between CSOs and the Mission, including cases of rapid onset disasters, insecurity, and strategic shifts in government or multilateral agencies.

Where these arguments converged was in highlighting the essential need for DFA to have the right skills for CSO risk oversight in place, and of investing in CSO risk capacity strengthening, especially in the case of new grant recipients (Table 5 below). It was therefore encouraging that there was evidence that CSDEU and HU have jointly introduced governance reviews to ensure CSO Board and executive oversight and risk management are sufficiently developed, and consideration was being given to integrate Governance assessment with MOU capacity benchmarks.

Table 5: Summary of advantages and disadvantages of the DFA approach to CSO risk

Advantages	Disadvantages
High flexibility and longer-term funding (HPP and PGII) have led to ability for CSOs to manage risks associated to context and programmatic shifts	Not a one-size fits-all approach – risk oversight requires a level of understanding of individual CSO operations across different countries and its corporate governance arrangements
Support for adaptive programming has led to stronger, more effective, and efficient programmes (aid effectiveness and grand bargain) plus the ability to leverage wider funds	Gaps in understanding of individual CSOs can lead to greater focus on compliance and risk management drawing attention away from the value-added joint policy, advocacy and learning capabilities of CSOs
CSO autonomy and decentralised aspects, seems to have mostly led to appropriate levels of CSO trust and commitment to improving organisational and programme performance	High levels of trust needed in the grant management arrangements and in following the line of sight between funding and risk. Among new entrants reaching this level of trust may take time and will rely on CSOs evidencing their capacity development
At global policy level, Safeguarding was a mature example of DFA-CSO engagement to set rules of the game around risk	No contingency funding or human resources to support CSOs that fall into special measures despite placing a heavy extra workload on DFA partner managers
Appropriate and efficient for the Department to support CSO internal systems that are compliant with the Irish Charity Regulator and avoid replicating the demands of other donors.	

EQ4. Are the PGII and HPP Theories of Change relevant and coherent?

Finding 26. DFA use of Theories of Change

The inclusion of a Theory of Change in the PGII strategic framework provided a broad framing of DFA support to the contributions or 'Inputs' of its CSO grant partners. No HPP Theory of Change was developed, and the PGII framework did not articulate the ways in which the collective (over and above the individual) contributions of CSOs would be assessed in relation to the high level ambitions of the PGII grant mechanism.

The PGII Theory of Change (Annex 2) was outlined in the PGII Strategic Framework that was shared with the CSOs in advance of the application process. This set out how partner and DFA inputs should support the delivery of the programme, which would in turn support the realisation of three outcomes that were informed by Irish Aid's Civil Society Policy. It provided the basis of the current evaluation intervention logic, structure and focus of the evaluation questions (Annexes 1 and 3). The Programme Grant Partner Inputs clearly set out expectations for CSOs (Box 8) with the first two categories articulated as the basis for DFA funding inputs, the third and fourth for DFA feedback and quality assurance, and the last three operating as the basis for DFA relationship management and policy dialogue.

The Theory of Change was situated within the policy context of OWOF and drew on the 2015 Review of the Programme Grant Mechanism and lessons learned from PGI. Continued alignment to ABW was supported by the extension of DFA's high level commitments as illustrated in Annex 7. The Programme Grant Outcomes set the direction for CSOs to continue using a programmatic approach and provided them considerable flexibility in framing their own Theories of Change and RBFs. However, beyond individual CSO annual reports and bilateral meetings, the current evaluation found no clear articulation of how these CSO-led processes and their humanitarian and development contributions (the Programme Grant outputs) would be assessed against the Programme Grant outcomes on a grant level basis. While this may become clearer through the meta-review of CSO evaluations planned for 2021, there has been no annual assimilation of CSO partner contributions to the PGII outcomes during the evaluation period. Instead, the primary focus since 2017 has been on managing bilateral CSO relationships through the application process, annual reports and bilateral reviews.

> ### Box 8: CSO Theory of Change Inputs
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> 1. A sound strategic policy basis consistent with the overall approach of OWOF underpins partners' programmes
> 2. Rigorous context analysis informs a strong context analysis and targeting strategy and takes into account factors contributing to marginalization, notably gender, climate etc.
> 3. Partners engage at macro, meso and micro level and global level where relevant with linkages between.
> 4. A strategic approach to partnership builds capacity and space for collective participation in development processes.
> 5. Partners have strong RBM systems that support PCM and encourage innovation.
> 6. Partners apply the highest standards of accountability, good governance, and financial oversight in managing programmes.
> 7. Partners conduct engagement with the Irish public and development education in a strategic and quality-focused way.

This gap may explain why the Evaluation Team heard no reference to the PGII Theory of Change among interviewees except when prompted. Nor has there been an update to the PGII Theory of Change during the implementation period, suggesting its use has not been instrumental to decision making on a bilateral or grant level basis. Furthermore, the Department has yet to prepare a HPP Theory of Change. While there are arguments that emergency response processes should commit to the Humanitarian Principles and Core Humanitarian Standards rather than a Theory of Change, this

perspective does not consider the two further dimensions of the HPP strategic framework of enabling communities to prepare for future crises and building resilience to support early recovery. It is therefore encouraging that there is clear recognition in the HU that a future HPP Theory of Change should be developed.

An area where there has been strong evidence of progress relative to the PGI is in the CSOs' own use of Theories of Change to frame their country and multi-country programmes. The Evaluation Team found strong evidence that these were linked to context analyses, and informed their results frameworks, monitoring systems and reporting to DFA. Each of the 7 CSO Theories of Change in the evaluation sample also showed a level of coherence with ABW and the higher-level goals in the PGII Theory of Change. This points to opportunities to 'nest' future CSO Theories of Change within a revised DFA Theory of Change to support the grant-wide analysis of DFA and CSO contributions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Department is to be commended for progress in advancing the work of CSOs and their humanitarian and development contributions. The Evaluation Team has found numerous significant examples of good practice at both the programmatic and organisational levels that offer opportunities for the future.

The conclusions and recommendations build on the analysis of past PGII and HPP performance and are presented in relation to:

- The strategic ambition of the funding arrangements
- DFA's approach to CSO partnerships
- The effectiveness of the PGII and HPP funding models
- DFA's approach to grant management, and
- Theory of Change.

The first three areas, alongside the Theory of Change, top and tail areas of high-level strategic guidance to the Department in line with the formative evaluation Terms of Reference. Within DFA's approach to grant management, the evaluation team focuses on operational areas to support future delivery of these strategic areas by covering:

- The application process
- Grant management systems
- DFA Capacities, and
- Risk management.

Conclusion 1: Strategic Ambition

The clear advantage of the programme partnership arrangement as compared with core funding is its ability to achieve an appropriate balance between CSO autonomy and their accountability for delivering planned programme outcomes and contributions to ABW. This was highlighted by information gained from comparator agencies and annual reviews, OECD DAC peer review, earlier evaluations, ODI Principled Aid Index and was consistently highlighted by all evaluation stakeholders.

DFA's ambitions for the strategic contributions of PGII and HPP are sufficiently open to allowing CSOs autonomy for them to prioritise the areas they will work on in line with their mandate, strategic focus, experiences and capacities. It is for CSOs to decide how they will approach the humanitarian nexus or localisation, not DFA. The Evaluation Team considers this approach to be appropriate. Examples included:

- Scope within OWOF and ABW: poverty reduction, reaching furthest behind first, fragile states, food, people, protection ensure a diversity of entry points for CSOs each with its own sectoral experience.

- Older policies also provide sufficient scope for CSOs, including but not limited to the Civil Society, Gender, Humanitarian Assistance Policies.
- CSOs were closely involved in the design stage of ABW, allowing most of them to help shape the policy scope and build their understanding of the Department's policy ambitions. ABW is also continuing to evolve in how it connects to programmes, missions and CSOs.
- The PGII and HPP strategic frameworks and PGII Theory of Change were left sufficiently open to CSO interpretation, allowing them to build a pragmatic alignment between their programmes and wider organisational policy ambitions.
- The funding models allowed CSOs to provide multiple examples, using a variety of approaches, of appropriate programmes that work within the double-triple nexus. This reflected well against a global policy ambition toward providing predictable and flexible funding that holistically addresses humanitarian, development and where relevant, peacebuilding needs and was appropriate to Ireland's Grand Bargain commitments.

The autonomy given to CSOs to design programmes that leverage their own experience and comparative advantage has led to a diversity of CSO interpretation of their broader policy alignment. While this supports CSO integrity and independence, the relationship between CSO use of the grant mechanisms and how they might contribute to the Department's policy and Mission level goals remained ambiguous.

Instead of a systematic approach to policy collaboration the Evaluation found a series of task-led examples of DFA-CSO policy discussions that focused on 'live' policy agendas. In some instances these were bilateral (such as on Scaling-up Nutrition), in others DFA was able to convene most CSO partners (for example the Dóchas-supported work on Safeguarding). While these examples did provide a sound basis for policy engagement, its inherent informality made it easier for CSOs with significant resources to engage with DFA than for others. Although this is to some extent inevitable, there was a clear appetite among CSOs for a more systematic approach that could provide a springboard for structured CSO-DFA collaboration in areas of common policy interest.

Similarly, the evaluation found no systematic approach to facilitating Mission level cooperation. Most Mission representatives were unaware of the level of PGII and HPP funding to individual CSOs in their countries of operation or the priority sectors of their Mission strategies. In the face of capacity limitations among Ireland's Missions, gaps in the communication of this information may have limited some Missions' ability to engage with DFA's PGII and HPP partners at a country level. Recent initiatives indicate scope for closing the loop between CSDEU, HU, the Africa Unit and other geographic desks in DCAD that could open avenues for closer Mission-CSO relationships. For example, by involving CSDEU and HU directors in monthly meetings with Heads of Mission and promoting periodic meetings between in-country CSOs and Missions, DFA may potentially help intelligence sharing in ways that better facilitate CSO contributions to Ireland's Mission strategies.

The flexibility and long-term nature of PGII funding in particular is seen by many CSOs as an opportunity to take a next step from what are often project based to more strategic organisations with greater capacities to extend their vision and mission. While the Evaluation Team recognises the PGII eligibility criteria were an appropriate reflection of DFA objectives and capacities in 2016, when looking ahead, the Department needs to be unambiguous about whether it wants to build a broader partner base. One option discussed by DFA and unsuccessful CSO applicants that was adopted by FINNIDA over the last 5 years is to consider a form of graduation support to smaller 'project' CSOs

wishing to shift out of the Civil Society Fund and apply for bridging funding that might help them build organisational capacities and start to shift from a project focused to more programmatic approach.

Recommendation 1 – Strategic Ambition

Given the significant expenditure on CSO partnerships, and the need to ensure funding remains flexible, the Department should clarify the potential value added of the funding and its strategic policy intent. This includes areas where it will look for future contributions to ABW, DFA's role in broadening the Irish civil society base for international development, and the ways in which it will systematically promote policy discussion and collaboration with CSOs both individually and collectively, while continuing to uphold their independence and autonomy.

The current approach of letting CSOs drive their own areas of policy, programming and geographical focus should be retained, as it allows them to leverage their strategic capacities and comparative advantage whilst also aligning with DFA's overarching policy goals.

The Department should revisit its strategic framework and high-level ambitions for future funding with respect to Global Ireland / Global Island / A Better World, as well as the Civil Society Policy to examine its potential role in supporting Irish civil society. This includes opportunities to:

- Develop a more systematic and structured approach to CSO policy discussions and defining areas of policy collaboration in CSO memoranda of understanding.
- Support closer country level CSO-Mission relationships by improving internal communications of the future PGII and HPP programmes to Missions to support their country level engagement of CSO partners;[67] and,
- Renew DFA's Civil Society Policy ambitions by establishing clearer bilateral expectations for CSOs with respect to their support for localisation.

Collectively, it will be important for the Department to communicate these high-level ambitions to its current and potential new partners in order to set the expectations of future applicants and partners.

Conclusion 2 – DFA partnership approach

By allowing CSOs to focus on their individual strategic goals, specialist functions, operational contexts, and modalities, the PGII and HPP programmes support flexibility and diversity across its Department's partners. The strength of this approach relies on the efficiency and effectiveness of these CSO partner strategies and systems. CSO Irish offices hold significant responsibility for the oversight of grant management requirements. There is strong evidence they oversee most aspects of grant management within their existing structures and processes, thereby freeing up both the CSOs' own country offices and DFA. As a result of this, the grants strongly reinforce efficiencies by promoting the internal coherence of CSOs between their headquarter, country and field level offices.

There is strong evidence of good practice in terms of DFA providing support to CSOs on governance, safeguarding, financial management, and risk. This has allowed the Department to build high levels of trust with most CSOs and to reinforce their individual autonomy. As an example, the Department's

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[67] It is also appropriate that where there is no Mission presence there are clear benefits for extending the Department's strategic reach through its CSO partnerships

decision to support one CSO that required special measures showed a duty of care that most donors would not have provided. Nevertheless, the potential for difficulties to arise in DFA-CSO partner relationships suggests DFA must be upfront as to the levels of confidence and trust it has with its CSO partners, and to ensure it has the skills, bandwidth and insight to identify and manage shortfalls as soon as possible.

The evaluation found DFA did not clearly differentiate between grant and partner management. The lack of partner management capacity at times led to a primary focus on contract compliance and fund disbursements, particularly when new grant managers or managers with less experience in international development were recruited as partner managers. When considering partner management in future, a more nuanced approach is needed to bring out the different strengths and weaknesses of each CSO and focus DFA oversight for each. Given the range of CSO partners, one-size does not fit all. It reduces opportunities to engage CSOs on a level appropriate to each and moves attention away from the potential value added both partner managers and CSOs may add to the funding arrangement.

In this respect, it is notable that although the Evaluation Team developed and tested a CSO typology that differentiated PGII and HPP partners in different ways, at no point did this give a clear picture of how the different strengths or weaknesses of each partner might be managed. While grouping CSOs is tempting, the Evaluation Team concluded it would be better to focus on concrete areas of analysis, accountability and support appropriate to each partner. The following recommendation focuses on mechanisms that might help the Department achieve this in future.

Recommendation 2 – Partnership approach

Effective DFA-CSO partnerships can be built around existing relationships and the current 'comply or explain' dynamic that contributes to, and may at times challenge, the extensive decision-making space given to CSOs. To improve the conditions for this relationship, DFA should consider unpacking its approach to CSO partnerships. When constructing its MOU agreement with each partner, DFA ought to consider the levels of trust and autonomy it is willing to provide each, and clearly delineate the expected contributions of both the Department and the CSO. Two management tools may be considered to support this approach. The first focuses on bringing a review of trust more clearly into the scope of decision-making based, for illustrative purposes, on a "trust equation" where,

Trust =
$$\frac{\text{(Partner Capacity + Performance (current \& past) + Transparency + Relationship)}}{\text{(the CSO's self-orientation + Irish office 'control' of this)}}$$

DFA's eye should also be toward working strategically with CSO partners in relation to their individual strengths, weaknesses, comparative advantages, and potential value-added contributions. To this end, the Department should consider breaking down the *individual* partnership with each CSO in ways that will allow DFA to agree their specific programme, policy and organisational expectations.

To this end, a decision tool for DFA partner managers can be structured in terms of the different core dimensions of the Grant including the CSO's planned Geographical reach and its targets for Programme outcomes, Programme quality, Policy value addition, Development Education and/or Public Engagement, Compliance and risk, and Organisational capacity development. At the

Application phase, the ambitions of the CSO should be assessed and agreed across each area. CSO implementation can then be reported on and reviewed annually on a formal and informal basis.

In some, not necessarily all areas, DFA and the CSO may want to identify specific areas of collaboration with the CSO, for instance in identifying specific Missions or Policy areas where the CSO and DFA share a common agenda, in order to help the Department's partner managers to support this wider institutional engagement (Table 6).

Table 6: Indicative CSO partner management framework

Partnership area	Application *What is the CSO planning to do?*	Implementation *How will DFA and the CSO review outcomes?*	Value added *How will DFA promote CSO collaboration?*
Geographical reach			
Programme outcomes			
Programme quality			
Policy value addition			
Development education			
Public engagement			
Compliance and risk			
Organisational capacities			

Conclusion 3 – Funding model

Without exception, both DFA and CSO stakeholders at the country and Irish office levels support the continued provision of long-term, relevant, context focused and flexible PGII and HPP programme funding. A key strength of the PGII and HPP is that they allow each CSO to build on its organisational strengths and capacities. When compared to alternative funding models, DFA's support for the individual and collective use of PGII and HPP funds by CSOs, the Blended funding pilot, and 2020 COVID-19 response show the funding approaches promoted enhanced efficiencies and effectiveness in CSO programme design, management, and delivery. More could nevertheless have been done to better promote CSO localisation efforts and to enhance their support to development education and public engagement outcomes. Each of these cases is taken in turn.

PGII funding model

The PGII funding model continues to be relevant to a changing development landscape. Through the grant, DFA has supported its DAC commitments for a "coherent approach to programming involving appropriate, flexible and predictable funding to civil society organisations". This has not required DFA to determine what a CSO should do: it has been about supporting, promoting, and facilitating CSOs to design and implement programmes that are appropriate to their organisational mandate, contexts of operation, technical focus, relevant capacities and experience.

There is strong evidence that the Department's CSO partners have designed programmes based on context analyses, and that they have adapted their programmes to changes in context. The provision of flexible, long-term PGII funding has clearly enabled CSOs to operate at the micro, meso, macro and global levels and strengthen the inter-linkages between them, such as by strengthening both civil society and government capacities. The Evaluation Team also considers the use of the PGII and HPP to provide the strategic underpinning of CSO programmes and leverage wider donor support to have been a positive attribute of the funding mechanisms.

Nevertheless, partnerships do at times require DFA to play the critical friend. For example, CSOs should be required to explain the value added of its funding to country and sub-national programmes in cases where the proportion drops below agreed thresholds. These can be agreed in each CSO's memorandum of understanding at the start of the grant cycle according to its specific programmatic and fund allocation approach. Similarly, in areas such as localisation that clearly converge with a number of DFA policy priorities, the evaluation team considers there to be a legitimate role for DFA to encourage *all* CSO partners toward a more progressive and inclusive programming approach.

HPP funding model

The evaluation found the HPP correctly balances the need to ensure that CSOs maintain their humanitarian response capacities and initiate their surge response (including with ERFS funding) whilst also targeting longer-term resilience building in contexts of protracted crisis. This is a highly strategic approach to humanitarian partnerships that broadly aligns with the ambitions of the HPP to respond to immediate lifesaving needs, while enabling communities to prepare for future crises and building resilience to support their early recovery.

In the provision of HPP funding, the Department has rightly avoided trying to define what a nexus or other relevant programming approach might be. The evaluation found clear examples of relevant programming appropriate to the different CSO partners' core strengths, including resilience building, women's empowerment, inter-community peacebuilding and preparedness planning, and the capacity building of local partners and government institutions during complex emergencies.

The HPP funding model and the Department's willingness to share risks to have strongly supported CSO engagement in double and triple nexus programming in areas affected by protracted crisis. The Evaluation Team consider this to contrast well in comparison to the more restrictive and time-limited funding arrangements of most OECD-DAC members. Given this is an area of existing leadership, DFA should consider the continued strategic ring-fencing of nexus and humanitarian in future to build on this. While the Department's focus on inviting eligible CSOs has allowed it to manage risks, consideration should be given to opening the fund to a wider pool of CSO applicants on the basis they are able to show demonstrable experience, systems, and capacities to uphold the Core Humanitarian Standards and Humanitarian Principles.

Blended funding model

There is strong evidence the blended funding model has worked well for Goal, who applied it flexibly across the humanitarian-development nexus. DFA emphasis on partner management surrounding the pilot was appropriate and should be considered more broadly as a model of engaging all its CSO partners. While the evaluation team is broadly supportive of the blended pilot for programmes in the

nexus space, it may not be an appropriate mechanism for all CSOs such as those in the PGII who welcomed the current flexibility of the funding model.

CSOs are consistent in their support for current PGII-HPP-ERFS funding arrangements. Flexible nexus programming approaches are evident among HPP partners, with good examples of CSOs supporting civil society engagement and/or using the ERFS as a crisis modifier. CSOs have already aligned their PGII and HPP financial and budgetary arrangements, lines of accountability and control, and their head office and country programming teams to manage the grants. With these systems in place, any introduction of the blended model across the partner group risks significant and perhaps unnecessary disruption should CSOs be expected to move quickly towards adopting this approach. The evaluation team do not consider this a necessary shift to operate in the spirit of existing CSO mandates. Instead, consideration should be given to bringing GOAL into an expanded HPP or combination of the PGII and HPP as with other CSOs while maintaining their integrated results framework.

CSO support for Localisation

A large majority of DFA and CSO stakeholders consider good practice to include efforts to enhance the capacities and engagement of local communities, civil society partners and government structures in delivering and sustaining programme outcomes. This ambition aligns with DFA policy priorities and can be applied to all but the most acute humanitarian emergencies. While in many cases localisation was seen to include on-granting to local partners, the diversity of localisation approaches applied by CSOs strongly suggests there is a need for DFA to develop a framework that supports a broader analysis. It is encouraging that least a third of DFA's CSO partners already use independent assessments and feedback to understand the extent to which their local partners consider themselves to have been empowered and able to deliver their own strategic priorities.

The Evaluation Team consider this strategic approach to partner engagement to warrant more focused support in future. For example, CSOs without long-term experience of working with or through local partners may need to invest in building internal capacities and strengthening due diligence processes to properly manage risks. Such arrangements should be made explicit in future CSO memoranda of understanding. Opportunities to promote lesson sharing among grant partners (e.g. policies, systems and training support for localisation) should be promoted. DFA should also consider how it might build on the plans of one CSO looking to establish a regional localisation hub in East Africa to support this and other PGII-HPP partners.

Funding to Development Education and Public Engagement

It is appropriate for development education and public engagement to be viewed as part of a range of formal and informal education and communications approaches to strengthening global citizenship and building public support in Ireland. It is also appropriate for these areas to be integral components of the DFA CSO programme funding portfolio. Revisions to this approach have been captured in a recent development education and public engagement guidance paper and may be incorporated within an updated development education strategy, as well as a revised communications strategy for the Department planned in 2021. This can be used to guide future partnerships in this area that add value to DFA's programme funding to CSOs.

Overall, the Evaluation Team conclude the following commitments should be considered:

- Public engagement and development education remain part of the Programme Grant,

- The two should be combined into a global citizenship work stream focusing on development issues and supporting public awareness of Irelands aid programme,
- Each CSO should each determine its specific approach based on its niche and skills,
- Funds allocated to each NGO should be based on the quality of their development education and/or public engagement application rather than as a proportion of the wider grant,
- Future CSO funding applications should continue to include results frameworks specific to this area,
- Common indicators will be explored to aggregate outcomes across CSO programmes,
- CSO public engagement on Irish domestic issues should be linked to its global dimensions,

Recommendation 3 – Funding Model

DFA has shown leadership among OECD-DAC peers in adopting an integrated model of development, nexus and humanitarian funding and support for public engagement. The programmatic approach is rightly praised by CSO field, country and headquarter staff for its long-term, flexible and predictable support that can be tailored to each specific context of operation without carrying the high overheads of other funding arrangements. Rather than revise this model, the Department should explore ways to build on this success.

Given the distinct emergency response, resilience/nexus, development and public engagement contexts and CSO contributions, the PGII – HPP – ERFS funding models should be retained. They can however be delineated in a more nuanced manner. This could include a funding model consisting of four separate areas or 'Lots' including DEVelopment (current PGII), CHRonic crisis fund (current HPP), ACUte crisis fund (current ERFS), and PUBlic engagement (development education and public engagement). These can be managed through a single call for applications with CSOs applying to each lot in accordance with their own strategic ambitions and capacities.

To respond to the different funding lines within the Department and ensure the analysis of each Lot focuses on the integrity and quality of each individual application to each area, separate RAM processes should be considered for the DEV, CHR and PUB Lots.

Consideration should also be given to opening up access to the HPP, and with it the ERFS, to CSO partners based on their demonstrable humanitarian experience, skills and capacities and ability to successfully apply the Core Humanitarian Principles.

To strengthen programming in line with the localisation ambitions of the Civil Society Policy and A Better World, DFA should consider reviewing the extent to which individual CSOs are looking to extend their work through local partners and government institutions. To assess CSO progress in this area, the Department needs to expand its analysis of CSO localisation support beyond the use of the flow of funds metric of CSO on-granting to local partners. For example, DFA should consider requiring CSOs to include targets for local partner and wider capacity building in their results frameworks.[68] As an example, and to capture the diversity of localisation efforts, a review model could be considered that scores CSO localisation commitments across four key areas (Figure 10).

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[68] See, for example: DFID, 2015. DFID Civil Society Challenge Fund, Final Evaluation

Figure 10: Localisation review model

The existing rules for CSO eligibility for the CHR (HPP) lot should be reviewed to allow more CSOs the option to apply while evidencing their humanitarian capacities. The exact determination of funding for DEV (PGII) and CHR (HPP) should depend on the quality of CSO applications. Given the potential shift of the blended model into this portfolio, consideration should be given to expanding the CHR (HPP) lot.

Linkages to the ACU (ERFS) fund should remain a sub-component of the CHR (HPP) portfolio and open only to HPP grant recipients. Because of the specific requirements, context analysis and need to understand the humanitarian capacities of CSO partners (Core Humanitarian Standards, Humanitarian Principles) oversight and management of ACU (ERFS) should remain in the Humanitarian Unit.

RAM assessment scores for CSO applications to the PUB funding lot should be separated from other funding lots (DEV, CHR, ACU). CSOs wishing to apply should demonstrate specific competencies, reach, and experience in development education and public engagement as is required in the other areas. Given the specific nature of development education and public engagement programming, and its Irish focus, a dedicated manager and team should continue to oversee the area with strong communications emphasis. DFA should seek to visualise the activities that fall under public engagement and development education in a table or simple graphic to provide CSOs with a clearer definition and guidance on the two work areas in advance of the applications.

Conclusion 4 Application Process

Eligibility, application, fund allocation, programme of work, MOU and contracting business processes allow DFA to be upfront in negotiating a comprehensive partnership agreement with each CSO based on a clear and transparent analysis of its strengths and weaknesses across all dimensions of the proposed partnership. The PGII and HPP grant structures and eligibility processes built on learning from earlier funding cycles enabled DFA to identify and support appropriate and effective partners. The joint PGII-HPP application process was an appropriate and efficient approach to their identification.

The PGII eligibility criteria ensured a level of organisational capacity suitable for existing CSO partners and new entrants. The application process provided a platform for CSOs to present, and DFA to

effectively assess, core expectations of PGII and HPP applications, including context analysis, CSO programme level Theories of Change and whether the strategic basis was consistent with the overall approach of the PGII and HPP mechanisms and aspirations of OWOF.

While the invitation to join the HPP did not explicitly require CSOs to meet the Core Humanitarian Standards, their past experience of working in the humanitarian sphere and ability to pass the PGII eligibility requirements were an efficient means of managing risks. However, they also left potential HPP partners out of the picture and consideration could have been given to opening up HPP applications to CSOs based on their demonstrable capacities and experience and ability to describe their approach to working across the humanitarian-development nexus.

While the one-stage application process and RAM provided a level playing field for CSO applications and was an efficient vehicle for DFA to manage, it was difficult for new CSO entrants and organisations with limited resources to apply. Only limited consideration was given to finding ways to help CSOs with limited fundraising capacities (but potentially innovative programme portfolios) to apply.

Recommendation 4 – Application Process

CSOs should be able to apply for a combination of Development, Chronic/Acute crisis, and Public Support funding (or Lots) in line with their context analysis, reach, capacity and experience. Eligibility for ERFS should continue to be restricted to HPP recipients. CSOs should also be invited to propose a focused shortlist of policy learning and value addition areas they will look to contribute to during the funding cycle in line with their own strategic aspirations. Consideration should also be given to inviting CSOs to identify related areas of collaboration with the Department at the Headquarter and/or Mission levels which DFA may choose to build on (or not) according to its own strategic priorities.

In line with the Partnerships conclusion 2, CSOs should be required to justify their ambition by presenting a clear assessment of their organisational compliance and risk management systems and capacities (including in the humanitarian and development education spheres) as well as their organisational level capacity strengthening plans to ensure high levels of quality can be achieved.

Adjustments to be considered for a future application process include reviewing the RAM basis (application, previous performance and absorption) to include the strategic value add and assessment of organisational capacities for an indicative fund allocation. To this end, DFA should consider factoring-in wider knowledge of CSO organisational capacities in partner assessments and RAM calculations such as by scoring prior CSF/ PGII / HPP partnerships, monitoring visit findings, organisational assessments and the results of earlier CSO evaluations.

To support smaller CSOs and new entrants two models should be explored:

- For CSOs that pass through the first application round, consideration could be given to providing a tailored pathway in which DFA and the CSO undertake a technical review of capacities and required areas of organisational development to support to the CSO 'programme of work' before finalising the agreement.
- A 5-year 'midway' or 'bridging' grant that targets support to potential future Irish CSO 'pre-PG' grant applicants (such those within the CSF) to review and build their organisational, compliance, programming and risk systems, capacities, policies and standards could be considered opening up their ability to apply in a future funding round.

Conclusion 5 – Grant Management Systems

The combination of results-based processes and PCM guidelines provided effective and efficient management support for the PGII and HPP gran programmes. Their interpretation and use by DFA partner managers and directors was sufficiently flexible to allow CSO partners to manage results frameworks in ways that supported innovation and the ability to adapt to contextual changes including climate events, the COVID-19 pandemic, displacements and insecurity.

Introduction of the SAGM in 2018 was comparatively less efficient in supporting grant management due to its having overlayed existing grant management processes overseen by CSDEU and HU. There were also delays in the annual disbursement of PGII funds that in some cases led to the transfer of risk by DFA grant recipients to local partners. Given the SAGM conforms to Ireland's annual, Government-wide budget cycle, the Department is unable to provide multi-year funding to PGII and HPP partners. It is therefore important for DFA and its CSO partners to recognise the potential delays in annual fund disbursements in memoranda of understanding but to also find ways for DFA contracts to share the risk with CSOs such that their internal budget processes can accommodate the delays in ways that avoid stop-start programme delivery.

The use of annual reports, bilateral meetings and monitoring visits as the main progress, accountability and learning vehicles for the PGII and HPP resulted in a one-to-one, DFA-CSO focused approach to managing the portfolios. Due to capacity limitations within the Department these bilateral processes at times became overly focused on compliance and the release of funds rather than as mechanisms to support the wider partnership.

More could have been done to build on individual and portfolio level CSO policy and programme learning as part of the Department's strategic approach to Policy analysis and engagement. A more systematic approach to DFA-CSO policy collaboration could have been envisaged involving both individual and multiple CSO partners according to the area of interest. While the Dóchas Working Groups supported a limited amount of lesson sharing, more could have been done by DFA to promote collaborative learning.

It will also be important for DFA to clarify the role of future monitoring visits on a case-by-case basis. According to the Department's relationship and understanding of each CSO, the Evaluation Team considers monitoring visits to serve two core functions: either the visit should support the assessment of CSO performance and exercise of DFA oversight; or it should help DFA partner managers to strengthen their familiarity of the CSO and explore opportunities for future collaboration. One or other of these functions needs to be agreed in the preparation of the terms of reference for each visit. In either case, both DFA should and CSO stakeholders agree the make-up of the DFA team should include experienced humanitarian and/or development professionals able to properly review a CSO programme, partner, and management practice.

Recommendation 5 – Grant Management Systems

The 2021 extension to current PGII and HPP funding that resulted from delays created by the COVID-19 pandemic provides an opportunity for the Department to update its grant management systems in

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ways that could support improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of future partner management arrangements. Areas to consider are presented with respect to DFA's internal use of its grant management systems, managing its bilateral oversight arrangements with CSOs, and the promotion of future multi-lateral collaboration within and among the Department's CSO partners as well as with Units across DFA.

DFA internal use of its grant management systems

* Efforts to bring forward the release of PGII (and potentially HPP) funds should be explored in line with recent improvements in CSO submission of PGII documentation before the year-end, alongside the 70% disbursement of funds in January with March adjustments.
* The specific requirements and guidance for any future revised funding area or 'Lot' and associated processes to accelerate fund disbursements should be incorporated in the PCM guidelines.

DFA-CSO bilateral grant management processes

* A structured grant management timeline should be adopted by DFA to avoid delays in feedback and the late preparation of questions in advance of bilateral meetings. As an example, by simply pushing some bilateral meetings back to Quarter 3 rather of trying to complete them all in Q2.
* An annual report page limit should be agreed with each CSO commensurate with the scope of the specific programme agreement.
* The focus of bilateral meetings should be reviewed to ensure policy, programming, compliance and risk, and capacity are covered: if necessary, separating out programme, policy and Public support outcomes discussions from organisational development and compliance engagements.

DFA promotion of multi-lateral DFA-CSO and CSO-CSO collaboration

* DFA should provide systematic communications of its future CSO grant portfolio including a breakdown of CSO budgets by country, by theme to its Missions and geographic desks, and a summary of CSO policy priorities to the Policy Unit.
* DFA partner managers should facilitate opportunities for joint learning in areas of common interest between CSOs and the Department's Policy and specialist units (e.g. Human Rights) both on a single partner basis, and through a multi-CSO portfolio-based approach including through Dóchas.
* The Department should clarify the purpose of monitoring visits on a case-by-case basis to either assess CSO performance and exercise oversight or help DFA strengthen its CSO relationships and support for future collaboration. Opportunities to 'lighten-up' visits should also be explored. Options include DFA staff accompanying CSO MEAL oversight visits and testing single country, multi-CSO visits that offer the opportunity to contrast each CSO's approach and bring Mission representatives into the monitoring process where they are present in the country.

Conclusion 6 – Capacities and Teaming

Although DFA is largely able to engage with the different structures, strategies, and capacities of its different CSO partners, its ability to manage staff rotation has led to a problematic variation in partner/grant management focus and CSO relationships. Partnerships in some cases relied on DFA

staff members who were unfamiliar with international development or CSO governance arrangements and untrained in the use of results frameworks. The layering of additional CSDEU responsibilities such as election observation disrupted partner management systems and processes and individual workloads. Overall, partner management has become overly dependent on a shortlist of experienced DFA staff members who have at times been overstretched.

Although recent improvements have been noted by CSOs, gaps in partner managers' foundational understanding about how CSOs work and the required competencies for partner and grant management is a barrier to effectiveness. This continues to leave DFA exposed to partner risk 'events' and the potential need for special measures to be put in place for CSO oversight.

CSO counterparts were highly appreciative of the Department's close engagement in agreeing common Safeguarding standards through Dóchas. In order to mitigate future risks, it remains essential for DFA to ensure it has the full range of partner management capacities in place for effective CSO oversight across all areas of organisational governance and development practice.

The introduction of CSO governance reviews and support to organisational development has led to signs of improvement in the governance and compliance systems of CSO partners. This has been a positive step that is likely to be of benefit their long-term programme and risk management performance and should be built on.

The convergence of management and administrative support between CSDEU and HU has also led to more recent improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of CSO partner management and helped build a better understanding of how different CSOs work in the Department. While these improvements appear to some extent to have helped mitigate capacity shortfalls, inefficiencies remain in the duplication of PGII and HPP grant management processes that could be further integrated.

Recommendation 6 – Capacities and Teaming

To ensure the Department is able to manage the grant cycle and its CSO partnerships effectively and efficiently, it will be important to for DFA to review its existing capacities on the specific demands of individual CSO partners. For example, focusing support for CSOs with weaker compliance systems on areas of organisational financial controls, risk management and governance, while facilitating CSOs with robust systems to build linkages across the Department in areas of policy and programme learning.

This approach will require a range of skills including grant oversight, financial, development, programmatic and organisational. To build on current initiatives that deliver more effectively through its CSO partners, the Department should consider an appraisal of its internal structures for partner management as part of the DCAD Management Review in order to ensure it has the right capacities, skills and management arrangements in place for overseeing the different types and technical range of CSOs. Given the specific complexities of each partnership, it is unrealistic to expect individual DFA staff members to completely carry the relationship. A 'Teaming' approach should be explored that also ensures a level of management continuity for the partner and Department whenever individual staff rotate.

There is a need for a clearer articulation and resourcing of competencies for partner and grant management. DFA should clarify the required foundation of understanding that allows capacity gaps

and training needs of DFA staff to be identified and addressed. Conducting comprehensive workforce planning will be important in this regard, including:

- Determining the required skillset for a more tailored approach to partner management and developing a training plan to address gaps,
- Moving beyond a contractual focus through the better use of the range of capacities available in CSDEU and HU to cover broader partnership requirements, and
- Continuing to build better understanding of CSO systems and capacities through governance reviews that engage effectively with their different structures, strategies and capacities.

To this end, consideration should be given to engaging an external service provider to support workforce planning and/or capacity strengthening and ongoing support to partner managers in line with the FINNIDA model.

A proposed option for the Department is to adopt a 'Teaming' arrangement that realigns existing resources for partner and grant management in a civil society 'sub-unit' that:

- Integrates HU grant and partner management within CSDEU, introduces a head of partner management position and retains an advisory role for the HU (e.g. to support double-triple nexus programming) which should retain responsibility for acute humanitarian ERFS funding,
- Manages clusters of similar CSO partners – each 'Team' with a Senior lead and administrator, and able to call on a development specialist and humanitarian specialist where appropriate,
- Continues to ring-fence a dedicated development education, public engagement and communications capacity for oversight of the PUB Lot,
- Continually assesses the competency requirements and roles-specific responsibilities in line with the CSO portfolio and rotational changes in the balance of experience and skills, and
- Calls in specialists from other units across the Department (e.g. Policy, Finance, Risk, Human Rights, Business Support) on a case-by-case basis to deepen DFA's partner relationships

Conclusion 7 – Risk Management

DFA's risk appetite recognises and supports the 'autonomous CSO' approach to its PGII and HPP partnerships. This involved compliance arrangements that largely operated through the CSOs' own systems and thereby dovetailed, to some extent, to their accountabilities to Ireland's Charity Regulator as well as to DFA's control environment as overseen by the PCM guidelines and SAGM. Because of the added risks for CSOs working in protracted crises where there is a heightened probability that a surge capacity is required, it is appropriate the Department requires its humanitarian-nexus partners to have the capacities and know-how to respond to emergencies and meet the Core Humanitarian Standards.

By and large, most CSOs were highly tuned to the DFA control environment and appetite for risk. While DFA has also largely ensured the required systems are in place for CSO oversight, this has been held back by capacity limitations that have led to a primary focus on contract compliance. Given the reliance on internal CSO risk management systems it is essential for DFA to consistently track CSO governance arrangements and agree areas of weakness and capacity investment with its grant partners. To this end it is important for partner managers to understand how CSO governance works and to be able to commit to a range of financial and technical interaction.

Recommendation 7 – Risk Management

CSO performance should continue to be mediated through their organisational structures, processes, and self-managed decentralised country teams. While the internal coherence of this approach, and its decentralised aspects appears for the most part to lead to high levels of CSO autonomy, trust and commitment to improving organisational and programme outcomes, the conditions for this rely on the Department's ability to have confidence in the effectiveness of CSO risk oversight systems and capacities. To ensure this arrangement is upheld to the highest standards in future DFA should:

- Build internal understanding of how charities work, how they respond to the Irish regulatory environment, and to expand the use of Governance reviews to assess the internal compliance and risk capacities at the CSO board, executive, and management levels.
- Require each CSO to clarify the relationships between its Irish and wider donor funding. To this end, CSOs should provide a clear presentation of their approach to co-funding, identify how DFA funds add value, and present a map showing the organisation's lines of authority, accountability and technical support for programme delivery from the local to country and global levels.
- Consider focusing investment support for CSOs with weaker compliance and risk systems into organisational capacity strengthening in line with their strategic funding commitments, especially in the cases of new or smaller grant recipients, and
- Review the extent to which the 'autonomous CSO' approach was managed by CSOs in their COVID-19 response where the reliance on CSO internal systems may have led to greater risks, such as when working through local partners to ensure access to the field.

Conclusion 8 – Theory of Change

The current PGII theory of change provides an overview of DFA's strategic grant support to CSOs including DFA's grant management inputs, and the range and scope of CSO programme contributions. Stronger areas of performance identified by the evaluation included DFA's provision of funding for CSO humanitarian and development programmes, CSO targeting of vulnerable populations and use of context analyses, CSO micro to macro linkages, and the effectiveness of RBM systems supported by the PGII.

While overall most CSOs performed well, there were inconsistencies in individual CSO standards of accountability, governance, and financial management, as well as in DFA oversight that continue to require attention. To ensure a more coherent approach to grant management across the CSO portfolio, the Theory of Change needs to circumscribe a coherent approach to partner management that covers CSO geographic (and Mission), programmatic, programme quality, policy, compliance and risk, organisational development and public engagement/development education considerations both on an individual CSO and portfolio level.

Weaknesses in the Theory of Change's articulation between individual CSO inputs, their programme outcomes and their policy contributions also need consideration. While it is appropriate that the Department has avoided trying to channel CSOs into areas that align with its own programme, policy or geographic priorities, the Theory of Change could have been explored as a framework to pool CSO

strategic and policy contributions. Unfortunately, capacity limitations within the Department and the absence of a systematic process was a barrier to this.

Overall, the Evaluation Team considers this to have been a missed opportunity for DFA. Future efforts should recognise the opportunity provided by the Theory of Change to help circumscribe and present the individual and collective contributions of CSOs supported by the PGII and HPP to Ireland's overseas development assistance efforts.

Recommendation 8 – Theory of Change

There are opportunities to shift the Department's use of its Theory of Change to better integrate the full range of individual and collective changes that programmatic funding supports, both for individual CSO partners, and across the portfolio as a whole. While avoiding any tendency toward capturing the civil society sector or the strategic focus of CSOs, DFA should consider updating the Theory of Change in line with the management response to this evaluation, to include how CSOs set their expected policy and programme contributions to ABW, and to constantly improve their effectiveness as organisations.

It should be possible to collate this analysis both thematically, such as in the individual and collective contributions of CSOs in nutrition, nexus or gender equality programming, and geographically, for instance in summarising the programme portfolio (or its thematic sub-components) for the Horn of Africa. A revised Theory of Change would then be the basis of CSO consultation, applications, partnership and policy collaboration in the lead-up to and implementation of a future grant cycle and provide the basis for future evaluations.

What emerges from the conclusions and recommendations outlined above is a potential partnership-based Theory of Change that uses an overarching structure to 'nest' CSO-led contributions across the portfolio. This should consider combining:

Policy outcomes

* DFA's strategic ambition in line with ABW, Civil Society, Humanitarian Assistance and other relevant policies.
* Collective CSO contributions to ABW including through Dóchas by thematic area, geographic focus or context (e.g. the collective voice on nexus programming).

CSO outputs

* Individual CSO programme contributions (DEV, CHR, ACU, PUB) by thematic priority area and by country.
* CSO collaborative learning and policy contributions with DFA units and other CSOs including through Dóchas.
* Synopsis of CSO policy contributions to ABW Policy in line with their specific areas of expertise,

CSO inputs

* CSO compliance and risk systems, processes and capacities to deliver strategic outcomes.
* CSO lines of accountability, technical support and risk oversight both organisationally and with respect to DFA funding where this differs.

- CSO organisational capacity development.

DFA inputs

- Partner eligibility requirements and why these are established, the assessment criteria and RAM led process for grant allocations.
- DFA partner management and oversight objectives and arrangements.
- DFA grant management systems and processes across the grant cycle including the. management of relationships and support to CSO Governance for delivery of grant outcomes.

DFA grant purpose

- Articulating the aims of each funding vehicle, their differentiation and potential interactions (DEV, CHR, ACU, PUB).
- The nature of CSOs targeted and role and function of the Programmatic funding arrangement.

Annex 1: Intervention Logic

	DFAT and Partner PGII and HPP Inputs			PGII-HPP Grant Output	PGII and HPP Grant Outcome	PGII-HPP Strategic Goal	PGII and HPP Policy Inputs	DFAT Policy Goal

PGII-HPP Grant Cycles

DFAT and Partner PGII and HPP Inputs

PGII-HPP Grant Output — PGII and HPP Grant Partners implement effective and innovative *humanitarian and* development

PGII and HPP Grant Outcome

PGII-HPP Strategic Goal — PGII and HPP Grant Partners contribute to sustainable positive change for poor and marginalised people *while enabling them to prepare for and recover from humanitarian crises* and strengthening accountability

PGII and HPP Policy Inputs

DFAT Policy Goal — PGII and HPP Grant Partners contribute to Ireland's Goals (as laid out by the One World One Future and A Better World Policies), and to Ireland's High-Level Outcomes (Framework for Action)

Goal 1. Reduced Hunger, Stronger Resilience.

Goal 2. Sustainable development, inclusive economic growth.

Goal 3. Better Governance, Human Rights and Accountability.

DFAT Inputs

D1. Eligibility dialogue: the provision of funds

D2. Grant management and compliance: control environment, risk, quality assurance and feedback

D3. Relationship management

D4. Policy dialogue

Grant Partner (CSO) Inputs

P1. A sound strategic and policy basis consistent with the overall approach of One World One Future and A Better World underpins the partners' programmes

2. A rigorous context analysis that informs a strong theory of change and/or humanitarian approach alongside a clear targeting strategy with a strong vulnerability focus, taking into account context-specific drivers of marginalisation

P3. CSO engagement at micro-, meso-, macro and global levels with strong inter-linkages between the different levels

P4. A strategic approach to partnership that builds capacity and space for collective participation and support for humanitarian processes

P5. Strong results-based management systems that support effective programme cycle management and encourage innovation

P6. High standards of accountability, good governance and financial oversight in managing programmes

P7. Engagement with the Irish public and Development Education in schools

Results are delivered at household, community and national level that have a positive impact on poor and marginalised people

PGII Grant Outcomes

Public participation, civil society space and local capacity are strengthened and widened; impacting positively on accountability, good governance and human rights

Strong public support for Ireland's development cooperation programme

P8. Proactive CSO engagement with DFAT on specific policy areas leading to enriched policy dialogue (geographical and sectoral)

Assumptions

A1. The PGII and HPP grant structures and eligibility processes build on learning from earlier funding cycles and enable DFAT to identify and support the most appropriate and effective partners

A2. DFAT processes for PGII and HPP grant management, oversight, funds analysis, risk assessment and feedback ensure the efficient and effective use of funds

A3. Compliance to the PGII-HPP programme cycle guidelines remains relevant to DFAT's standard approach to grant management and the national regulatory and control environment

A4. DFAT is able to engage effectively with the different structures, strategies and capacities of CSOs

A5. DFAT and its CSO partners are able to adapt flexibly to changes in the contexts across which the CSOs work

A6. The HPP partnership supports CSOs to uphold the humanitarian principles

A7. CSO humanitarian and development programmes are effective and support poor and marginalised people

A8. Management relationships function adequately between DFAT and all CSOs regardless of their type

A9. CSOs and DFAT share a common approach to development education and public engagement

A10. Learning from the humanitarian and development programmes and geographical footprint of Grant Partners is captured and shared with DFAT in ways that can be used

A11. The PGII and HPP grant mechanisms strengthen the ability of CSOs to contribute to and enrich DFAT's strategic humanitarian and development policy ambitions

Evaluation Questions

EQ1 — PGII-HPP Policy Relevance and Coherence

EQ2 — CSO Eligibility Assessments

EQ3 — Grant Management Arrangements

EQ4 — Grant Cycle Theories of Change

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Annex 2: PGII Theory of Change

Programme Grant Theory of Change: Logic Model

Programme Grant partners contribute to Ireland's Goals (One World, One Future) and Ireland's High-Level Outcomes (Framework for Action)		
Goal 1: Reduced Hunger, Stronger Resilience	Goal 2: Sustainable Development, Inclusive Economic Growth	Goal 3: Better Governance, Human Rights and Accountability
Ten High-Level Outcomes		

Programme Grant Strategic Goal
Programme Grant partners contribute to sustainable, positive change for poor and marginalised people and strengthened social accountability

Programme Grant Outcomes		
1. Results are delivered at household, community and national level that have a positive impact on poor and marginalised people	2. Public participation, civil society space and local capacity are strengthened and widened; impacting positively on accountability, good governance and human rights	3. Strong public support for Ireland's development cooperation programme continues

Programme Grant Output
Programme Grant partners implement effective and innovative development programmes

	Programme Grant Partner Inputs	**Irish Aid Inputs**
Programmatic approach	1. A sound strategic and policy basis consistent with the overall approach of OWOF underpins the partners' programmes	1. Provision of funding
	2. A rigorous context analysis informs a strong theory of change and a clear targeting strategy with a strong vulnerability focus. The analysis takes into account key context-specific drivers of poverty and factors contributing to marginalisation, notably gender, climate, etc.	
	3. Partners engage robustly at micro, meso and macro level, and at the global level where relevant. There are strong linkages between the work at the different levels	2. Feedback and quality assurance
	4. A strategic approach to partnership builds capacity and space for collective participation in development processes	
	5. Partners have strong results-based management systems that support effective programme cycle management and encourage innovation	3. Relationship management & policy dialogue
	6. Partners apply the highest standards of accountability, good governance and financial oversight in managing programmes	
	7. Partners conduct engagement with the Irish public and development education (where relevant) in a strategic and quality-focused way	

External context and Irish Aid values (*OWOF*)

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Annex 3: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation question	Criteria	Indicators / measures of success	Methods / lines of enquiry	Sources and quality of evidence
EQ1. How effective is the **programme grant model** as set out by PGII and HPP as a means of achieving DFAT's policy objectives in partnership with CSOs? - Are the original justifications still relevant? (a) - Is there an alternative funding model? (b)	Relevance / Effectiveness (in relation to grant model objectives)	Continued strategic alignment grant model with Irish Aid / DFAT policy objectives with a focus on gender equality, nexus and localisation Evidence of earlier evaluation recommendations in PGII-HPP design Evidence of CSO shared commitments to DFAT's policy objectives Relationship between CSO fund allocations and DFAT Policy objectives Strategic and functional coherence in relation to alternative funding approaches Evidence of leverage and multiplier effects of PGII-HPP in relation to policy outcomes	Review of DFAT internal justifications and assumptions relating PGII-HPP to One World One Future and the development education Strategy, alongside possible shifts in response to the introduction of "A Better World" and the "Framework for Action" PGII-HPP design response to MAPSII and PGI evaluation recommendations Policy mapping of the key themes from A Better World, the Framework for Action, One World One Future and the Civil Society Policy with a specific focus on gender equality, reducing humanitarian need (nexus), localisation and strengthening governance / civil society space CSO typology (strengths/weaknesses) mapping Review of planned/actual policy-technical geographical contributions in relation to DFAT Policy initiatives and Policies (A Better World, One World One Future, Framework for Action, Humanitarian Assistance, Civil Society Policies) Mission review of CSO value added 'reach' / DFAT policy projection Comparator analysis of PGII-HPP grant models against alternative DANIDA and FINNIDA bilateral civil society funding approaches and their expected policy-development contributions Review of DFAT funding of PGII-HPP relative to other Irish Aid objectives and strategic justifications with a specific focus on gender equality, reducing humanitarian need (nexus), localisation and strengthening governance / civil society space PGII-HPP funding of CSOs in relation to DFAT policy objectives – allocations and justifications	KIIs at global (headquarter) and country levels Virtual co-review and co-creation workshops covering headquarter and country levels Policy document review. CSO Shadow Report to the DAC Peer Review. MAXQDA coding of DFAT, CSO and comparator agency policy and programme documents

EQ2. How efficient and effective are the Department's processes for determining the **eligibility** of organisations up to and including approval of partners?	Efficiency, Effectiveness	Transparency of eligibility criteria Evidence of use of assessment formula in determining CSO eligibility and grant award Comparator analysis of eligibility criteria against other bilateral approaches Consistency of application of eligibility criteria to establish the CSO cohort Assessment experiences of new applicant civil society stakeholders	Mapping of eligibility criteria to efficiency and effectiveness factors to establish DFAT expectations and 'rules of the game' in the PGII & HPP decision-making process[69] Review of DFAT CSO assessment formula and scoring process, capacity assessments and reliance on previous experience for repeat applicants in relation to grant award CSO experiences of eligibility criteria clarity, purpose, decision-process and communications Comparator analysis of eligibility criteria and grant assessment mechanisms with 2 bilateral models (Danida; FINNIDA) Mapping of fund allocation in relation to eligibility criteria and assessment formula Fund allocation by (grant recipient type) * (policy/technical contribution) * (assessment formula) # partner capacity assessments and/or capacity building efforts undertaken before/as part of/following fund allocation decision-making	HQ level KIIs comparing DFAT (CSDEU, HU, Internal Audit) and CSO assessments Document Review (eligibility criteria, assessment formula, assessment process, CSO scores, clarity of decisions and communications) DFAT analyses of departmental resource allocations (time, funds) Dóchas-supported group of interested past and future applicants not in receipt of PGII-HPP funds
EQ3. (*To what extent*) are the Department's consequential **management arrangements** (PGII and HPP) appropriate for the range of organisations supported? With regard to: **Oversight** factors - The efficiency and effectiveness of management processes, including the approach to partnerships (a);	Relevance, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Sustainability	Integrity of DFAT systems and processes to manage the number and diversity grantees are operating as intended Evidence of DFAT prioritising adequate staff skills and capacities for CSO oversight Utility review of flow of funds analysis including feedback and CSO shifts	Grant oversight and management of DFAT service blueprint (building on eligibility assessment and contract awards of EQ2) Typology mapping of CSOs (and logframes) in relation to DFAT grant management experiences Practice changes in grant oversight before and during current PGII-HPP portfolio Review of the application of PCM Guidelines (clarity, use, reference to by DFAT and CSOs) *vis a vis* Oversight Oversight comparator analysis against Danida-FINNIDA through comparative review of PCM guidelines % staff time spent on grant oversight activities in relation to other demands Flow of funds review: - CSO PGII-HPP funding allocations at head office, regional, country, local partner levels and line of sight to beneficiaries - CSO funding by Country	KIIs to identify and explore formulative aspects of the key areas (DFAT, CSO, comparator agency stakeholders) at HQ and country levels PGII 2020 Audit The EAU 2018 staff resourcing assessment and DFAT internal analyses of departmental resource allocations (time, funds) DFAT Fraud Policy EAU interviews and inputs including reference to related audits and evaluations GOAL-Trinity College blended funding research findings

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69 e.g. CSO value added to Irish Aid (globally and in-country); CSO policy/programme alignment/coherence; CSO country focus and Mission 'reach'; DFAT assessments of capacities and commitments to work programmatically; evidence of accountable CSO relationships with different stakeholders; CSO strategy and approach to public engagement and development education in Ireland; coherence of humanitarian and development approach in protracted crises; historical performance relationship with DFAT; CSO financial capacities and probity analysis; innovation (social, technological, financial etc.); integration of gender, intersectionality and rights.

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		- CSO funding by technical sector in line with DFAT Policy clusters	
		- CSO investments organisational development and MEAL investments management overheads	
		- DFAT feedback and shifts in CSO spending	
		Comparator analysis of flow of funds models against Danida-FINNIDA grant models (if available from most recent years)	
Partnership factors	Quality of the DFAT (CSDEU, HPP, Policy) relationship with CSOs including changes across the grant cycle (eligibility, award, management, policy 'dialogues') Evidence of adaptive management and innovation (compliance versus flexibility)	Exploration of the quality of relationship and dialogue (DFAT and CSO perspectives at Mission and Headquarter levels) in relation to the Eligibility-Award, Grant Management (compliance), Relationship Management and Policy Dialogue (value-added) stages of the grant cycle Identification of critical factors (CSO typology, new/past grant recipients, size and type of organisation etc.) in relation to the quality and focus of joint-working relationships Identification of critical flexibility factors that allowed new opportunities and challenges to be negotiated (e.g. COVID) DFAT-CSO relationships social network analysis of communications (quantity-quality, communications focus) and ranking by type of counterpart focal point (e.g. CSDEU-HPP-Policy) by grant cycle stage CSO investments into grant managers (dedicated staff, financial and time resource commitments)	Virtual workshop to explore relationships through the grant cycle Survey of inter-relationships across grant cycle leading to social network analysis CSO Shadow Report to the DAC Peer Review Results, Policy and Humanitarian Working Groups
Capacity factors - The level of the Department's internal capacity appropriate to engage in the partnerships (b);	Level of DFAT capacities to engage in the partnership with CSOs Evidence of DFAT capacity support to CSO partners (including governance) Evidence of CSO use of PGII/HPP for internal capacity building (by focus)	Review of DFAT and CSO investments into capacity building and staffing in relation to partnership management (as a total invested; % of grant; as proportion of capacity investments in other areas and in relation to CSO type) Review of use of, or conflict between, management processes stipulated by DFAT PCM guidelines and CSO internal systems and processes for internal capacity development by CSOs Case review of examples of DFAT capacity for specific capacity and governance areas with CSOs (see also Risk below)	CSO annual reports KIIs triangulating EAU, CSDEU, HU, Policy unit and CSO perspectives DR review (e.g. EAU Assessment of Staff Resourcing) Special reviews and reports (individual CSO or DFAT reviews and reports) Results Working Group
Programming factors - The degree of and potential for joint working between the two programmes (flexibility, nexus – c). - Capitalizing on opportunities and responding to challenges (e)	Use of the mechanisms by DFAT and CSOs identify and respond to challenges and opportunities across PGII-HPP and focus (e.g. gender, nexus, localisation)	Analysis of HPP/PGII support to flexible programming – appreciative enquiry of CSO nexus case studies; COVID response; other examples of flexible programming (management, focus, experience, lessons) Review of PCM Guidelines (clarity, use, reference to) in relation to rules of the game for flexible programming and changes (e.g. COVID response) Quantitative analysis of proportion of PGII-HPP funds reallocated to respond to changing priorities, context challenges etc. Comparator analysis of flexibility factors in Danida-FINNIDA civil society programme grant management (Nexus funding) including the comparative	CSO annual reports KIIs triangulating EAU, CSDEU, HU and CSO perspectives Survey responses to open question for flexible programming examples Humanitarian Working Group

- Clarity around PCM guideline (DFAT vs. CSO guidelines) (g).			experiences of Danida-FINNIDA and PGII-HPP in their efforts to work flexibly with CSO partners across the humanitarian-development nexus.	
Monitoring and evaluation factors - Monitoring and capturing short-, medium- and long-term results (d);		Alignment of PCM annual report framework in relation to DFAT Policy outcomes Strength of CSO monitoring and reporting of results against DFAT Policy outcomes Evidence of use of PCM results framework (annual report structure) in relation to CSO decision making including adjustments to CSO activities and/or fund allocations	Mapping and review of CSO Annual Reports and bilateral meeting minutes in relation to CSO results frameworks and MEAL systems (including # CSO results frameworks aligning with DFAT PCM and annual report framework) DFAT to CSO feedback on results monitoring and reports performance including adjustments to planning and/or funding Comparator analysis of PCM results monitoring requirements and Annual Report structure against Danida-FINNIDA # examples of DFAT use of MEAL data from PGII-HPP programmes including qualitative and quantitative analysis Review of DFAT and CSO investments into capacity building and development of MEAL systems in Annual Budgets and Reports	KIIs (CSO, CSDEU, HPP) CSO Annual Reports DFAT-CSO bilateral meeting summaries and decisions CSO Budgets and Budget Reviews FINNIDA indicator framework Development Education Annual Partner Experience Reports Public Engagement Annual Progress Reports Dóchas results working group
Risk management factors - DFAT management of risk (risk register / process and decision-making examples?) (f);		Extent to which risk informs PGII-HPP decision making, feedback and funding of PGII-HPP and/or CSOs	Review of DFAT fiduciary, performance and reputational risk assessments, systems and processes (internal audit) Alignment of CSO risk management Systems and processes to the department register and Policy on Fraud Review of the parallel PGII Audit Review of DFAT risk appetite for partner on-granting # partner CSOs with operating risk and audit systems in place at national and international levels # examples where there is clear evidence risk assessments have informed DFAT management decision making (by type of risk)	KIIs triangulating CSDEU, HU, CSO and DFAT Audit perspectives DFAT Audit review of PGII-HPP programmes DFAT Fraud Policy CSO Internal audit reports and risk registers DFAT biannual CSO risk reviews
EQ4. Are the PGII and HPP **Theories of Change** relevant and coherent? - Are they holding? - Have adaptations been made? If so, were they justified? - Are partner Theories of Change coherent with PGII and/or HPP Theories of Change?	Relevance, Coherence, Sustainability	Utility of PGII TOC to shape different stages of the Grant Cycle (eligibility, award, management oversight, policy value added) Evidence that PGII TOC has been reviewed and is holding, and/or adaptations been made with clear and appropriate justifications provided Justification of absence of HPP TOC (e.g. trumped by humanitarian principles) Coherence review of partner Theories of Change in relation to PGII TOC and DFAT policy objectives	Preparation of evaluation Theory of Change to encompass the PGII-HPP grant models TORs and evaluation questions Comparator analysis of PGII TOC against those of other bilateral programme grant providers (Danida, FINNIDA) Visualisation, mapping and review of CSO TOCs to PGII TOC and DFAT Policy objectives and potential shifts in alignment relative to One World One Future and introduction of A Better World Review of NGO flow of funds in relation to their TOCs and PGII-HPP/OWOF expected results areas Review of changes made to DFAT and CSO TOCs and results frameworks and justifications % of CSO frameworks showing clear alignment to DFAT policy priorities % of CSOs making or planning changes to TOCs % respondents who understand and support PGII-HPP TOCs	KIIs triangulating CSDEU, HU and CSO findings PGII programme cycle management guidelines CSO Applications and Annual Reports Comparator analysis of agency policy frameworks and civil society programme guidelines and examples GOAL-Trinity College blended funding research findings Results, Policy and Humanitarian Working Groups

EQ5. What, if any, **changes** are needed in future programme design? - *Formative analysis* of the design of PGIII-HPP2 for 2021	Sustainability	Common agreement of grant features to retain, change and/or introduce Extent to which programmes should be combined and managed Review of main justifications and options including from bilateral comparator agencies	Formative analysis of key findings (observations, reflections, insights and positioning of stakeholders) Comparative analysis against alternative flexible bilateral programme grant models Ranking of the degree to which CSOs working across the triple nexus support different funding models	KIIs triangulating CSDEU, HU and CSO perspectives Workshop (virtual) and iterative review of evaluation conclusions and recommendations by stakeholders

Annex 4: List of Interviewees

Organisation and Department	Name
Action Aid, HQ	Triona Pender
Action Aid, HQ	Erick Onduru
Aidlink, HQ	Anne Cleary
CBM, HQ	Sarah O'Toole
Children in Crossfire, HQ	Matthew Banks
Christian Aid, DRC,	Moise Luboto
Christian Aid, HQ	David Williams
Christian Aid, HQ	Sarah O'Boyle
Christian Aid, HQ, Adaptive Programming	Stephen Gray
Christian Aid, Sierra Leone, Country Manager	Jeanne Kamara
Christian Aid, South Sudan	James Wani
Christian Aid, Zimbabwe, Country Manager	Nicholas Shamano
Concern, DRC, Country Director	Russell Gates
Concern, Ethiopia, Country Director	Eileen Morrow
Concern, Haiti, Country Director	Kwanli Kladstrup
Concern, HQ	Anne O'Mahony
Concern, HW, Emergency Director	Dominic Crowley
Concern, Malawi, Country Director	Yousaf Jogezai
Concern, Rwanda, Country Director	Maud Biton
Concern, Sierra Leone, Country Director	Austin Kennan
Concern, Somalia, Country Director	Andrea Solomon
Concern, South Sudan, Country Director	Aine Fay
DFA, CFO & HR	John Conlan
DFA, CSDEU	Aine Doody
DFA, CSDEU	Aoife Ni Fhearghail
DFA, CSDEU	Carina Connellan
DFA, CSDEU	Columba O'Dowd
DFA, CSDEU	Deirdre Toomey
DFA, CSDEU	Gerard Considine
DFA, CSDEU	Paula Kenny
DFA, CSDEU	Reachbha Fitzgerald
DFA, Director of Africa Unit	Alan Gibbons
DFA, Director of CSDEU	Orla Mc Breen
DFA, Director of HU	Frank Smyth
DFA, Director of Irish Aid	Ruairi de Burca
DFA, EAU	Anne Barry
DFA, EAU	Martina Healy
DFA, EAU	Tom Hennessy
DFA, Ethiopia Mission	Patrick Mc Manus
DFA, Ex-CSDEU Director	Julian Clare
DFA, HU	Matthew Cogan
DFA, HU	Seamus O'Callaghan
DFA, HU	Susan Fraser
DFA, Malawi Embassy	Anne Holmes
DFA, Mozambique Mission	Edel Cribbin
DFA, Policy Unit	Aidan Fitzpatrick
DFA, Policy Unit	Michelle Winthrop
DFA, Policy Unit	Vicky Dillon
DFA, Sierra Leone Mission	Mary O'Neill
DFA, Vietnam Mission	Elisa Cavacece

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DFA, Zambia Mission	Pronch Murray
Frontline Defenders, HQ	Kim Wallis
GOAL, Ethiopia, Country Director	Dinkeh Asfaw
GOAL, HQ	Bernard Mc Caul
GOAL, HQ, MEAL Officer	Enida Fries
GOAL, HQ, Senior Programme Manager	Albha Bowe
GOAL, HQ, Senior Strategy Officer	Sharon Moynihan
GOAL, Malawi, Country Director	Philippa Sackett
GOAL, Sierra Leone, Country Director	Gashaw Mekonnen
GOAL, South Sudan, Country Director	Chris Mc Elhinney
GOAL, Uganda, Country Director	Jen Williams
GOAL, Zimbabwe, Country Director	Gabriella Prandini
Gorta Self Help Africa, HQ	Orla Kilcullen
HelpAge, HQ	Leonie Try
HelpAge, HQ	Tapiwa Huye
HelpAge/MANEPO, Malawi, MANEPO Executive Director	Andrew Kavala
Oxfam, DRC, Funding Advisor	Justine Kavira
Oxfam, DRC, Operations Coordinator	Hashim Mloso
Oxfam, DRC, Protection Manager	Calvin Bita Tshomba
Oxfam, HQ	Colm Byrne
Oxfam, HQ	Niamh Carty
Oxfam, Malawi, Country Director	Lingalireni Mihowa
Oxfam, Malawi, Funding Manager	Wilford Njala
Oxfam, Rwanda, Country Director	Immaculee Mukampabuka
Oxfam, South Sudan, Interim Country Director	Zubin Zaman
Oxfam, South Sudan, Programme Manager	Iltaf Abro
Oxfam, Uganda, Country Director	Francis Odokorah
Oxfam, Uganda, Women's Rights Adviser	Jane Ocaya-Irama
Oxfam, Uganda, Women's Rights project coordinator	Charity Namara
Oxfam, Zimbabwe, Country Director	Mirjam van Dorssen
Oxfam, Zimbabwe, MEAL Officer	Sheila Mlambo
Oxfam, Zimbabwe, Regional Woman's Rights and Gender Justice, Programme Manager for PGII	Netsai V Shambira
Oxfam, Zimbabwe, SRP/PGII Project Officer	Nomthandazo Jones
Plan International, HQ	Dualta Roughneen
Sightsavers, HQ	Ciara Smullen
Sightsavers, Sierra Leone, West Africa Regional Director	Fatoumata Diouf
Tearfund, HQ	Markus Köker
Tearfund, HQ	Sean Copeland
Trócaire, HQ	Sean Farrell
Trócaire, HQ, Director of Strategy, Advocacy and Development	Finnola Finnan
Trócaire, HQ, Head of Humanitarian Programmes	Noreen Gumbo
Trócaire, HQ, Head of Programme Impact and Learning Team	Karen Kennedy
Trócaire, Malawi, Country Director	Conor Kelly
Trócaire, Malawi, Country Director	Jeanette Wijnants
Trócaire, Rwanda, Country Director	Dony Mazingaizo
Trócaire, Sierra Leone, Country Director	Michael Solis
Trócaire, Sierra Leone, Programme Manager	Eimear Lynch
Trócaire, Somalia,	Paul Healy
Trócaire, South Sudan, Country Director	Ibrahim Njuguna
Trócaire, South Sudan, Deputy Country Director	Nika Musiyazwiro
Trócaire, Uganda,	Martina O'Donoghue
Trócaire, Uganda, Country Director	Ian Dolan
Vita, HQ	Sam Kappler
Vita, HQ	Emily Hosford
World Vision, HQ	Maurice Saddler
World Vision, HQ	Clodagh Mc Loughlin
World Vision, HQ	Anne Cleary

World Vision, Sierra Leone, Director of Programmes	Grace Kargbo
World Vision, Sierra Leone, Resource Acquisition & Management Director	Yhen Veso
World Vision, Somalia, Design, Monitoring and Evaluation	Victor Onama
World Vision, Somalia, Programme Coordinator and Quality Assurance	Suen Wan
World Vision, Uganda, Associate Director - Grants Management	Caroline Abalo

Annex 5: List of Documents

Report Author	Report Date	Report Title
Action Aid	2016	Action Aid Application PGII
Action Aid	2016	Action Aid Appraisal Final
Action Aid	2017	Action Aid Budget PGII
Action Aid	2018	Action Aid Budget PGII
Action Aid	2019	Action Aid Budget PGII
Action Aid	2020	Action Aid Budget PGII
Action Aid	2017	Action Aid Ireland-Annual Report
Action Aid	2018	Action Aid Ireland-Annual Report
Action Aid	2017	Action Aid MoU 2017-2021
Action Aid	2017	ActionAid Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Action Aid	2018	ActionAid Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Action Aid	2019	ActionAid Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Action Aid	2017	ActionAid Ireland 2017 Bilateral Note
Action Aid	2018	ActionAid Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note
Action Aid	2019	ActionAid Ireland 2019 Bilateral Note
Action Aid	2020	ActionAid Partner List 2017 (PG)
Action Aid	2017	ActionAid Partner List 2018 (PG)
Action Aid	2018	ActionAid Partner List 2019 (PG)
Action Aid	2019	Children in Crossfire Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2017	Children in Crossfire 2017 Bilateral Note
Children in Crossfire	2018	Children in Crossfire 2018 Bilateral Note
Children in Crossfire	2019	Children in Crossfire 2019 Bilateral Note
Children in Crossfire	2020	Children in Crossfire 2020 Bilateral Note
Children in Crossfire	2017	Children in Crossfire Budget PG II
Children in Crossfire	2018	Children in Crossfire Budget PG II
Children in Crossfire	2019	Children in Crossfire Budget PG II

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Children in Crossfire	2020	Children in Crossfire Budget PG II
Children in Crossfire	2017	Children in Crossfire Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2018	Children in Crossfire Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2019	Children in Crossfire Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2017	Children in Crossfire MoU 2017-2021
Children in Crossfire	2019	Children in Crossfire MoU modificaction 2019
Children in Crossfire	2020	Children in Crossfire Partner list 2017 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2017	Children in Crossfire Partner List 2018 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2018	Children in Crossfire Partner List 2019 (PG)
Children in Crossfire	2016	Children in Crossfire PG II Application
Children in Crossfire	2019	Children in Crossfire Report Monitoring Visit Tanzania
Children in Crossfire	2017	Children in Crossfire-Annual Report
Children in Crossfire	2018	Children in Crossfire-Annual Report
Children in Crossfire	2019	Children in Crossfire-Annual Report
Children in Crossfire	2019	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2017 (PG & HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	200331-CAI Annex I A Angola RF 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	200331-CAI Annex I B CenAm RF 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	200331-CAI Annex I C Colombia RF 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	200331-CAI Annex I D IoPt RF 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	200331-CAI Annex I E Sierra Leone RF 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	200331-CAI Annex I F Zimbabwe RF 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Budget HPP
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid Budget PG II
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Budget PG II
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Budget PG II
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid Ireland 2017 Technical Meeting Note
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland 2019 Bilateral Note
Christian Aid Ireland	2020	Christian Aid Ireland 2020 Bilateral Note
Christian Aid Ireland	2016	Christian Aid Ireland Application form PG and HPP 16
Christian Aid Ireland	2016	Christian Aid Ireland Appraisal Matrix
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)

Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2020	Christian Aid Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland HPP 2019-2021 Abbreviated Results Framework
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland HPP 2019-2021 Programme of Work
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid Ireland MoU 2017-2021
Christian Aid Ireland	2020	Christian Aid Ireland Partner List 2017 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid Ireland Partner List 2017 (PG)
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid Ireland Partner List 2018 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Ireland Partner List 2018 (PG)
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid Ireland Partner List 2019 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland Partner List 2019 (PG)
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid Ireland updated MoU 2019
Christian Aid Ireland	2016	Christian Aid PG II HPP Application
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid ToR Monitoring Visit Zimbabwe
Christian Aid Ireland	2017	Christian Aid-Annual Report
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Christian Aid-Annual Report
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Christian Aid-Annual Report
Christian Aid Ireland	2019	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2017 (HPP)
Christian Aid Ireland	2018	Irish Aid Monitoring Visit Report Christian Aid Burundi final
Christian Aid Ireland (IOD PARC)	2012	Christian Aid Partner Report - Final
Coffey	2015	Coffey PG1 Review Final Sept2015
Concern	2019	Active citizenship - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Afghanistan - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Bangladesh - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Burundi&Rwanda - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	CAR - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Chad - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2016	Concern Application Form PG II HPP
Concern	2017	Concern Appraisal
Concern	2017	Concern Budget PG II

Concern	2018	Concern Budget PG II
Concern	2019	Concern Budget PG II
Concern	2020	Concern Budget PG II
Concern	2019	Concern HPP 2019-2021 - Programme of Work
Concern	2016	Concern Irish Aid PG and HPP Application_Submitted 29.7.2016
Concern	2017	Concern Worldwide 2017 Bilateral Note
Concern	2018	Concern Worldwide 2018 Bilateral Note
Concern	2019	Concern Worldwide 2019 Bilateral Note
Concern	2020	Concern Worldwide 2020 Bilateral Note
Concern	2017	Concern Worldwide-Annual Report
Concern	2018	Concern Worldwide-Annual Report
Concern	2019	Concern Worldwide-Annual Report
Concern	2019	DPRK - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	DRC - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Ethiopia - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Haiti - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	HPP Result Framework Report 2019- consolidated
Concern	2019	Liberia - IAPG Report 2019
Concern	2019	Malawi - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Niger - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Public Engagement - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Sierra Leone IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Somalia - IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	South Sudan IAPG RF 2019
Concern	2019	Sudan - IAPF RG 2019
Concern (IOD PARC)	2012	Concern Partner Report - Final
Concern Worldwide	2017	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2017	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2018	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2019 (HPP)
Concern Worldwide	2019	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2019	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2020 (HPP)
Concern Worldwide	2020	Concern Worldwide Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2017	Concern Worldwide MoU 2017- 2021

Concern Worldwide	2020	Concern Worldwide Partner List 2017 (HPP)
Concern Worldwide	2017	Concern Worldwide Partner List 2017 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2017	Concern Worldwide Partner List 2018 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2018	Concern Worldwide Partner List 2019 (HPP)
Concern Worldwide	2019	Concern Worldwide Partner List 2019 (PG)
Concern Worldwide	2019	Concern Worldwide updated MoU 2019
Concern Worldwide	2019	Frontline Defenders Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
DFA	2016	DFA CSO appraisal leads
DFA	2016	PCM review from CSO appraisals
DFA	2020	PG II and HPP Jan Submissions Overview
DfID	2016	DFID Civil-Society-Partnership-Review
DfID (IOD PARC)	2015	CSCF Annex 5 Evaluation Methodology
DfID (IOD PARC)	2015	CSCF Evaluation Report Final Draft
Dochas	2017	Dochas HA WG TOR 2017
Dochas	2019	Dochas OECD DAC Shadow Memo_FINAL_280619
Dochas	2020	Dochas PWG Terms of Reference May2020 Final
Dochas	2016	Dochas Results WG TOR 2016
Finnida	2017	Finnish CSO2 Synthesis report
Front Line Defenders	2016	Front Line Defenders Application form PG II
Front Line Defenders	2017	Front Line Defenders Budget PG II
Front Line Defenders	2018	Front Line Defenders Budget PG II
Front Line Defenders	2019	Front Line Defenders Budget PG II
Front Line Defenders	2020	Front Line Defenders Budget PG II
Front line Defenders	2017	Front line Defenders MoU 2017-2021
Front Line Defenders	2017	Front Line Defenders-Annual Report
Front Line Defenders	2018	Front Line Defenders-Annual Report
Front Line Defenders	2019	Front Line Defenders-Annual Report
Frontline Defenders	2017	Frontline Defenders 2017 Bilateral Note
Frontline Defenders	2018	Frontline Defenders 2018 Bilateral Note
Frontline Defenders	2019	Frontline Defenders 2019 Bilateral Note
Frontline Defenders	2017	Frontline Defenders Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Frontline Defenders	2018	Frontline Defenders Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Frontline Defenders	2019	Frontline Defenders Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)

Frontline Defenders	2020	HelpAge International Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
GOAL	2019	1_GOAL_IAPF RF for Annual Report 2019 Consolidated
GOAL	2017	Annex 1 GOAL Theory of Change
GOAL	2017	Annex 2 B GOAL HPP Abbreviated Results Framework
GOAL	2017	Annex 2. B HPP RF
GOAL	2017	Annex 2b Plan International Ireland HPP Results Framework
GOAL	2017	Annex 2c. HPP Abbreviated Results Based Framework
GOAL	2017	Annex 5 Signed ARA
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 2 GOAL 2017 Results Frameworks
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 3 GOAL Cert of Assurance
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 4 2017 GOAL Partner List
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 5 2017 Evaluations List
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 6 2017 Networks List
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 7 GOAL Case Study Ethiopia
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 8 GOAL IA Asset disposal register
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Annex 9 Procurement Deviations
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Finance Annex 1 GOAL 2017 Finance Narrative Report
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Finance Annex 2.1 GOAL Internal Audit - Briefing
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Finance Annex 2.2 2017 Audit Assurance Table
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Finance Annex 3 2017 GOAL Organisational Financial Data 1
GOAL	2017	Annual Report 2017 Finance Annex 4 GOAL 2017 Irish Aid Expenditure Report
GOAL	2017	Financial Reporting IAPF Budget template
GOAL	2017	GOAL 2017 Bilateral Note
GOAL	2018	GOAL 2018 Bilateral Note
GOAL	2019	GOAL 2019 Bilateral Note
GOAL	2017	GOAL Monitoring Visit Report Sierra Leone FINAL
GOAL	2019	GOAL MoU 2019-2021
Goal	2012	Goal Partner Report - FINAL Sept 12
GOAL	2017	GOAL Revised 2017 Irish Aid Budget
GOAL	2017	GOAL-Annual Report
GOAL	2018	GOAL-Annual Report

GOAL	2019	GOAL-Annual Report
GOAL	2020	IAPF 2020 Budget Template - DRAFT
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2016	GSHA Application PG II
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2017	GSHA Budget PG II
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2018	GSHA Budget PG II
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2019	GSHA Budget PG II
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2020	GSHA Budget PG II
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2017	GSHA Final Combined Appraisal Matrix
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2019	GSHA Report Monitoring Visit Zambia
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2017	GSHA-Annual Report
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2018	GSHA-Annual Report
GORTA, Self Help Africa	2019	GSHA-Annual Report
Help Age	2017	HelpAge International Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Help Age	2018	HelpAge International Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Help Age	2019	HelpAge International Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Help Age	2020	HelpAge International Partner List 2017 (PG)
Help Age	2017	HelpAge International Partner List 2018 (PG)
Help Age	2018	HelpAge International Partner List 2019 (PG)
Help Age	2019	Oxfam Ireland Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
HelpAge	2019	AFFORDII - MidTerm Evaluation Report
HelpAge	2017	HelpAge 2017 Bilateral Note
HelpAge	2018	HelpAge 2018 Bilateral Note
HelpAge	2019	HelpAge 2019 Bilateral Note
HelpAge	2020	HelpAge 2020 Bilateral Note
HelpAge	2017	HelpAge Budget PG II
HelpAge	2018	HelpAge Budget PG II
HelpAge	2019	HelpAge Budget PG II
HelpAge	2020	HelpAge Budget PG II
Helpage	2017	Helpage MoU 2017-2021
Helpage	2019	Helpage MoU modification 2019
HelpAge	2016	HelpAge PG II Application Form
HelpAge	2019	HelpAge Report Monitoring Visit Ethiopia
HelpAge	2017	HelpAge-Annual Report

HelpAge	2018	HelpAge-Annual Report
HelpAge	2019	HelpAge-Annual Report
IDM	2020	Learning Journey Brief
IOD PARC	2017	Donor Matrix for report draft - SDC eval
IOD PARC	No date	Donor trends summary FINAL
IOD PARC	2015	Gates draft facility proposal
IOD PARC	2015	Gates draft grant facility EM
IOD PARC	No date	Grant funding models
IOD PARC	2012	MAPS II Synthesis Report FINAL Sept 12
IOD PARC	2012	Trócaire Partner Report - Final
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Results Framework Template 2021
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Template and Guidance for Case Studies
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Safeguarding Monitoring
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Guidance for Annual Report
Irish Aid	2020	Budget Template 2021
Irish Aid	2017	2017 ERFS Allocations Summary
Irish Aid	2018	2018 ERFS Summary of allocations
Irish Aid	2019	2019 ERFS Summary of allocations
Irish Aid	2019	20191104_Annex 5A Modified ARA
Irish Aid	2020	2020 ERFS Summary of allocations
Irish Aid	2020	Update on Organisational Financial Data
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Expenditure and Statistics
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Flow of Funds for 2021
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Flow of Funds Guidance Note
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Partner List Template
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Disposal of Assets Register
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Audit Assurance
Irish Aid	2020	PCM Guidelines: Risk Register
Irish Aid	2019	A-Better-World-Irelands-Policy-for-International-Development
Irish Aid	2008	Civil-society-policy
Irish Aid	2017	Country HPP Allocations 2018 + 2017&18 Combined
Irish Aid	N.D.	ERFS guidelines
Irish Aid	2019	Ethiopia FINAL CSP Report

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Irish Aid	2018	Evaluation Northern Province Zambia Final	
Irish Aid	2019	External Review of the Emergency Response Fund Scheme (ERFS) Review	
Irish Aid	2017	Final Notes RAM PG 2017021 HPP 20172018	
Irish Aid	2016	Development Education Strategy 2017 – 2023	
Irish Aid	2019	Final RAM HPP 2019 21	
Irish Aid	2017	Final RAM PG 2017021 HPP 20172018	
Irish Aid	2019	Framework for Action 2013	
Irish Aid	2013	Framework-for-Action	
Irish Aid	2004	gender equality policy 2004	
Irish Aid	2015	Gender Second National Action Plan Women Peace and Security	
Irish Aid	2019	Gender Third National Action Plan	
Irish Aid	2019	HPP 2019 Final Allocations	
Irish Aid	2020	HPP 2020 ALLOCATIONS	
Irish Aid	2019	HPP Meta-evaluation report	
Irish Aid	2015	Humanitarian-Assistance-Policy	
Irish Aid	2017	Introduction - HPP 2017- 18 Guidelines	
Irish Aid	2019	Introduction - PG II & HPP 2019 PCM Guidelines	
Irish Aid	2016	Introduction - PG II Strategic Framework (HU inputs)	
Irish Aid	2020	Introduction - ToR PGII HPP Formative Evaluation	
Irish Aid	2017	Irish Aid Annual Report	
Irish Aid	2018	Irish Aid Annual Report	
Irish Aid	2018	Irish Aid Monitoring Visit Report Christian Aid Burundi 2018 final	
Irish Aid	2015	Irish-Humanitarian-Summit-Document-3	
Irish Aid	2016	Malawi CSP FINAL	
Irish Aid	2012	MAPS II Synthesis Report FINAL Sept 12	
Irish Aid	2019	Memo re HPP Allocations	
Irish Aid	2017	Mission staffing	
Irish Aid	2013	One World One Future Policy Document	
Irish Aid	2018	Oxfam HPP Monitoring Visit Report 2018 FINAL	
Irish Aid	2019	Palestine Strategy Internal Review FINAL	
Irish Aid	2018	Plan Ireland HPP Monitoring Visit Report Final sent 23.07.18	
Irish Aid	2020	Public Engagement and Development Education in PG_Options paper	

Irish Aid	2011	RAM 2011 final
Irish Aid	2011	RAM detailed notes
Irish Aid	2017	RAM PG 2017 21 HPP 2017 18 Final Notes
Irish Aid	2015	Review of the Irish Aid Programme Grant Mechanism Final Report
Irish Aid	2019	Updated PGII HPP CSF 2019 2020 Monitoring Visit Schedule
Irish Aid	2018	World Vision Ireland HPP Monitoring Visit Report 2018
Irish Aid	2020	WVI_Annex_V_PGII_2020_Flow_of_Funds
Irish Aid	2020	WVI_Annex_VI_Partner_List_HPP_PGII
Irish Aid (Coffey)	2015	Review of the Irish Aid Programme Grant Mechanism Final Report
Irish Aid Grant Management	2019	Annex 5 Standard ARA
Irish Aid Grant Management	2020	Annex_1_Results_Information_ and_Reporting_Mapping
Irish Aid Grant Management	2018	Assessment of Staff Resourcing for Partner Management in DCD - FINAL
Irish Aid Grant Management	No date	CSDEU Organigram
Irish Aid Grant Management	No date	DCD Humanitarian Organigram
Irish Aid Grant Management	2016	Final PG II Strategic Framework for sharing
Irish Aid Grant Management	2020	SAGM_development
Irish Aid Grant Management	2017	Standard Approach to Grant Management (Updated 2019)
MFA Finland	2017	FinnishCSO2_Synthesis_report
Norad	2018	Norad CS Eval
Norad (IOD PARC)	2017	MASTER Tech Prop Eval Norwegian Dev Support
OECD	2020	OECD Ireland Review
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework HPP DRC
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework HPP South Sudan
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework HPP Tanzania
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework PGII Malawi
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework PGII Public Engagement
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework PGII Rwanda
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework PGII Tanzania
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework PGII Uganda
Oxfam Ireland	2019	1. Annex I Oxfam Ireland Results Framework PGII Zimbabwe
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Final Oxfam Appraisal Feedback for internal purposes
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Final signed ARA

Oxfam Ireland	2018	For Reference - Oxfam HPP Monitoring Visit Report
Oxfam Ireland	2017	OIE Abbreviated RF HPP
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam Appraisal Feedback
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam ARA - signed by Patrick & Louise
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam Budget PG II
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Oxfam Budget PG II
Oxfam Ireland	2020	Oxfam Budget PG II
Oxfam Ireland	2018	Oxfam HPP Monitoring Visit Report 2018 FINAL
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam Ireland 2017 Bilateral Note
Oxfam Ireland	2018	Oxfam Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Oxfam Ireland 2019 Bilateral Note
Oxfam Ireland	2020	Oxfam Ireland 2020 Bilateral Note
Oxfam Ireland	2016	Oxfam Ireland Application PG II
Oxfam Ireland	2016	Oxfam Ireland Application PG2 & HPP_Final 290716
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Oxfam Ireland	2018	Oxfam Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (HPP)
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Oxfam Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Oxfam Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (HPP)
Oxfam Ireland	2020	Oxfam Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam Ireland MoU 2017-2021
Oxfam Ireland	2020	Oxfam Ireland Partner List 2017 (PG)
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam Ireland Partner List 2018 (PG)
Oxfam Ireland	2018	Oxfam Ireland Partner List 2019 (PG & HPP)
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Oxfam Ireland updated MoU 2019
Oxfam Ireland	2020	Oxfam PG II MV DRAFT Terms of Reference
Oxfam Ireland	2017	Oxfam-Annual Report
Oxfam Ireland	2018	Oxfam-Annual Report
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Oxfam-Annual Report
Oxfam Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
Plan International Ireland	2017	Plan International Ireland 2017 Bilateral Note
Plan International Ireland	2018	Plan International Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note
Plan International Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland 2019 Bilateral Note
Plan International Ireland	2020	Plan International Ireland 2020 Bilateral Note

Plan International Ireland	2017	Plan International Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (PG & HPP)
Plan International Ireland	2018	Plan International Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Plan International Ireland	2018	Plan International Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Plan International Ireland	2017	Plan International Ireland MoU 2017 -2021
Plan International Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland Partner List 2017 (PG)
Plan International Ireland	2017	Plan International Ireland Partner List 2018 (PG)
Plan International Ireland	2018	Plan International Ireland Partner List 2019 (PG & HPP)
Plan International Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland updated MoU 2019
Plan International Ireland	2019	Self-Help Africa Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
Plan Ireland	2016	Appraisal Feedback PLAN Ireland
Plan Ireland	2019	HPP 2019-21 application Plan International Ireland
Plan Ireland	2017	Plan International Ireland Annual Report
Plan Ireland	2018	Plan International Ireland Annual Report
Plan Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland Annual Report
Plan Ireland	2017	Plan International Ireland Budget PG II
Plan Ireland	2018	Plan International Ireland Budget PG II
Plan Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland Budget PG II
Plan Ireland	2020	Plan International Ireland Budget PG II
Plan Ireland	2016	Plan International Ireland PG II HPP Application
Plan Ireland	2019	Plan International Ireland Programme Grant II and HPP Section A-C4 FINAL
Plan Ireland	2018	Plan Ireland HPP Monitoring Visit Report Final sent
Plan Ireland	2018	Plan Ireland Report Monitoring Visit Cameroon
Plan Ireland	2019	Signed ARA
Self Help	2017	Self-Help Africa Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Self Help	2018	Self-Help Africa Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Self Help	2019	Self-Help Africa Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Self Help	2020	Self-Help Africa Partner List 2017 (PG)
Self Help	2017	Self-Help Africa Partner List 2018 (PG)
Self Help	2018	Self-Help Africa Partner List 2019 (PG)
Self Help	2019	Sightsavers Ireland Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
Self Help Africa	2019	Annex I GSHA RBF Master 2019 m
Self Help Africa	2017	Self Help Africa MOU 2017 -2021
Self Help Africa	2019	Self Help Africa MoU modification 2019

Self-Help Africa	2017	Self-Help Africa 2017 Bilateral Note
Self-Help Africa	2019	Self-Help Africa 2019 Bilateral Note
Self-Help Africa	2020	Self-Help Africa 2020 Bilateral Note
Sightsavers	2019	Cameroon RF 2019
Sightsavers	2019	Liberia RF 2019
Sightsavers	2019	Public Engagement RF 2019
Sightsavers	2019	Senegal RF 2019
Sightsavers	2019	Sierra Leone RF 2019
Sightsavers	2017	Sightsavers Ireland 2017 Bilateral Note
Sightsavers	2018	Sightsavers Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note
Sightsavers	2019	Sightsavers Ireland 2019 Bilateral Note
Sightsavers	2020	Sightsavers Ireland 2020 Bilateral Note
Sightsavers Ireland	2020	Revised SSI 2020 Ind Budget
Sightsavers Ireland	2016	Sightsavers Application Form PG II
Sightsavers Ireland	2017	Sightsavers Budget
Sightsavers Ireland	2018	Sightsavers Budget
Sightsavers Ireland	2019	Sightsavers Budget
Sightsavers Ireland	2017	Sightsavers Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Sightsavers Ireland	2018	Sightsavers Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Sightsavers Ireland	2019	Sightsavers Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Sightsavers Ireland	2017	Sightsavers Ireland MoU 2017-2021
Sightsavers Ireland	2019	Sightsavers Ireland MoU modification 2019
Sightsavers Ireland	2020	Sightsavers Ireland Partner List 2017 (PG)
Sightsavers Ireland	2017	Sightsavers Ireland Partner List 2018 (PG)
Sightsavers Ireland	2018	Sightsavers Ireland Partner List 2019 (PG)
Sightsavers Ireland	2020	Sightsavers MV DRAFT Terms of Reference
Sightsavers Ireland	2016	Sightsavers Post Calibration Appraisal Matrix
Sightsavers Ireland	2017	Sightsavers-Annual Report
Sightsavers Ireland	2018	Sightsavers-Annual Report
Sightsavers Ireland	2019	Sightsavers-Annual Report
Sightsavers Ireland	2019	Trócaire Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
Trócaire	2019	Annex 1 Trócaire HPP 19-21 Abbreviated Results Framework FINAL
Trócaire	2019	Annex 1_Results Framework

Trócaire	2016	Trócaire - Application for PGII and HPP
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire - Application for PGII and HPP
Trócaire	2017	Trócaire 2017 Bilateral Note
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire 2019 Bilateral Note
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire Annex 2C - Abbreviated RF for HPP (2 pages A3)
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire ARA - signed by Patrick and Louise
Trócaire	2017	Trócaire Budget HPP
Trócaire	2018	Trócaire Budget PG II
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire Budget PG II
Trócaire	2020	Trócaire Budget PG II
Trócaire	2017	Trócaire Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
Trócaire	2018	Trócaire Flow of Funds 2019 (HPP)
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire Flow of Funds 2020 (HPP)
Trócaire	2020	Trócaire Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire HPP 2019-21 application form FINAL
Trócaire	2017	Trócaire MoU 2017-2021
Trócaire	2020	Trócaire Partner List 2017 (PG)
Trócaire	2017	Trócaire Partner List 2018 (HPP)
Trócaire	2018	Trócaire Partner List 2018 (PG)
Trócaire	2018	Trócaire Partner List 2019 (HPP)
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire Partner List 2019 (PG)
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire Report MV Honduras
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire updated MoU 2019
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire_Partner_List_PGII_2019
Trócaire	2020	Trócaire_PGII_Flow_of_Funds_for_2020
Trócaire	2017	Trócaire-Annual Report
Trócaire	2018	Trócaire-Annual Report
Trócaire	2019	Trócaire-Annual Report
Trócaire	2019	Vita Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
VITA	2017	VITA 2017 Bilateral Note
VITA	2018	VITA 2018 Bilateral Note
VITA	2019	VITA 2019 Bilateral Note

VITA	2020	VITA 2020 Bilateral Note
VITA	2017	VITA Annual Report
VITA	2018	VITA Annual Report
VITA	2019	VITA Annual Report
VITA	2017	VITA Annual Report and Financials Presentation
VITA	2017	VITA Annual Report Appraisal
VITA	2016	VITA Application PG II
VITA	2017	VITA Budget PG II
VITA	2018	VITA Budget PG II
VITA	2019	VITA Budget PG II
VITA	2020	VITA Budget PG II 2020 (Revised)
VITA	2017	Vita Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
VITA	2018	Vita Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
VITA	2019	Vita Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
VITA	2017	Vita MoU 2017-2021
VITA	2019	Vita MoU modification 2019
VITA	2020	Vita Partner List 2017 (PG)
VITA	2017	Vita Partner List 2018 (PG)
VITA	2018	Vita Partner List 2019 (PG)
VITA	2019	VITA Report Monitoring Visit Eritrea 2019.
VITA	2019	World Vision Ireland Flow of Funds 2017 (PG)
World Vision Ireland	2019	20200331_PGII_Irish_Public_Engagement_RF
World Vision Ireland	2019	Annex 1_HPP_2019_Somalia_FINAL
World Vision Ireland	2019	Annex 1_HPP_2019_South Sudan_FINAL
World Vision Ireland	2019	Annex 1_HPP_2019_Sudan_FINAL
World Vision Ireland	2019	Annex 1_HPP_2019_Syria_FINAL
World Vision Ireland	2020	Final signed ARA World Vision Ireland HPP 2020
World Vision Ireland	2019	Irish Public Engagement 2019
World Vision Ireland	2019	PGII Mauritania 2019 RBF_Final
World Vision Ireland	2019	PGII Sierra Leone 2019 RBF_Final
World Vision Ireland	2019	PGII Tanzania 2019 RBF_Final
World Vision Ireland	2019	PGII Uganda 2019 RBF_Final
World Vision Ireland	2017	World Vision Ireland 2017 Bilateral Note

World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note - (1)
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland 2018 Bilateral Note - (2)
World Vision Ireland	2019	World Vision Ireland 2019 Bilateral Note
World Vision Ireland	2020	World Vision Ireland 2020 Bilateral Note
World Vision Ireland	2016	World Vision Ireland Application Form
World Vision Ireland	2017	World Vision Ireland Budget PG II
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland Budget PG II
World Vision Ireland	2019	World Vision Ireland Budget PG II
World Vision Ireland	2020	World Vision Ireland Budget PG II
World Vision Ireland	2017	World Vision Ireland Flow of Funds 2018 (PG)
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (HPP)
World Vision Ireland	2019	World Vision Ireland Flow of Funds 2019 (PG)
World Vision Ireland	2019	World Vision Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (HPP)
World Vision Ireland	2020	World Vision Ireland Flow of Funds 2020 (PG)
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland HPP 2019-2021_Abbreviated RBF_Final 070918
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland HPP Monitoring Visit Report 2018 final
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland Ireland HPP 2019-2021 application form 070918
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland Ireland PGII and HPP Programmes of Work
World Vision Ireland	2017	World Vision Ireland MoU 2017-2021
World Vision Ireland	2020	World Vision Ireland Partner List 2017 (PG)
World Vision Ireland	2017	World Vision Ireland Partner List 2018 (PG & HPP)
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland Partner List 2019 (PG & HPP)
World Vision Ireland	2019	World Vision Ireland updated MoU 2019
World Vision Ireland	2017	World Vision Ireland-Annual Report
World Vision Ireland	2018	World Vision Ireland-Annual Report
World Vision Ireland	2019	World Vision Ireland-Annual Report

Annex 6: Country selection

Region	Country	Irish Embassy	Nexus context	HPP Prog	PGII Prog	CSOs in Country
West Africa	Sierra Leone	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Christian Aid Ireland, Concern, GOAL, Sightsavers, Trócaire, World Vision
	DRC	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Christian Aid Ireland, Concern, Trócaire, Oxfam
East Africa	South Sudan[70]	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Concern, GOAL
	Uganda	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	GOAL, GSHA, Oxfam Ireland, Trócaire, World Vision
	Ethiopia	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	GOAL, Trócaire, Concern
Central Africa	Rwanda[71]	No	No	No	Yes	Concern, Oxfam Ireland, Trócaire
Southern Africa	Malawi	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Concern, GOAL, GSHA, HelpAge, Oxfam Ireland, Trócaire
	Zimbabwe[72]	(Pretoria)	Yes	No	Yes	Christian Aid Ireland, GOAL, Oxfam Ireland, Trócaire
Central America	Haiti	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Concern, GOAL

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[70] Within DFA reporting arrangements, South Sudan is a country of secondary accreditation for the embassy in Addis Ababa.

[71] Within DFA reporting arrangements, Rwanda is a country of secondary accreditation for the embassy in Kampala.

[72] Zimbabwe provides a further comparison where the Embassy is remote (Pretoria, South Africa) but has a primary focus on the Zimbabwe context with respect to humanitarian and development programming

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Annex 7: Ireland's Policy Focus

One World One Future	A Better World		Other policies
Goals	**Leadership Areas**	**Priority areas for action**	
1. Targeting countries that are fragile	1. Protection	Working across the triple nexus, protracted crises, building regional consensus, supporting access to basic services	**Humanitarian Assistance Policy** Linking Ireland's humanitarian and development approaches to prevent, prepare for, support recovery from, and build resilience to, crises
2. Reduced hunger, stronger resilience	2. Food	Ending hunger, sustainable food systems, preventing malnutrition, agricultural markets and private sector engagement, opportunities for women and youth	
3. Providing essential services	3. People	Health, education and social protection, education for girls during emergencies, universal health coverage and mitigating epidemics, democracy and governance, girls' access to education, preparing young people for the future	**Civil Society Policy** Ensuring pro-poor service delivery
	Key strategies and Objectives		
Gender identified against the 6 OWOF leadership areas	**Gender equality**	Integration of gender across policies and interventions; women, peace and security and preventing GBV; women's economic empowerment; education for girls; sexual and reproductive health and rights	**Civil Society Policy - Humanitarian Assistance Policy** Ensuring gender equality across objectives
Reduced hunger and stronger resilience identified against the 6 OWOF leadership areas	**Reducing humanitarian needs**	Sustaining Peace', 'Grand Bargain', humanitarian preparedness and response, integration with foreign policy, regional approaches to conflict and fragility, hunger and nutrition, basic needs and services	**Humanitarian Assistance Policy** Needs-based humanitarian assistance that is predictable and flexible to respond to sudden onset, protracted and forgotten humanitarian crises
4. Climate change and development	**Climate action**	Integrating climate action in development cooperation, supporting climate action interventions – Small Island Developing States, adaptation finance and risk, resilient food systems, Blue Economy, public support	
5. Better governance, human rights and accountability	**Strengthening governance**	Reaching the furthest behind first, protecting the civil society space, strengthening essential institutions, increasing domestic resource mobilisation	**Civil Society Policy** Promoting participation and good governance; Enabling environment for civil society engagement
6. Sustainable development and inclusive economic growth			**Civil Society Policy** Supporting pro-poor economic growth

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Purpose of the PGII and HPP grants

The PGII is focused on long-term development including addressing poverty, inequality and fragility, strengthening the social fabric and engaging the public in Ireland in development issues. The PGII Strategic Framework guides the objectives of the funding mechanism and the Theory of Change underpinning it outlines the intended results in the delivery of effective programmes which contribute to positive and sustainable change for those furthest behind. As well as providing grants for programming in developing countries, PGII also supports the objective of A Better World to collaborate with CSOs on development education and public engagement.

The HPP recognises the complexity of the double/triple nexus and the need to increase the coherence between humanitarian and development funding, especially against the backdrop of protracted crises. HPP supports a nexus approach, addressing acute humanitarian needs whilst considering future development plans, including resilience and sustainability. Its specific objectives also include strengthening the partnership-based nature of DCAD's humanitarian engagement with CSOs and to support partner organisations' capacity for humanitarian response. It also supports the concept of innovative and blended finance and funding mechanisms as set out in A Better World. By aligning the multi-annual funding and programme cycles of PGII and HPP, DFA sought to promote coherence between humanitarian and development funding for CSOs.

Annex 8: Comparator Agencies

	Danida	FINNIDA
Funding	134m EUR in 2019 (includes humanitarian funding)	65m EUR for all CSOs and 12m for Finnish CSOs in 2019 200 Million euros over four years
Funding Mechanisms	• Strategic partnerships • Pooled/delegated funding (development cooperation; public engagement; increasing Danish CSO capacity) • Project grants • Joint Civil Society Funding Mechanisms	• Core Funding • Programme partnership funding (CSO, foundations and associations) • Project support • Development communications and education • National share of EU funding for CSOs.
Open to non-national NGOs	No	12m EUR for Finnish CSOs in 2019
By invitation only?	Open	Open for those that passed the eligibility requirement of 5 years registered in Finland
Intervention logic required	Theory of change and results framework	Theory of Change, Results Chain or other results-based management system
Performance related funding	Results-oriented assessment of applications Prior performance included in Resource Allocation Model (RAM) RAM incentivises appropriate management of risks rather than avoidance Reporting includes information on how Danish CSOs assist the global South and exercise influence on international alliances and policies	Emphasis on Results Based Framework
Co-financing required	Yes 20%	Self-financing 15% of the total programme cost
Required strategic fit	General alignment to Denmark's The World 2030, Policy for Danish support to Civil Society (2014) and 2017 Strategy for development and humanitarian action	Alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals as well as Finland's policy and human rights objectives. Guidelines for Civil Society in Development Policy 2017
Geographic focus	Some geographical alignment required	Encourage synergies with Finland's bilateral programme countries
Thematic focus	Some thematic alignment expected as well as capacity building of local partners, policy and strategic services. Must address SDG priorities	Alignment of the organisation's strategy and activities with at least one focus area and related objectives in the Call for Proposals
Use of standard indicators	No, Use of standardised reporting	No. Have just completed a review with CSO partners
Budget limit	€2-17 m/y for individual Strategic Partners:	Not specified. Largest partner under €10m/y

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Type of partnerships	Aim toward 14 partnerships. All Danish CSO must involve southern based actors that genuinely constitute local civil society.	16 large Finnish CSO programme fund partners. 23 project partners
Management	Do not currently involve embassies, policy and geographical unit but plan to incorporate this in future.	Management oversight in Civil Society Unit. Not
IATI	Will include phasing in of the use of IATI platform	Encourage IATI compliance
Eligibility Criteria	NA	• At least three different nationalities on the Board • Operations in more than two countries • Registered for at least five years • Funding from at least one other source • Commitments in line with Finnish policy and compliance requirements
Capacity Assessment	Capacity Assessment for Strategic Partners: • Administrative, financial and technical capacity • Experience with development and humanitarian cooperation • Compliance with Danish development cooperation strategies and policies • Context analysis of partner countries • Own-financing and popular support base • For humanitarian organisations: ECHO Certification, HAP or equivalent)	Quality of the Proposal inter alia (and in addition to the above), • Outline of reliable and high-quality monitoring and evaluation and reporting systems • Financial stability (e.g. ability to cover its operational expenditure by its fund-raising or other activities) • Adequate financial risk management procedures

Annex 9: Eligibility Criteria

1. **Country of origin:** The applicant organisation must be either Irish-based, or a non-Irish organisation which has received an invitation to apply for funding**.**

2. **Organisational Status**: The applicant must be a non-governmental, non-profit, civil society organisation. It must have legal status and must have received charitable tax exemption from the Irish Office of the Revenue Commissioners, i.e. be the holder of a charity reference (CHY) number for a minimum of five years prior to the date of application. An equivalent exemption is required for non-Irish organisations.

3. **Governance:** Applicants must have a formal decision-making structure (e.g. a board of trustees) which can take legal responsibility for the administration and use of Irish Aid funds. All Irish applicants must have such a structure legally recognised in Ireland.

4. **Accounts:** Applicants must have submitted annual audited accounts comprising at a minimum the Balance Sheet, the Income and Expenditure Statement, and Cash Flow statement for the five most recent financial years for which accounts are available.[73] Applicants must also have submitted the most recent management letter received from the auditors. These accounts must be available on the organisation's website at the date of application to the Irish Aid Programme Grant.

5. **Dependency on Irish Aid:** Income received from Irish Aid, either directly or indirectly,[74] must not exceed 60% of the overall organisational income of the applicant. This should be calculated based on an average of the previous three-year period.[75]

6. **Focus of Work**: The areas of intervention by the agency must meet the OECD DAC definition of Official Development Assistance and take place in a country classified as eligible for assistance. See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/methodology for details.

7. **Record of Compliance:** Applicants, previously in receipt of Irish Aid funds, must have a record of compliance in terms of the administration and use of such funds. Applicants which have a previous record of non-compliance with the terms of an Irish Aid contract(s) may not be considered for funding.

8. **Funding History** with the Civil Society and Development Education Unit: a) Applicants must have at least five consecutive years of managing grants from Irish Aid's Civil Society and Development Education Unit as of 2015; and b) The average annual grant received from the Civil Society and Development Education Unit over the three-year period 2011-2013 must have been a minimum of €170,000.

9. **Organisational Income:** The average annual organisational income over the previous three-year period must have been a minimum of €680,000.

10. **Child Protection:** Applicants must have a child protection policy in place that is in compliance with the *Children First Guidance* launched by the Minister for Children and Youth Affairs in July 2011. An equivalent policy is required for non-Irish organisations.

11. The applicant organisation's strategic framework must be consistent with **Ireland's Policy** for International Development, *One World, One Future* and the associated Framework for Action, as well as Ireland's Foreign Policy, *The Global Island.*

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[73] The organisation's own financial year can be used here.

[74] Funds originating from Irish Aid and channelled through organisations such as Misean Cara, WorldWise Global Schools or other Irish Aid partners must be included in the 60%.

[75] Irish Aid will verify this and all eligibility criteria relating to funding using its own financial information and the information provided in the applicant organisations' audited accounts.